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This dissertation challenges the dominant conception of liberal education today, or the 
“Socratic ideal of liberal education,” which is rooted in the ideal of the examined life and has as 
its core practice the critical examination of the beliefs that shape one’s life and world. This 
practice is thought to enable students to reconstruct their lives with views they have deliberately 
and autonomously chosen and to thereby lead flourishing lives. Moreover, within the Socratic 
ideal, the educator’s job is to unsettle students by provoking them to question and examine their 
beliefs, without offering students guidance about what to believe.  
I argue that the practices of the examined life today, which are embedded in an 
intellectual ethos that valorizes autonomy and a rationalistic and skeptical mode of engaging 
with the world, is insufficient for students’ flourishing and can impede it by disrupting four 
conditions of flourishing — epistemic stability, orientation and purpose, faith in and hope for 
humanity, and a sense of belonging. The Socratic ideal offers inadequate resources for mitigating 
these risks and for helping students reconstruct their beliefs so as to restore these conditions. 
These concerns raise ethical questions for liberal educators and are especially significant for 
today’s “emerging adults,” who scholars argue need more support and guidance due to the 
weakening of traditional norms and social structures in modern society.   
Taking into account these developmental needs, I propose an alternative vision for liberal 
education guided by a conception of flourishing defined as “wholehearted engagement with the 
good.” In this vision, the liberal educator assumes a “pastoral” role, shepherding students 
through the examined life by creating a transitional community that supports students in their 
uncertainty and by offering them substantive guidance based on her own views. This vision also 




inquiry, the purpose of which is to help student form their beliefs and discover possibilities for 
wholehearted engagement with the good. This vision ensures that the examined life serves as an 
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The Examined Life and the Value of Liberal Education 
 
Socrates said that the unexamined life is not worth living for a human being. In other words, this 
life of questioning is not just somewhat useful; it is an indispensable part of a worthwhile life for 
any person and any citizen. 
                                — Martha Nussbaum1 
 
Every college [should] do what every true teacher, at least since Socrates, has asked every student 
to do: engage in some serious self-examination. 
               — Andrew Delbanco2 
 
Socrates’ job needs doing. The conflicting faiths, moral codes, and ideologies of our time badly 
need thoughtful examination. No group is better qualified and in a better position to do this job than 
the … faculties of colleges and universities. If they have not time for the Socratic task, it is idle hope 
that the job will be done well elsewhere. 
                 — Walter Kaufmann3 
 
 
The value and purposes of American undergraduate education have come under intense 
scrutiny in recent years. Amidst rising tuition costs, subsequently rising student debt, and reports 
of graduates struggling in the job market, politicians and the public in general are expressing 
growing discontent with higher education and expressing serious doubt about the value of 
attending college. For example, in the last presidential election cycle, Senator Marco Rubio 
dismissively declared that “we need more welders and less philosophers” and, in 2013, former 
Secretary of Education William Bennett published a book entitled, Is College Worth It?: Former 
United States Secretary of Education and a Liberal Arts Graduate Expose the Broken Promise of 
Higher Education.4 Although a 2017 Gallup poll reported that political conservatives, such as 
                                                 
1 Martha C. Nussbaum, Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 21. 
2 Andrew Delbanco, College: What It Was, Is, and Should Be (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), 25. 
3 Walter Kaufmann, The Future of the Humanities: Teaching Art, Religion, Philosophy, Literature, and History 
(New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1995), 27. 
4 Shoshana Weissmann, “Rubio: ‘We Need More Welders and Less Philosophers,’” The Weekly Standard, 
November 10, 2015, https://www.weeklystandard.com/shoshana-weissmann/rubio-we-need-more-welders-and-less-
philosophers; William Bennett and David Wilezol, Is College Worth It?: Former United States Secretary of 
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Rubio and Bennett, tend to be far more skeptical than liberals about whether or not colleges and 
universities are doing the country and its young people any good due to concerns about liberal 
bias and students being poorly educated, only fifty-six percent of Americans who identify as 
“Democrats and leaners” reported that they have a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in 
higher education, citing concerns about cost, “deteriorating quality,” and graduates not finding 
jobs. Together, only forty-four percent of Americans express this level of confidence.5  
As the views of Rubio and Bennett suggest, liberal education has faced particular 
skepticism in this environment. Higher education institutions are under pressure to offer 
undergraduates an education with immediate, practical value (that is, training for a financially 
stable job or career) and to demonstrate the worth of students’ and their parents’ investments in 
terms of “job placements” and future earnings.6 Given the declining public trust and increasingly 
instrumental discourse on higher education, liberal education advocates are scrambling to find 
ways to effectively communicate and defend its value.7 Though some counter that liberal 
education does teach students skills that employers seek and does offer financial returns in the 
                                                 
Education and a Liberal Arts Graduate Expose the Broken Promise of Higher Education (Nashville: Thomas 
Nelson, 2013). 
5 Frank Newport and Brandon Busteed, “Why Are Republicans Down on Higher Ed ?,” Gallup (Washington, DC, 
August 16, 2017), https://news.gallup.com/poll/216278/why-republicans-down-higher.aspx?version=print. 
6 The criticisms to which I refer here are largely directed toward four-year colleges and universities and primarily 
with a concern for traditionally-aged undergraduates, and these are also my primary focus. While acknowledging 
that there are important differences among the different types of institutions and particularly between four-year and 
two-year colleges and their student populations, it is my contention that the issues I will be addressing with regard to 
liberal education are applicable to traditional undergraduates and nontraditional undergraduates under 30 years of 
age at two-year colleges who are enrolled in liberal arts courses or programs, in virtue of their similar developmental 
stage.  
7 The significance of this issue for liberal arts colleges is evident in the theme of the 2017 Annual Meeting of the 
Association for American Colleges and Universities (AAC&U), the largest and leading national organization 
dedicated to promoting liberal education: “Building Public Trust in the Promise of Liberal Education and Inclusive 
Excellence.” The AAC&U also distributes a weekly e-mail newsletter featuring articles from various media outlets 
making a case for the value of liberal education.  
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long run,8 most argue that it enriches aspects of students’ lives that cannot merely be subsumed 
under immediate, practical concerns.  
In making this argument, many gesture towards one of liberal education’s most revered 
and enduring ideals, that of the examined life. Rooted in Socrates’ famous claim — that the 
unexamined life is not worth living — this ideal and the figure of Socrates himself have been 
invoked by champions of liberal education in the United States since the early twentieth 
century.9 This Socratic ideal of liberal education10 is understood to be at its core the practice of 
critically examining, or of questioning and testing, the fundamental beliefs that shape one’s life 
and world and that guide one’s choices. This kind of questioning and critical thinking are said to 
have existential, ethical, and civic benefits for our students and our society, and it has come to be 
seen as one of the distinguishing features not only of the dominant conception of liberal 
education, but of a truly worthwhile education, and, indeed, a worthwhile life.  
Undergirding the claims about the Socratic ideal of liberal education is the view that, by 
scrutinizing their beliefs, students will be able to reconstruct their lives deliberately with beliefs 
                                                 
8 See, for example, “Fulfilling the American Dream: Liberal Education and the Future of Work” (Washington, DC, 
2018) and Debra Humphreys and Patrick Kelly, “How Liberal Arts and Sciences Majors Fare in Employment: A 
Report on Earnings and Long-Term Career Paths” (Washington, DC, 2014).  
9 Alexander Meiklejohn, The Liberal College (Norwood, MA: Plimpton Press, 1920); Mortimer J. Adler, Manual 
for Discussion Leaders (Ann Arbor, MI: Edwards Brothers, 1946); Kaufmann, The Future of the Humanities: 
Teaching Art, Religion, Philosophy, Literature, and History; Nussbaum, Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense 
of Reform in Liberal Education; Minda Rae Amiran, “Ethics and the Aims of Higher Education,” in A Companion to 
the Philosophy of Education, ed. Randall Curren (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 551–60; Delbanco, 
College: What It Was, Is, and Should Be; William M. Sullivan, Liberal Learning as a Quest for Purpose (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2016). For analyses of the meanings of “Socratic education,” see Jack Schneider, 
“Remembrance of Things Past: A History of the Socratic Method in the United States,” Curriculum Inquiry 43, no. 
5 (2013): 613–40 and Avi I. Mintz, “From Grade School to Law School: Socrates’ Legacy in Education,” in A 
Companion to Socrates, ed. Sara Ahbel-Rappe and Rachana Kamtekar (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 
476–92. 
10 In calling this dominant conception of liberal education the “Socratic ideal,” I do not mean to equate the 
conception, its practices, or all of its philosophical underpinnings with those of Socrates and his interlocutors. In 
fact, it is one of my contentions, for which I will argue in chapter 2, that there are important differences between 
them, which call for a careful consideration of how we engage students in the critical examination of ideas today, 
but the core practice of critically examining one’s beliefs is directly inherited from Socrates. Throughout this 
dissertation, I will refer to the contemporary appropriation of the ideal and practices of the examined life the 
“Socratic ideal of liberal education” or the “Socratic ideal.”  
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they have consciously and autonomously chosen — rather than having acquired them from 
tradition, social convention, local prejudice, or, in the terms of critical theory, oppressive social 
norms. These examined lives are presumably better, more worth living, than the ones with which 
they entered the classroom, as it were. I take Martha Nussbaum’s explanation of what Socrates 
thought was wrong with the unexamined life to encapsulate the views of those educators who see 
themselves as carrying his mantle today: 
Most of the people Socrates encountered were living passive lives, lives in which, 
in the most important things, their actions and choices were dictated by 
conventional beliefs. These beliefs inhabited and shaped them, but they had never 
made them truly their own, because they had never really looked into them, 
asking whether there were other ways of doing things, and which ways were truly 
worthy of guiding them in their personal and political lives. To this extent, they 
had not made their own selves fully their own.11 
 
Put simply, the examined life is about trying to answer for oneself what Socrates considered the 
fundamental ethical question, that of how one should live12 or, as Mark Lilla put it to incoming 
Columbia University freshman, “what it is that’s worth wanting.”13 A liberal education modeled 
on the examined life is meant to offer students the chance to — even requires them to — 
critically reflect on their beliefs so they can determine how best to lead their private and public 
lives. This education provides an opportunity that vocational or professional education, which 
generally focuses on the means to fixed ends, such as how to repair a broken pipe or how to 
stitch a wound, often precludes.14 Moreover, central to the Socratic ideal is a conception of the 
                                                 
11 Nussbaum, Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education, 21. 
12 Plato, “Republic,” in A Plato Reader: Eight Essential Dialogues, ed. C. D. C. Reeve (Indianapolis: Hackett, 
2012), 352d. 
13 Mark Lilla, “The Soldier, The Sage, The Saint and The Citizen,” April 23, 2010, 
https://www.college.columbia.edu/core/lectures/spring2010-0, quoted in Delbanco, College: What It Was, Is, and 
Should Be, 14. 
14 For a critique of this common characterization of vocational education and the commonly accepted opposition 
between vocational and liberal education, see John Dewey, Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the 
Philosophy of Education (New York: Free Press, 1916); Matthew B. Crawford, Shop Class as Soulcraft: An Inqiury 
Into the Value of Work (New York: The Penguin Press, 2009). I agree with Dewey’s and Crawford’s views that 
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liberal educator15 as a Socratic figure who provokes students to question and examine their 
beliefs without telling students what to believe or endorsing any beliefs. Accordingly, Andrew 
Delbanco includes this sober admonishment in his otherwise inspirational defense of liberal 
education: “No college teacher should presume to answer [Lilla’s] question for students, though, 
too often, he or she will try. (Requiring discipleship has always been a hazard of the teaching 
profession.) Instead, the job of the teacher, and of the college, is to help students in the arduous 
work of answering it for themselves.”16 Such an education is said to have intrinsic value for 
students as it is about cultivating themselves as individuals and human beings.  
While the promises of the examined life have been highly celebrated, my interest in this 
project lies in its risks and limitations. Although it is generally assumed for the reasons stated 
above that critical thinking about one’s beliefs will enable students to flourish or to lead a more 
worthwhile life, I argue that the contemporary appropriation of the practices of the examined life, 
which are now embedded in an intellectual ethos that valorizes autonomy and a rationalistic and 
skeptical mode of engaging with the world, is insufficient for and can actually impede students’ 
flourishing. Critical examination of their fundamental beliefs and the world poses often 
overlooked emotional and psychological risks to students, and the Socratic ideal offers 
inadequate resources for mitigating these risks and helping students reconstruct the beliefs that 
will guide their lives.  
More specifically, students who genuinely engage in this Socratic practice can experience 
a profound sense of disorientation, disillusionment, and loss about cherished ideals and social 
                                                 
vocational education can be one in which students reflect on ends, but contemporary professional education does not 
generally share their rich conceptions of vocation or practices and tends to be technical in nature.  
15 Throughout this dissertation, I use the term “liberal educator” to refer to educators who consider themselves to be 
teaching within a liberal arts tradition, not to indicate a political stance. 
16 Delbanco, College: What It Was, Is, and Should Be, 14. 
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attachments that have been formed around the beliefs they question. This emotional and 
psychological upheaval can both affect students’ subjective sense of their flourishing, making 
life feel less worth living, and disrupt certain objective conditions of flourishing. Within the 
Socratic ideal, however, the aim of the liberal educator is precisely to “unsettle” students so they 
will begin to think critically. No attention is given either within this conception of liberal 
education or in the actual professional training of educators to how they can help students cope 
with the instability they experience or restore the conditions of flourishing that have been 
disrupted after they have been unsettled.  
Furthermore, the ideals governing the contemporary ethos of liberal education constrain 
both the liberal educator’s role and the possibilities for the examined life today to provide 
support with regard to these issues. In the name of protecting and developing students’ 
autonomy, the educator refrains from sharing her own views, which might provide some 
substantive guidance to students about what to believe and how to live. The rationalistic nature 
of intellectual inquiry devalues any engagement with subjective experiences in the academic 
realm, which would be necessary for addressing the emotional and psychological disruptions 
they experience and for the process of evaluating ideas that might form one’s beliefs. Finally, its 
skeptical approach can prevent students from affirmatively engaging with ideas as potential 
resources for forming the beliefs that might guide their lives. Overall, the Socratic ideal of liberal 
education relies on a narrow and truncated set of educational aims, conception of educator’s role, 
and mode of intellectual inquiry that together undermine its promise to enable students to lead 
flourishing lives. These risks and limitations raise important ethical questions for liberal 
educators who espouse the ideal and engage in its practices. 
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These concerns take on a particular significance for today’s traditional undergraduates. 
Following the work of psychologist Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, higher education researchers in recent 
years have focused on understanding the experiences and needs of “emerging adults,” those in 
the 18-29 year-old age range, as they explore their identities and values in transitioning to 
adulthood.17 They argue that emerging adult undergraduates need more support in this process 
because the path to adulthood has become much more complex and ambiguous due to the 
delegitimization of traditional sources of morality and the loss of social structures that once 
established and limited the possible social and vocational paths for young people. A number of 
educators and scholars have charged colleges18, including and perhaps especially those offering a 
liberal arts education, with providing inadequate resources and guidance to undergraduates as 
they grapple with questions about what they believe, who they want to become, how they can 
live lives of “meaning and purpose.”19 The failure of higher education in this regard is attributed 
to curricular, pedagogical, and broader cultural and institutional factors, all of which are distinct 
but related and are thought to create a deficient developmental environment for students. 
Educators and scholars, therefore, urge higher education institutions to do a better job of helping 
emerging-adult students address these ethical and existential questions during this pivotal stage 
when they are pressed to make important practical decisions about their futures. Given the 
                                                 
17 Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, Emerging Adults in America: Coming of Age in the 21st Century (Washington, DC: 
American Psychological Association, 2006). 
18 For the sake of simplicity, I will use “college” to refer to that part of a higher education institution that educates 
undergraduates, including within research universities, unless the distinction between college and universities is 
necessary. 
19 Harry Lewis, Excellence Without a Soul: Does Liberal Education Have a Future? (New York: Public Affairs, 
2006); Anthony Kronman, Education’s End: Why Colleges and Universities Have Given Up on the Meaning of Life 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007); Robert J. Nash and Michele C. Murray, Helping College Students Find 
Purpose: The Campus Guide to Meaning-Making (San Franisco: Jossey-Bass, 2010); Sharon Daloz Parks, Big 
Questions, Worthy Dreams: Mentoring Emerging Adults in Their Search for Meaning, Purpose, and Faith, Revised 
(San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2011); Richard Arum and Josipa Roksa, Academically Adrift: Limited Learning on 
College Campuses (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011); Tim Clydesdale, The Purposeful Graduate: Why 
Colleges Must Talk to Students about Vocation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015); Sullivan, Liberal 
Learning as a Quest for Purpose. 
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developmental needs of emerging adult undergraduates, what can liberal educators do to ensure 
that their practices are truly serving students well?  
This constellation of the educational, philosophical, and developmental issues delineated 
above has not been explored in a comprehensive way, either in the literature on liberal education 
or higher education in general. The Socratic ideal of liberal education has largely gone 
unquestioned. Some scholars have recognized that critical thinking can have a disruptive effect, 
but, to my knowledge, only a few explore the ethical implications for our educational aims and 
practices.20 There have been numerous critiques of the Enlightenment ideals of autonomy and 
rationality apart from educational questions in philosophy. Philosophers of education have also 
challenged these ideals, but most focus on the flawed philosophical underpinnings of these ideals 
and their implications specifically for moral development, rather than their implications for 
broader developmental concerns or for educational practice.21 Finally, only recently have a few 
scholars considered liberal education from a developmental perspective, as there has come to be 
greater recognition that traditional undergraduates, while no longer children, are not quite yet 
adults who are ready to make fully independent choices about their lives, but these scholars do 
not consider the issues from a philosophical perspective.22  
                                                 
20 Sharon Todd, Learning from the Other: Levinas, Psychoanalysis, and Ethical Possibilities in Education (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 2003); Megan Boler, “Teaching for Hope: The Ethics of Shattering World 
Views,” in Teaching, Learning, and Loving: Reclaiming Passion in Educational Practice, ed. Daniel Liston and Jim 
Garrison (New York: RoutledgeFalmer, 2004), 117–36; Douglas W. Yacek, “Transformative Education: A 
Philosophical Inquiry” (PhD diss, The Ohio State University, 2017), 
http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1500072204487494. 
21 Elmer John Thiessen’s philosophical and developmentally informed critique of liberal education most closely 
aligns with my project, but he focuses only on children. He argues that the ideals of autonomy and critical rationality 
that are central to liberal education are developmentally inappropriate for children who need to be socialized 
(indoctrinated) into a stable set of values before they are encouraged to critically examine them. Teaching for 
Commitment (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1993).  
22 Parks, Big Questions, Worthy Dreams: Mentoring Emerging Adults in Their Search for Meaning, Purpose, and 
Faith; Delbanco, College: What It Was, Is, and Should Be; Sullivan, Liberal Learning as a Quest for Purpose. 
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One of the central aims of this dissertation is to examine the examined life as an ideal for 
liberal education, particularly as it has been conceived and put into practice in contemporary 
American higher education. I seek to offer a comprehensive analysis of its risks and limitations, 
both drawing on and synthesizing the current relevant scholarship and offering my own 
conceptual framework for understanding them in order to consider whether or not it is an 
education that is truly worthwhile for today’s undergraduates. This project, however, is more 
than a critique of liberal education. Positively conceived, it proposes aims and practices that 
would make an education in the examined life worthwhile for students and a conception of what 
it means to be a responsible liberal educator in light of its risks and limitations. In other words, I 
offer a vision for liberal education that retains the practice of self-examination for the purpose 
of considering how to live a worthwhile life but that is grounded in students’ need for support 
and more substantive guidance so that our practices do enable them to flourish.  
Of course, what it means to flourish is perhaps the most fundamental human question, a 
comprehensive exploration of which is beyond the scope of this dissertation. One of my tasks 
will be to offer an account of what I consider important and relevant aspects of flourishing that 
are affected by the practices of Socratic ideal of liberal education and to which higher education 
can reasonably contribute. To explain, although I believe flourishing entails having one’s basic 
physical needs met, such as having enough food to eat, I am not concerned with this aspect of 
flourishing in this project, as it is not one of the central purposes of higher education to meet this 
need.23 In offering an account of certain flourishing by which to understand the risks of the 
                                                 
23 There are instances, however, when higher education institutions are right to be concerned about and in some 
instances even provide for this need, such as when there are students who lack the financial resources to purchase 
adequate food and when a meal plan is included in the student housing arrangements provided by the institution. On 
the former issue, see Ashley A. Smith, “GAO Report Reviews Studies on Student Hunger,” Inside, January 10, 
2019, https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/01/10/gao-report-reviews-studies-student-hunger#. 
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Socratic ideal, I am also proposing an alternative to the dominant aims of rationality and 
autonomy, which will enable us to reconceptualize the examined life and that should guide the 
practices of the liberal educator.  
I believe that a liberal education that engages students in critical thinking and that the 
liberal educator herself can offer resources for flourishing in ways that are difficult to encounter 
outside of higher education today and that are only partially captured by and often thwarted by 
the Socratic ideal. Thus, of central importance in my vision for liberal education is a revised 
conception of the liberal educator that goes beyond provoking students to critically examine their 
beliefs to encompass mitigating the risks and helping students form their beliefs in order to more 
adequately support students’ flourishing. There is relatively little scholarship on the roles and 
responsibilities of professors qua educator of undergraduates, especially philosophical treatments 
of the topic, compared to the scholarship on teaching and the teacher-student relationship in K-
12 education. Most of the literature on the roles and responsibilities of professors focuses on the 
instructional methods (with no connection to broader and more fundamental aims related to 
flourishing), minimal obligations as instructors, or potential ethical violations of the appropriate 
boundaries of the teacher-student relationship.  
Overall, this dissertation attempts to “think what we are doing”24 when we pursue the 
Socratic ideal in our educational practice and ultimately to reconceptualize the ideal and the 
particular role liberal educators should play in making the examined life worth living. Broadly 
speaking, the questions driving my inquiry are as follows: How is the Socratic ideal of liberal 
education understood and practiced in higher education today? Does this kind of education 
promote students’ flourishing as emerging adults? In what ways can and should an education in 
                                                 
24 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 5. 
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the examined life promote their flourishing? What does it require of us as educators to ensure 
that it does?  
My approach to these questions will be philosophically oriented, developmentally 
informed, “phenomenologically sensitive,”25 and pedagogically practical. It is philosophically 
oriented in that it investigates the underlying concepts and ideals that shape our educational aims 
and practices and makes a philosophical case for alternative aims and practices. It is 
developmentally informed in that it draws on psychological theories and student development 
research to frame the problem in terms of emerging adults’ developmental needs and to provide 
empirical support for the specific issues I identify. This project has been particularly influenced 
by William G. Perry’s seminal work, The Forms of Intellectual and Ethical Development in the 
College Years: A Scheme, which brought the central problem and overall direction of this project 
into focus for me and provided rich material for understanding and describing students’ 
experiences.26 My view of the needs of emerging adults also owes much to the work of Sharon 
Daloz Parks, who builds on the work of Perry and provides a simple yet compelling framework 
for thinking about how to support the development of emerging adults through an education that 
takes them from “big questions” to “worthy dreams.”27 I do not claim, however, to be offering 
any sort of developmental theory of how students’ intellectual, ethical, or cognitive development 
does or should progress over time, beyond asserting what I take to be an uncontroversial view 
that it is not good for emerging adults (or anyone) to remain in a highly unsettled emotional or 
psychological state for an extended period of time without support and that human beings require 
                                                 
25 I borrow this phrase from Douglas Yacek. “Transformative Education: A Philosophical Inquiry,” 20. 
26 William G. Perry, Jr., Forms of Intellectual and Ethical Development in the College Years: A Scheme (San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1998). 
27 Parks, Big Questions, Worthy Dreams: Mentoring Emerging Adults in Their Search for Meaning, Purpose, and 
Faith. 
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a certain level of stability in order to flourish. My approach is phenomenologically sensitive in 
that I am interested in how students experience their engagement in the practices of the Socratic 
ideal of liberal education. I look to philosophical and literary sources as well as formal 
qualitative research, such as Perry’s study, and anecdotes to portray these experiences. Finally, it 
is pedagogically practical in that it offers recommendations for classroom practice, based on 
examples gleaned from the writings of other educators and my own teaching experience as well 
as on my philosophical arguments. 
Before outlining how the argument will proceed, a few caveats are in order. What follows 
will necessarily involve some generalizations and simplifications. For the purposes of this 
project, I consider liberal education in our contemporary context to encompass undergraduate 
education that has as its primary aim the cultivation of students’ critical thinking and broader 
intellectual capacities in contrast to a strictly technical vocational education. Given this 
definition and my concern with ethical issues that pertain specifically to engaging students in 
critically examining their beliefs, I am including critical pedagogy, or social justice education, 
within the domain of liberal education, though they can be distinguished in important ways, and 
have been opposed to each other by critical pedagogy scholars.28 I will also be characterizing 
higher education, colleges, and the undergraduate experience today according to dominant ideas 
and practices and large-scale trends, but, of course, every institution — depending on type (for 
example, research university, four-year college, liberal arts college, public, private, religious, 
minority-serving), size, and demographics — has its own unique culture and offers a unique 
educational experience. Still, these ideas, practices, and trends have exerted a common influence 
                                                 
28 For example, social justice education scholars have criticized or opposed themselves to liberal education in virtue 
of its tendency to emphasize “Great Books” or the Western canon and its inattention to the voices of marginalized 
groups. See, for example, Darryl J. Gless and Barbara Hernstein Smith, eds., The Politics of Liberal Education 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1992). 
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on modern academic culture and the academic experiences of undergraduates, as evidenced by 
the frequent critiques of them in the literature in philosophy, philosophy of education, higher 
education scholarship, and student development research from which I draw. Finally, in 
discussing the roles of professors or faculty, my interest is in the nature of the roles and 
responsibilities of anyone who teaches undergraduates, regardless of rank or status, and applies 
to graduate students as well. 
Chapter Overviews 
 In Chapter 2, I lay out in more detail what I understand the Socratic ideal of liberal 
education to be and place its aims and practices in developmental perspective by considering 
how they interact with the overall approach to student development issues in higher education 
institutions and with the experiences of emerging adults. Juxtaposing it with the conception of 
the examined life in Socrates’ time, I characterize the Socratic ideal of liberal education in terms 
of its aims, conception of the liberal educator’s role, and its mode of engagement, all of which 
are governed by the Enlightenment ideals of autonomy and rationality. These various aspects 
constitute a “critical ethos” that pervades higher education and can become a pervasive way of 
life for educators and students. Overall, the examined life today seeks to develop students into 
autonomous and rational thinkers who rely on their own authority to determine their beliefs and 
encourages a skeptical and rationalistic mode of engaging with the world as a way to protect 
themselves from external and irrational influences.  
 Having identified the defining features of the Socratic ideal, I describe the division of 
labor in contemporary American higher education between students’ intellectual development 
and all other aspects of their development, showing that nonintellectual developmental concerns 
and the responsibility of guiding students are considered to fall outside the purview of 
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professors. Finally, I explore the intersection of the needs of emerging adults, the practices of the 
critical ethos of the Socratic ideal, and the institutional context in which students develop to 
argue that, together, these create a deficient developmental environment for emerging adult 
undergraduates. 
 In Chapter 3, I focus on the specific risks to students’ flourishing posed by their 
engagement in the critical examination of their beliefs and the world. To provide a framework 
for identifying these risks and to offer an alternative ideal of flourishing towards which liberal 
education should aim, I propose a conception of flourishing that is primarily defined by 
“wholehearted engagement with the good.” Based on the work of philosophers and psychologists 
who have theorized the existential dimensions of our lives, “wholehearted engagement with the 
good” characterizes both the subjective and objective aspect of what it means to flourish or live a 
worthwhile life. Subjectively, the individual feels she is living a worthwhile life because she is 
purposefully involved in pursuits and relationships that she genuinely experiences and deems to 
be good and through which she experiences herself to be in harmony with herself and the world. 
Objectively, the individual is involved in pursuits that are in fact good and good for her 
flourishing. I then explore the fundamental role that beliefs play in our flourishing, arguing that 
they provide a sense of existential security and inform our view of the reality in which we live, 
such that to detach from and question them is destabilizing and can be demoralizing, depending 
on the substance of those beliefs. Finally, I elaborate on four specific risks critical thinking poses 
to students’ flourishing: (1) loss of epistemic stability; (2) loss of orientation, purpose, and hope 
for one’s future; (3) loss of faith in the world and hope for the human condition; (4) loss of 
belonging. 
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 In Chapter 4, I propose the first of two correctives to the Socratic ideal of liberal 
education, focusing on the relational aspect of the liberal educator’s role in students’ 
development, proposing a “pastoral” conception of the liberal educator as an alternative to the 
ideal of the Socratic educator who unsettles students. The pastoral professor aims beyond 
unsettling students in order to develop their autonomy and critical thinking skills to shepherding 
them through the examined life toward flourishing, or wholehearted engagement with the good. 
Towards this end, the educator (1) works to create a transitional intellectual and existential 
community that supports students in their vulnerability and distress and (2) offers potentially 
viable ways for them to reconstruct their beliefs and (re)engage with the world. I address the 
potential objection that educators should not act as and are not qualified to be students’ therapists 
and therefore should not provide emotional support. I argue that, on the one hand, providing 
educational support should not be equated with therapy, but, on the other, education and therapy 
overlap in significant ways in terms of how they help people grow, so we should not create a 
rigid distinction between the two that precludes providing emotional support for existential 
concerns. Moreover, the emotional and psychological disruptions students can experience are a 
result of the liberal educator’s practice, and, therefore, not addressing them in some way is 
professionally irresponsible. I also address the concern that, in sharing her own views, the liberal 
educator will threaten students’ autonomy, and make the case that, on the contrary, the 
educator’s personal viewpoints and experiences serve as resources for helping students become 
thoughtful and independent thinkers about their beliefs and how they will live. 
 In Chapter 5, I turn to our modes of engagement in liberal education and how they can 
support students’ flourishing by helping students reconstruct their beliefs and open them up to 
possibilities for engaging with the good. I argue that the critical mode of engagement, which 
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embodies a skeptical attitude, requires disengagement from our emotions, desires, and 
commitments, and restricts inquiry to a set of critical questions, is too narrow for achieving these 
aims. A skeptical attitude can prevent students from viewing the objects of inquiry as potential 
resources for forming their beliefs. A disengaged, rationalistic approach removes internal 
resources that are necessary for the evaluative process and for discovering potential goods. 
Furthermore, critical questions limit what students perceive in the objects of inquiry and 
therefore what they perceive about the world. We must, therefore, broaden our modes of 
intellectual inquiry, taking a more holistic and affirmative approach. Inquiry for flourishing is 
holistic in that it engages the subjective aspects of students’ experience and in the types of 
questions that drive inquiry, including existential questions that invite students to apply what 
they have learned about the objects of inquiry to various dimensions of their lives. Inquiry for 
flourishing is also fundamentally affirmative in that it views the objects of inquiry as potentially 
valuable resources for shaping one’s life.  
 Finally, in Chapter 6, I revisit the question of the value of liberal education and discuss 
how my vision offers a way to ensure that liberal education is a worthwhile education for all 
undergraduates, not just for those who experience the disruptions of the examined life. I argue 
that we make our most compelling case for the value of liberal education by making it a 
worthwhile experience, one that students experience as valuable for their pursuit of a worthwhile 









The Examined Life Today and Emerging Adults 
 
 
Educational mores have not kept up with this century’s changes in the nature of knowledge or with 
the demands the new relativism places upon the learner. 
      — William G. Perry, Jr.29  
 
What kind of environment best serves the tasks of young, emerging adulthood? 
      — Sharon Daloz Parks30 
 
 
In his history of liberal education, Bruce Kimball argues that what we call “liberal 
education” today actually stems from two competing educational traditions in Ancient Greece, 
that of the orators, following Isocrates, and that of the philosophers, following Socrates (via 
Plato). Both aimed to cultivate virtue in their pupils to prepare them for civic leadership, but the 
oratorical tradition emphasized respect for the cultural narratives that portrayed the desired 
virtues and was dogmatic and prescriptive in its teaching. The Socratic, or philosophical, 
tradition emphasized the search for, rather than the transmission of, truth, and this endeavor was 
carried out through the intellectual, speculative work of dialectic, a dialogical process in which 
the interlocutors would go back and forth, questioning, analyzing, and logically testing opposing 
propositions about various virtues to refine and eliminate errors in their thinking. Importantly, 
Socrates’ questions were not inhibited by the strictures of tradition or convention, and dialectic 
was considered “an endeavor that liberates the mind from the chains of its shadowy cave of 
ignorance.”31 In the end, the Socratic tradition came to dominate. Thus, in the minds of most 
contemporary educators, liberal education connotes a “liberating” education, one that frees 
                                                 
29 Perry, Forms of Intellectual and Ethical Development in the College Years: A Scheme, 239. 
30 Parks, Big Questions, Worthy Dreams: Mentoring Emerging Adults in Their Search for Meaning, Purpose, and 
Faith, 8. 
31 Bruce Kimball, Orators and Philosophers: A History of the Idea of Liberal Education (New York: College 
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students’ minds from unquestioning adherence to tradition and authority and enables them to 
“think for themselves.”32  
While “Socratic education” has generally come to mean “teaching through questions,” as 
opposed to lecturing,33 it is Socrates’ insistence on critically examining the fundamental ethical 
beliefs of his time, and his insistence that others do the same, that has become an educational 
dictum for modern liberal education. To critically examine one’s beliefs means, as suggested 
above, to scrutinize their validity by seeking and evaluating the reasons given to justify them, 
rather than simply following the dictates of authority, tradition, and social convention. This 
practice is at the core of the examined life. Today, it is often referred to as “critical thinking” and 
is considered by most educators to be the primary (intellectual) aim of not only liberal education 
but of formal education in general, and especially higher education. As a case in point, one critic 
of higher education states under a section entitled “The Educational Mission,” “Most higher 
education experts agree that its central objective should be to develop capabilities of critical 
thinking.”34 Providing further evidence of the pervasiveness of this view, developing students’ 
“ability to think critically” is the one aim that nearly all teachers of undergraduates (99.1%) — 
across different types of institutions and disciplines — agree is “essential” or “very important.”35 
In addition, critical thinking has also come to be applied more broadly than to just one’s ethical 
beliefs. Within the literature on critical thinking, Nicholas Burbules and Rupert Berk write, “the 
                                                 
32 Ibid., 159. 
33 Mintz, “From Grade School to Law School: Socrates’ Legacy in Education,” 479. 
34 Deborah L. Rhode, In Pursuit of Knowledge: Scholars, Status, and Academic Culture (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2006), 64. 
35 Kevin Eagan et al., “Undergraduate Teaching Faculty: The 2013-2014 HERI Faculty Survey” (Los Angeles, 
2014). 
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critical person is something like a critical consumer of information … driven to seek reasons and 
evidence” for the facts and ideas they encounter before accepting them as true.36 
Outside of philosophical discussions of education, educators typically refer to critical 
thinking as a skill to be developed, and there is little discussion of the underlying aims and 
beliefs that have given it such prominence in education today. Chris Higgins has helpfully 
illuminated how all educational practices (and theories) imply claims about human nature and 
our condition, what it means for humans to flourish — that is, to live the good life or a 
worthwhile life — and how best to facilitate flourishing.37 In carrying out our educational 
practices, we often take these claims for granted. For Socrates as well as for contemporary liberal 
educators, the practice of critically examining beliefs is embedded in more fundamental ideals 
and conceptions of flourishing and in a particular intellectual and cultural ethos. This ethos 
motivates the practice, and its norms of intellectual inquiry amount to a particular way or mode 
of relating to the world. In other words, the examined life can be understood not just as a type of 
education defined by the skills it seeks to develop and its pedagogy, but also, as the phrase 
implies, a way of life, as Pierre Hadot has reminded us.38 
Although contemporary proponents of the Socratic ideal of liberal education consider 
themselves direct heirs of the ancient Socratic tradition and although there is a clear lineage 
connecting the two, there are also significant differences in the ethos that governs the practices of 
the examined life today as well as in the contemporary institutional and cultural context in which 
they are practiced. The ethos of the Socratic ideal, in conjunction with this context, create 
                                                 
36 Nicholas C. Burbules and Rupert Berk, “Critical Thinking and Critical Pedagogy: Relations, Differences, and 
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37 Chris Higgins, The Good Life of Teaching: An Ethics of Professional Practice (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 
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38 Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault, ed. Arnold I. Davidon, 
trans. Michael Chase (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 1995). 
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conditions that I believe magnify some of the risks inherent to the examined life, which I discuss 
in the following chapter.  
In this chapter, I elaborate on what I call the “critical ethos” of the Socratic ideal of 
liberal education, characterizing it in terms of its particular aims and underlying beliefs, its 
conception of the liberal educator and its related pedagogical practices, and its mode of 
engagement with the world in terms of its norms of intellectual inquiry. I will then discuss how 
this ethos is embodied in and interacts with current institutional practices with regard to student 
development in American higher education. Finally, I consider how the critical ethos and 
institutional context of the examined life today intersect with the developmental needs of 
emerging adults.  
2.1 The Critical Ethos and Practices of the Examined Life  
I begin with a brief sketch of the ethos of the examined life in Socrates’ time (as 
understood through Plato’s writings) then describe the critical ethos of the Socratic ideal, 
identifying corresponding differences and placing them in their historical and philosophical 
context. The purpose of the comparison is to make salient key aspects of the examined life as 
conceived and practiced in higher education today and to show that it has become a narrow and 
truncated educational ideal. Since my interest is in the contemporary appropriation of the 
examined life in liberal education, I will not be exploring and engaging with the vast scholarship 
on the dialogues and the figure of Socrates. 
For Plato, the aim of the examined life was to discover what true virtue was and to 
thereby become a virtuous citizen by living in accordance with the truth. This search was 
metaphysically undergirded by a belief in an inherently meaningful and eternal cosmic order, of 
which human existence was a part and which manifested the ultimate Good. Knowledge of this 
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ultimate Good, he believed, would lead to virtue, or a virtuous life, which was the essence of 
flourishing. To flourish, one must try to attain knowledge of the Good and orient one’s soul 
toward it. Furthermore, it was through reason, and specifically dialectic, that one could gain this 
knowledge.39 Reason and virtue were intimately connected: reason was understood precisely as 
the capacity to perceive the natural order, a view Charles Taylor calls a “substantive conception 
of reason,” 40 and rationality was judged according to the accuracy of one’s conclusion, namely 
whether or not one had a “a vision of the true order,” which would make one virtuous.41 Socrates 
engaged his interlocutors in critically examining their beliefs about virtue in the hope that they 
too would come to see the truth and become virtuous citizens. Thus, in his defense at his trial, he 
says, “I do nothing except going around trying to persuade you … not to care about your bodies 
or your money as intensely as about how your soul may be in the best possible condition,”42 and, 
in the Allegory of the Cave, he characterizes education as a “turning of the soul” towards the 
ultimate reality outside the cave.43  
Much has been written about the multiple intriguing facets of Socrates’ teaching method, 
though he denied being a teacher at all.44 For my purposes, I will bring attention to just two. His 
main pedagogical influence is his reliance on questioning his interlocutors’ assumptions and 
views to reveal the errors in their thinking and to do so without offering his own conclusions on 
                                                 
39 Kimball, Orators and Philosophers: A History of the Idea of Liberal Education; Charles Taylor, Sources of the 
Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989). 
40 Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity, 121. 
41 Ibid., 120–24. 
42 Plato, “Apology,” in A Plato Reader: Eight Essential Dialogues, ed. C. D. C. Reeve (Indianapolis: Hackett, 
2012), 30b. 
43 Plato, “Republic,” in A Plato Reader: Eight Essential Dialogues, ed. C. D. C. Reeve (Indianapolis: Hackett, 
2012), 518c. 
44 Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault; Alexander Nehamas, The Art 
of Living: Socrating Reflections from Plato to Foucault (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); Gregory 
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the matter at hand.45 He conceived of himself as a “gadfly” whose purpose was to provoke others 
to question and examine their beliefs, and he denied being a teacher because he did not impart 
any knowledge or wisdom. The climactic moment in his dialogues was the moment of aporia, a 
state of utter confusion on the part of an unwitting young man, who is no longer confident in the 
views of which he had once been so certain. The purpose of inducing this state was to free the 
young man from the grip of preconceived ideas based on convention or authority so he could 
think through the matter himself. In addition, Socrates developed a relationship with his 
interlocutors that would raise eyebrows today to say the least, if not provoke moral outrage. 
Shaped by their cosmology and following the norms of Ancient Greek culture, their teacher-
student (or master-disciple) relationship was bound by an erotic love, which was seen as an 
“educative love.”46 Socrates would seduce the young men, and their love for him would produce 
a longing for knowledge of the Good and Beautiful that they lacked, towards which Socrates 
pointed them. In other words, their search for truth was not only grounded in a belief in an 
ultimate good but was motivated by a love for it via their love for Socrates.47  
It is significant for what follows to note that those who sought to emulate Socrates under 
the tutelage of Plato understood themselves to be adopting a whole new way of life defined the 
figure of Socrates and by particular beliefs and practices, much like joining a religious 
community. Describing education in the Hellenistic schools of thought of that time, Hadot 
writes, “In this period, to philosophize is to choose a school, convert to its way of life, and accept 
                                                 
45 Mintz, “From Grade School to Law School: Socrates’ Legacy in Education.” 
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its dogmas.”48 While students in Plato’s academy questioned the nature of certain virtues, for 
instance, they would not have questioned that there was an ultimate and divine Good that ordered 
the world or the very value of dialectic itself. The founder of each school was also seen as “the 
rational depiction of the state of perfection.” Hadot explains, “[the founder’s] transcendent norm 
established by reason, each school … express[es] its own vision of the world, its own style of 
life, and its idea of the perfect man. This is why in every school the description of this 
transcendent norm ultimately coincides with the rational idea of God.”49 
It is not be difficult to see that, today, the examined life and academic inquiry in general 
occur within an ethos constituted by significantly different philosophical and cultural views, 
even if the pedagogy, as I have suggested and will further discuss, is similar. Since the latter half 
of the nineteenth century, American higher education and liberal education in particular have 
been profoundly shaped by Enlightenment thought. Although its influential philosophers, such as 
Immanuel Kant and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, were inspired by Socrates’ “never-ending search for 
truth” and “habit of criticism” — hence Socrates’ influence on liberal education — the 
Enlightenment also gave birth to ideas that have served to erode key aspects of the ethos in 
which higher learning would be pursued beginning in the latter half of the nineteenth century.50  
Initially established to cultivate Christian character in young men, American colleges are 
now largely secular and pluralistic, reflecting the transformation of modern Western, industrial 
societies. Enlightenment thought was hostile to religious dogma (if not religion itself), tradition, 
and authority, and instead championed human reason and individual autonomy in determining 
truth, moral standards, and the trajectory of one’s life. It also fueled the rise of experimental 
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scientific research, as it advocated open-ended inquiry, such that “any conclusions … are always 
subject to challenge and criticism.”51 Submission to authority and tradition gave way to the 
imperatives of skepticism and the assertion of the individual conscience.  
In the wake of Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment thought, religion and metaphysical 
notions, such as an inherently meaningful cosmos, a transcendent ideal of the good, moral 
absolutes, and grand narratives defining the purpose(s) of human existence, have lost legitimacy 
in the modern academy and dominance in the contemporary Western outlook.52 Flourishing and 
reason, therefore, are no longer connected to one’s grasp of the cosmic order. Although reason 
has retained its central importance in flourishing, a “procedural” notion of reason and rationality 
has taken hold.53 Enlightenment thought conceived of rationality as a process of thinking, which, 
if properly executed, would lead to the discovery of truth. We see this conception of rationality 
expressed in the conception of critical thinking offered by philosopher of education John 
McPeck: “What makes some bit of thinking critical is a function not of the result but of the way 
in which a particular result is pursued. Just as rationality is not a function of what is believed but 
of the way in which a belief is arrived at, so too with critical thinking. The precise result of a 
given assessment of statements is quite beside the point.”54  
In order to properly evaluate ideas and information, one must be impartial and objective, 
detached from and therefore unhindered by emotion, personal motives, prejudice, and embodied, 
                                                 
51 Ibid., 121. 
52 Julie A. Reuben, The Making of the Modern University: Intellectual Transformation and the Marginalization of 
Morality (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996); René Vincente Arcilla, For the Love of Perfection: 
Richard Rorty and Liberal Education (New York: Routledge, 2009); Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the 
Modern Identity. Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2007).  
53 Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity, 156. For the characterization of the Enlightenment 
conceptions of reason and autonomy that follow, I draw on Taylor’s work, especially chapters 8 and 9 of Sources of 
the Self, because he richly articulates what these mean in modern Western culture as epistemological and ethical 
ideals and as a lived mentality and outlook. 
54 John E. McPeck, Critical Thinking and Education (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1981), 44. 
 25 
sensory experience. This ideal of “disengaged reason” is ultimately motivated by the ideal of 
autonomy and an ethic of “self-responsibility,”55 whereby the aim is to achieve “rational control” 
over oneself56: we must “wrest the control of our thinking and outlook away from passion or 
custom or authority and assume responsibility for it ourselves.”57 In so doing, we turn ideas, the 
world we experience, and ourselves into objects (objectify them) to examine and mentally 
manipulate them from a neutral point of view.58 The achievement of rational control, total 
intellectual freedom, and self-responsibility became central to fulfilling our humanity and the 
definition of agency:  
The ideal of disengagement defines a certain — typically modern — notion of 
freedom, as the ability to act on one’s own, without outside interference or 
subordination to outside authority. It defines its own peculiar notion of human 
dignity closely related to freedom…. The liberation through objectification … has 
become for many the model of the agent’s relation to the world, and hence sets 
the very definition of what it is to be an agent.59 
 
Although the possibility of being completely objective or of being able adopt a “view from 
nowhere” is no longer deemed possible or desirable,60 a detached stance towards our beliefs and 
other objects of examination, sometimes called “critical distance” or “critical detachment,” is 
still considered necessary for more impartial reasoning and for achieving self-responsibility.61 
This view of rationality is dominant in all disciplines in the modern academy, such that it is the 
standard for “rigorous” analysis and inquiry in both scientific research (including the social 
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sciences) and humanistic scholarship, though these standards have been challenged in both 
domains by philosophers as well as feminist theorists.62 
Autonomy, however, means more than being in control of one’s thinking, as Taylor 
suggests. Wresting control of one’s thinking and freeing it from external influences enables us to 
be in control of what we do, how we live, and even “allows us the possibility to remake 
ourselves in a more rational and advantageous fashion.”63 Autonomy is generally understood to 
be the ability to choose and pursue one’s own conception of the good, but I find Meira 
Levinson’s definition particularly relevant for my purposes, if less succinct. She defines it as “the 
capacity to form a conception of the good, to evaluate one’s values and ends with the genuine 
possibility of revising them should they be found wanting, and then to realize one’s revised 
ends.”64 Forming a conception of the good implies a cognitive or intellectual process by which a 
conception of the good is developed, as opposed to merely evaluating and choosing among 
already available options.  
In Western liberal societies today, the capacity to form one’s own conception of the good 
— or in the terms I have been using, to form one’s own beliefs about the good that will guide 
one’s life — and the opportunity to act accordingly are considered essential for and constitutive 
of a worthwhile life, or flourishing. As Christopher Winch writes, 
It is almost a commonplace assumption of post-Enlightenment ethics and political 
theory that individual autonomy is a necessary condition of human fulfillment and 
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moral integrity. This assumption has now come to be largely taken for granted 
within the political and moral context of Western market-oriented societies of the 
early twenty-first century. It does not follow, of course, that the only kind of 
worthwhile life is an autonomous one…[but] the particular metaphysical and 
psychological assumptions underpinning [Enlightenment] accounts of autonomy, 
namely the general theme of the self-determination of ends, has come to dominate 
not just philosophical discussion but also educational thinking and individuals’ 
views about the nature and trajectory of their own lives.65  
 
Harry Brighouse’s view of flourishing helps to explain why autonomy would be assumed to be 
necessary for a worthwhile life characterized by fulfillment and moral integrity: “For somebody 
actually to flourish, they have to identify with the life they are leading. They have to live it from 
the inside out, as it were. They must, at the very least, not experience their way of life as being at 
odds with their most fundamental experienced interests and desires.”66 In other words, their way 
of life must align with the interests and desires they experience as their own, not what someone 
else considers their fundamental interests and desires. To be able to identify with one’s life, he 
goes on to argue, depends partly on “think[ing] critically about alternatives”67 and “evaluating 
different ways of life,”68 especially for those whose parents are very prescriptive about the lives 
they lead. The importance Brighouse places on identifying with one’s life reflects what Taylor 
calls the “moral ideal of authenticity,”69 which we could see as the subjective aspect of 
autonomy. It is the touted ideal of “being true to oneself,” and it is a moral ideal, Taylor argues, 
because “people are called upon to be true to themselves and to seek their own self-
fulfillment.”70 We hear this call throughout our culture in any number of movies, advertisements, 
and commencement speeches in which the message is that happiness and success are won by 
                                                 
65 Christopher Winch, Education, Autonomy, and Critical Thinking (London: Routledge, 2006), 2. 
66 Harry Brighouse, On Education (London: Routledge, 2006), 16.  
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid., 17. Levinson holds the same view. The Demands of Liberal Education, 58. 
69 Charles Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 21. 
70 Ibid., 14. 
 28 
asserting who one is, and following one’s passions. In the political realm, what is referred to as 
“identity politics” is fueled by the belief that everyone has a right to be who they are and want to 
be and that each deserves equal recognition, treatment, and power.71 I would add to Brighouse’s 
requirement that one’s life align with one’s fundamental interests and desires that it must also 
align with one’s conscience, which speaks to the relationship between autonomy and moral 
integrity. 
We see then that rationality, criticality, and autonomy are intertwined in an ethico-
epistemological ideal, that of the rational-critical, autonomous individual. This ideal is prominent 
in philosophical educational discourse and is at the heart of the Socratic ideal of liberal 
education.72 Rationality is tied to the critical motive, that is, the motive to challenge and test 
ideas, and, as several scholars have noted, critical thinking is defined in terms of the 
Enlightenment conception of rationality and often seen as the epitome of good thinking.73 To be 
a good thinker is to be a critical thinker. Similarly, just as the development of critical thinking is 
one of the most frequently cited educational aims, so it is with autonomy within the 
philosophical literature on education because the latter is the justification for the former, as we 
saw with Brighouse: if you are to choose for yourself among various options how to live, then 
you must have the ability to evaluate these options. Similarly, Harvey Siegel, one of the most 
influential voices on critical thinking, justifies the educational ideal of critical thinking as a 
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means to render [the student] self-sufficient; to empower the student to control her destiny and to 
create her future, not submit to it.”74 He further writes, “The self-sufficient person is… a 
liberated person; such a person is free from the unwarranted and undesirable control of 
unjustified beliefs, unsupportable attitudes, and paucity of abilities, which can prevent that 
person from competently taking charge of her own life. Critical thinking thus liberates as it 
renders students self-sufficient.”75  
It is worth noting that it was only after Enlightenment thought had gained a foothold in 
the United States in the wake of the American Revolution that college reformers began looking 
to Socrates as a model teacher, despite the fact that educators had been teaching about him since 
long before.76 As Kimball explains, “Equality, liberty, learning, progress, experimentation, and 
science were associated in the mind of Revolutionary leaders.”77 The inspiration of Socrates is 
evident in the liberal education visions that college reformers published in the early twentieth 
century, which specifically promoted “dialectic,”78 “discussion and questioning,”79 and the idea 
that college is “a place in which the human mind is seeking deliverance from its bonds,”80 a 
specific reference to the Allegory of the Cave. We also begin to see, however, a specific concern 
for students’ autonomy. Mortimer Adler, for instance, developed the “Socratic seminars,” in 
which the seminar leader is to engage students in dialectic. The purpose of this “Socratic 
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method” is to prevent “indoctrination,” which he believes does “violence” to the mind, whereas 
“questioning and discussion do nothing but make the mind act in its own way.”81  
Later critics of undergraduate education who espouse the Socratic ideal are more explicit 
and emphatic about cultivating the rational-critical autonomous individual. Walter Kaufmann 
argues that humanities scholars are failing to live up their responsibility to society and their 
students of doing the Socratic work of “examin[ing] the faith and morals of [our] time”82 and 
teaching students to do the same. For Kaufmann, one of the main purposes of studying the 
humanities is to “liberate the mind and bring us closer to autonomy — to making fateful choices 
with our eyes open to alternatives.”83 The “Socratic teacher,” therefore, “will stress the need for 
critical evaluation of alternatives and continued self-examination” and will teach students to 
become a “dialectical reader” who experiences reading as a dialogue with the author and “pits 
against each other texts that reflect different world views, attitudes, and sensibilities.”84 The text, 
for Kaufmann, “is an aid in autoemancipation.”85 We hear the ideal echoed in the Nussbaum 
quote in the introduction and in her articulation of the value of reason in her Socratic vision of 
liberal education: “Reason … constructs the personality in a very deep way…. it produces people 
who are responsible for themselves, people whose reasoning and emotion are under their own 
control.”86 Liberal education is an education that “promotes rational freedom,”87 which enables 
students to consider other possible perspectives and ways of living. Finally, Delbanco sees the 
purpose of self-examination as enabling students to determine what is important to them, so as 
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not to remain “susceptible to the demands — overt and covert — of their parents and of the 
abstraction we call ‘the market.’”88 
It might be said that this aim of producing rational-critical, autonomous individuals does 
not seem all that different from Socrates’ aims in engaging in his interlocutors. After all, 
Socrates’ critical practices and pedagogy inspired Enlightenment thought, and one of the ways 
Socrates conceived of his educative role was as a midwife that helps his followers give birth to 
their own souls as they struggle to discover truth themselves.89 Today, however, the practice of 
critically examining one’s beliefs is given a different moral accent, if you will, foregrounding a 
concern for autonomy and critical thinking as the primary aims. For Socrates, the ultimate aim of 
rational inquiry was to discern truth about the natural order and the Good so as to conform 
oneself to it and thereby become a virtuous person, the essence of a flourishing life. Moreover, 
the search for truth was motivated by a love for a good that transcended the self to which one 
submitted in orienting one’s life toward it. Autonomy and the capacity to critically examine ideas 
are intermediary aims that are embedded within and serve to realize a further ethical aim. 
Outside of perhaps religious educational institutions, one would be hard pressed to find 
anyone in the academy who speaks of a transcendent, ultimate Good and of conforming one’s 
life to it, and, in the wake of pragmatist, postmodern, and critical philosophies, many academics 
might shy away from or outright reject talk of seeking truth. The ancient Socratic aim has been 
superseded, both in higher education and the broader culture, by the aim of becoming self-
responsible and achieving autonomy, though, in higher education discourse, it is the intermediate 
aim of critical thinking that is ubiquitously named and assumed. That is, when we say we want 
students to think for themselves, this aim in itself — that of students’ becoming autonomous 
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critical thinkers — seems to be the primary end or the only universally acceptable end. For 
example, professor of English Rob Jenkins reflects on and justifies his continued use of “the 
Socratic method,” which he describes as “draw[ing] out a student’s underlying assumptions and 
foster[ing] reasoned debate by asking pointed questions and assuming a contrary position,” 
despite the fact that some students have misunderstood him as advocating the contrary position: 
What I don’t intend to do … is stop using the Socratic method — or my own 
version of it — because it works. It helps students think more deeply about where 
they stand and why, understand the strengths and weaknesses of their positions, 
and gain a better appreciation for other points of view. Those are the cornerstones 
of effective argument. And if the ultimate goal is to seek truth — as I believe it is 
— then backing away from this highly effective method would be cowardly, not 
to mention a disservice to my students.90 
 
He can simply assert the value of the Socratic method in terms of thinking critically and helping 
students learn to argue effectively, but he must qualify his belief that the ultimate goal is to seek  
truth.  
 The ideal of autonomy and critical thinking are also reflected in the dominant conception 
of the role of the Socratic professor and in the nature of Socratic pedagogy. Liberal educators 
commonly express that their job is to “unsettle” students and make them “uncomfortable,” as 
Socrates did with his interlocutors. The pinnacle of their pedagogy seems to be the student’s 
aporia. Professor of writing John Warner, for instance, states in a recent article in Inside Higher 
Ed, “I believe that the most important thing I can do for students is to make them 
uncomfortable,” and he offers the following quote from Cornel West, which “encapsulates this 
belief”: 
I want to be able to engage in the grand calling of a Socratic teacher, which is not 
to persuade and convince students, but to unsettle and unnerve and maybe even 
unhouse a few students, so that they experience that wonderful vertigo and 
dizziness in recognizing at least for a moment that their world view rests on 
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pudding, but then see that they have something to fall back on. It’s the shaping 
and forming of critical sensibility. That, for me, is what the high calling of 
pedagogy really is.91 
 
Likewise, in reflecting on what role, if any, she should play in students’ “spiritual search,” 
professor of religion Susan Handelman explains that she has withheld her own religious views 
from her students 
for good and obvious reasons: a belief that the academy was the forum for an 
unmediated free play of ideas, and that my role as a professor in a large publicly-
funded state university was to generate this free play; a sense that our mission was 
to teach “critical thinking,” and that my function was to unsettle and challenge my 
students, not to be their spiritual counselor, or put forth my own personal religious 
beliefs.92 
 
In American higher education, the roots of this Socratic pedagogy and its connection to critical 
thinking and autonomy are found directly in Adler’s writings on the Socratic seminar. The 
seminar, as mentioned, was to a be a place in which students engaged in dialectic, which he 
describes as “an intellectual process in which all men engage in so far as they undertake the to be 
critical of their own opinions, or the opinions of others.”93 In his leader’s manual, he writes, “the 
instruments of intellectual midwifery are questions—and more questions.”94 The seminar leader 
is more concerned with overseeing “the flow of ideas than with the acquisition of specific 
information.”95 Liberal educators are to catalyze the process of inquiry but should not tell 
students what to believe or possibly even state their position on the matter at hand, spawning the 
commonplace view that “college doesn’t teach you what to think, it teaches you how to think.”  
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I do not mean to suggest here that liberal educators do not care at all about truth, the 
knowledge students gain, or what kind of people they become aside from being autonomous 
critical thinkers. There are certainly moral and civic ends that many educators do have in mind, 
such as uprooting prejudice and teaching students to engage in rational and empathetic dialogue 
with those different from themselves, but these ends are not universally assumed by liberal 
educators. Recent critiques of undergraduate education show that scholars and educators feel the 
need to reassert these aims.96 By elevating critical thinking and autonomy over other ends, the 
dominant intellectual and cultural ethos of liberal education limits the possibility of trying to 
achieve substantive ethical educational aims that might contribute to students’ flourishing. The 
respect for individual autonomy and the corollary claims of a diverse, pluralistic society raise 
barriers against the inculcation and endorsement of particular views and values. Whatever ethical 
aims individual educators may have, colleges (again, aside from strictly religious institutions) 
notoriously have no unified moral purpose, if they understand themselves to have any moral 
purpose at all, and struggle to engage in any sort of robust moral education, a criticism that has 
been launched by critics since the early twentieth century.97 The only acceptable moral stances 
that higher education institutions can endorse seem to be those considered central to maintaining 
order in a liberal, democratic, pluralistic society, which revolve around respecting individual 
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autonomy: respect for individual rights, tolerance, diversity, and inclusion. Even with these, 
however, colleges do not require students to enroll in or participate in civic education courses or 
programs; instead, students are reminded of these values when they are violated within the 
campus community, for example, in the recent spate of issues concerning controversial speakers 
on campus and the broader issue of ensuring that classrooms and campuses are “safe spaces” for 
all students.98 
I have characterized the critical ethos of the examined life today in terms of the ideals of 
autonomy and critical thinking, as they have been shaped by the fusion of Socrates’ practice of 
critical self-examination and Enlightenment thought. These ideals have also contributed to and 
are embedded in the broader secularized and pluralistic ethos of the modern academy. I now turn 
to what I have referred to as the “mode of engagement” with the world that is characteristic of 
the critical ethos of the examined life. By “mode of engagement,” I mean a way of approaching 
our intentional interactions with something and how we relate to it. In the case of the examined 
life, it is through particular forms of intellectual inquiry that educators and students interact with 
objects of critical examination, where “objects” broadly refers to beliefs, ideas, narratives, 
information, the natural world, and, in the context of higher education, the course materials in 
which these are presented to students, such as texts, works of art, images, and physical objects. 
The features of what I will call the “critical mode of engagement” have been woven into what I 
have described above, but I would like to bring them into greater focus to describe what I 
contend cultivates a general way of being when it is the dominant mode of engagement. My aim 
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is to offer a phenomenologically sensitive sketch of what it means to operate within the critical 
ethos of the examined life.  
Central to the critical mode of engagement is its rationalistic approach to what is being 
examined. To be critical, we will recall, means to rationally evaluate some idea or information. 
The critical mode seeks to rely solely on a process of (logical) reasoning rather than on emotion, 
prior attachments, desires, and prejudices shaped by traditions and the claims of authority 
figures. Criticality, however, involves more than a reliance on reason. The ideal of rationality 
within the critical ethos calls for a particular stance, attitude, and aims. To be rational is to take a 
disengaged and detached stance from the subjective aspects of ourselves and our nonrational 
responses to the objects we examine, whether our own beliefs, others’ ideas, or the world around 
us. Rather than respond to something according to an immediate emotional reaction or with 
personal investment in the matter, we “take a step back” and enter a reflective mode, in which 
we hold up an object at a critical distance for analysis, scrutiny, and evaluation from multiple 
perspectives, without committing to any, at least for the time being. From this position, then, we 
can proceed to formulate an impartial position and a logical argument using impersonal reasons 
and evidence.  
Intrinsic to the critical ethos is a general attitude of skepticism, sometimes suspicion, and 
an initial posture of doubt, which Descartes famously turned into a painstaking method to ensure 
the certainty of his own knowledge. The imperative to test your beliefs and the claims of 
tradition and authority means that you cannot simply trust the sources of these claims, nor can 
you trust your emotions or any other untested beliefs. In the face of a claim, norm, or some set of 
facts, we must question it: is it true, justified, and/or valid? To try to prove that it is, we must 
investigate the possible errors and weaknesses in the position until we are certain that it is 
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logically sound. Peter Elbow calls this approach “the doubting game,” which he sees has having 
a “monopoly” on intellectual life in contemporary higher education. “We now have a state of 
affairs,” he writes, “where to almost anyone in the academic or intellectual world, it seems as 
though when he plays the doubting game is being rigorous, disciplined, rational, and tough-
minded. And if for any reason he refrains from playing the doubting game, he feels he is being 
unintellectual, irrational, and sloppy.”99 Wayne Booth has similarly called the dominance of the 
skeptical approach a modern dogma,” which “teaches that we have no justification for asserting 
what can be doubted, and we are commanded by it to doubt whatever cannot be proved.”100  
The Enlightenment’s spirit of free inquiry opened the door to an unbounded freedom and 
imperative to question beliefs in all domains of life, not just our ethical beliefs. Anything and 
everything can be and should be questioned and critically examined,101 with the exception, 
perhaps, of the value of critical thinking and autonomy, but even these have their vocal minority 
of critics, as we have seen. At this point in Western history, no intellectual stone has been left 
unexamined. Scholars have critically examined and offered new theories about, for instance, 
• physical, social, existential, and spiritual reality: about nature and the cosmos, what 
society is like and how society functions, the human condition (existential, spiritual, 
material) 
• the past and future of these realities: how all of these have come to be as they are and 
how they will be in the future 
• ethical beliefs: beliefs about what is good and right to be and do, what we bear 
responsibility to be and do, the standards by which we judge these 
• the nature of truth and knowledge: what truth and knowledge amount to, how we know 
what we know and justify it 
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Inquiry in these various domains has led to the proliferation of academic disciplines and 
subdisciplines housed within the arts and sciences departments that generally offer the courses 
that comprise liberal arts curricula. 
In certain disciplinary contexts, the attitude is not merely skepticism but suspicion, to 
borrow a term from Paul Ricoeur. The difference between skepticism and suspicion within the 
critical ethos of the examined life is that the distrust of the latter is based on a belief that there is 
a hidden agenda, force, or harm that lies beneath the surface of our experiences and social 
reality. In other words, suspicion begins from a particular premise about the world that is not 
present in a more general skepticism. Ricoeur used the term to describe a style of literary 
interpretation he traces back to the thought of Karl Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Sigmund 
Freud, one in which “hermeneutics is not an explication of the object, but a tearing off of masks, 
an interpretation that reduces disguises.”102 Rather than engaging in interpretation as a 
“recollection of meaning,” where the aim is to understand the substantive meaning of a text and 
what truth it reveals to the reader, the hermeneutics of suspicion “calls for a very specific 
philosophy which subordinates the entire problem of truth and error to the expression of the will 
to power.”103 In other words, the belief is that our understanding of what is true and right has 
actually been constructed by those in power and who seek to maintain their power.  
Ricoeur offered his critique in 1970 and was writing about literary interpretation, but the 
suspicious attitude has become a well-established mode of criticism in other humanistic 
disciplines as well as the social sciences, fostering a type of scholarship that can be broadly 
characterized as social critique. Launched from the vantage point of various critical and 
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postmodern theories, social critique does not merely examine claims to assess their truth or 
falsity but explains claims, norms, and other social phenomena as the effects of oppressive uses 
of power.104 In her 2015 book The Limits of Critique, literary scholar Rita Felski explores 
suspicion as an intellectual ethos that shapes much contemporary humanistic scholarship and 
notes its currency outside of literary studies, such as “when anthropologists unmask the 
imperialist convictions of their predecessors, when historians choreograph the stealthy tug of 
power and domination, when legal scholars assail the neutrality of the law in order to lay bare its 
hidden agenda.”105 She sees the same mode of criticism that Ricoeur describes in the work of 
today’s social critic, whose task is “to expose hidden truths and draw out unflattering and 
counterintuitive meanings that other fails to see.”106 In the suspicious mode, the questions posed 
in reading texts and in interpreting truth claims and social reality are not so much, “Is it true, 
justified, and/or valid?” but  
• Is it legitimate?,” where illegitimacy connotes an unjust claim to truth and power 
• Who benefits from or is disempowered by X [some belief/view/situation]? 
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• How does this text or interpretation of a text promote or undermine the status quo (where 
the status quo is seen to be oppressive)?  
• In what ways does this X [some idea/situation] fail to live up to our democratic ideal of 
equality? 
 
Just as skepticism has become a mark of being a good thinker, there is, Felski writes, an 
“assumption that suspicion is an intrinsic good or a guarantee of rigorous or radical thought.”107 
To be a good social critic one must be committed to “professional suspicion.”108  
Drawing on the phenomenology of Martin Heidegger,109 Felski characterizes suspicion as 
a “mood”: 
Mood … refers to an overall atmosphere or climate that causes the world to come 
into view in a certain way. Moods are often ambient, diffuse, and hazy, part of the 
background rather than the foreground of thought. In contrast to the suddenness 
and intensity of the passions, they are characterized by a degree of stability: a 
mood can be pervasive, lingering, slow to change. It ‘sets the tone’ for our 
engagement with the world, causing it to appear before us in a given light. Mood, 
in this sense, is a prerequisite for any form of interaction or engagement. Mood is 
what allows certain things to matter to us and to matter in specific ways.110 
 
The notion of mood can be applied to skepticism as well as suspicion, and I find it helpful as a 
way to illuminate the subjective experience of the critical mode of engagement or what it is like 
to inhabit the critical ethos. Just as being in a bad mood can lead to us to remember and see only 
negative aspects of our day, the “critical mood” directs our attention to certain aspects of the 
world as we encounter it in the objects we examine.111 We look for the weaknesses and errors in 
an idea or argument. We look for the workings of injustice and oppression in texts, social norms 
and institutions, and historical and current events. Heidegger actually conceives of mood as 
having a much more totalizing effect on our view of the world than Felski’s characterization 
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indicates. For Heidegger, a mood “discloses” the world in which we find ourselves and in which 
we exist “as a whole” and “makes it possible first of all to direct oneself towards something,”112 
while it also “closes it off.”113 In other words, the world that a particular mood discloses to us 
and that we therefore perceive is simply the world with which we engage. Mood, with its 
pervasiveness and all-encompassing reach, determines the very tenor of our lived experience 
when we are enveloped by it. 
 Mood usually connotes a feeling, but it is a complex of emotions, beliefs, particular 
perspectives, and personal attachments and motives, even from the stance of the most disciplined 
detachment of rationality. A skeptical and suspicious attitude is based on beliefs about our 
humanity, how truth is validated, and about others and the world that paint it as untrustworthy in 
some way, and therefore, we are wary, guarded, and vigilant as we approach those whose claims 
we must examine and the reality that is presented to us. Our engagement with the world is like a 
confrontation, and in this confrontation, there is a highly personal, existential prize at stake — 
our autonomy (or our emancipation), our dignity as self-responsible agents, our very selves — 
along with the respect of others. Matthew Crawford describes this posture as a “kind of… 
epistemic machismo,” which works to prevent our “being duped.”114 For many educators and 
scholars, there are also public goods at stake in exercising and developing in students’ rationality 
and criticality, such as a thoughtful and empowered citizenry and a more just society, but the 
critical mode of engagement, grounded as it is in the ideal of the rational autonomous individual, 
turns towards the self — towards self-protection, self-assertion, and, in a professional and 
institutional context where one “wins points” for one’s critical analysis and aggressive 
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argumentation, self-promotion. Academics are all too familiar with this kind of intellectual 
posturing from their colleagues, and, perhaps in more candid moments, from themselves. 
Referring to the dominance of the critical mode, Felski notes, “the result can be a regrettable 
arrogance of intellect, where the smartest thing you can do is to see through the deep-seated 
convictions and heartfelt attachments of others.”115 Writing about social justice education, Daniel 
Liston offers a similar reflection: 
Rather than grounding our critical work in the struggles of those harmed, critical 
theory becomes a kind of detached analysis that probes the ills of the world, the 
ironies, and the unending deceptions…. Hubris is in the air that is exuded, and all 
too often disdain and arrogance become the coins of the realm…. It is a lure that 
seduces the individual and one that doesn’t serve the community…. And all too 
often in our attempts to uncover power we become seduced by the tinsel of 
institutional status.116 
 
Whether by example or the nature of the grading system, and probably both, students, 
too, can be drawn into the critical mode of engagement as a way to shore up their intellectual 
status or simply to earn an A. In his study, Perry observes that the “independence of mind … 
demanded by authority” would at times make students’ “efforts to be impartial” an exercise of 
strategies that “become the stock armamentarium of the gamesman who has ‘caught on’ to ‘what 
they want’… in exchange for grades and a diploma.”117 Michael Roth, writing more than thirty 
years later, cautions colleges against valorizing critical thinking: “The skill at unmasking error, 
or simple intellectual one-upmanship, is not completely without value, but we should be wary of 
creating a class of self-satisfied debunkers or, to use a currently fashionable word on campuses, 
people who like to ‘trouble’ ideas.”118 Of course, the influence of the professional and 
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institutional context on the way scholars and student engage in critical thinking is not intrinsic to 
the critical ethos of the examined life and can be seen as a corrupting force, but it is, nonetheless, 
part of the contemporary reality of higher education and, therefore, of the examined life today. 
Liston’s reflections provide a helpful counterpoint to the previously mentioned role of 
eros in the examined life for Socrates and his interlocutors. The rationalistic and critical nature of 
the examined life, along with professional and institutional pressures, leaves little room to be 
moved by erotic longings in intellectual inquiry. Or perhaps it is rather that we are seduced by 
something different, possibly the “tinsel of institutional status.” Certainly, the sexual nature of 
the pedagogical relationship is culturally out of bounds and in a number of ways morally and 
educationally objectionable,119 but that is not of central importance here. The more fundamental 
idea is that Socrates and those he captivated were motivated to search for the truth, and to 
critically examine their beliefs about virtue, by a love for something they perceived to be greater 
than and outside of themselves with which they hoped to live in union — the good, the beautiful, 
and the cosmos that embodied them. They were motivated by a love for something other than 
their autonomy, freedom, self-sufficiency, rational control. From this point of view, we can see 
more clearly that the examined life for Socrates is not about the search for a set of true 
propositions or uncovering the way things “really are,” which is how the purpose of critical 
thinking is perceived today, but it is about discovering the right kinds of attachments to have that 
enable one to flourish. What is worth caring about, investing oneself in, and committing to? In 
fact, that is precisely how Socrates frames his endeavors: “I do nothing except going around 
trying to persuade you…not to care about your bodies or your money as intensely as about how 
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your soul may be in the best possible condition.”120 To care about something is to be emotionally 
invested in it. In the “hyper-rationalized”121 critical ethos, however, the loves, desires, longings, 
and hopes that animate us and draw us towards objects we perceive to be good and to which we 
believe it is worth committing ourselves must be held at bay, compartmentalized, and 
suppressed.  
The separation of reason and intellect from emotion in general is part of a long history in 
Western philosophy, having roots in Ancient Greek thought, such that emotion has been 
considered irrational and subjective, and therefore unreliable. “Emotions are taken,” Liston and 
Jim Garrison write, “as affective upheavals in an otherwise smoothly functioning process.”122 
Emotions are precisely one of the intrusions into our reasoning from which we must protect 
ourselves. As we engage with texts, ideas, and the world around us, we must stop ourselves from 
getting swept up by the emotional response they engender in us and instead place them under the 
critic’s microscope. Thus, while desires and emotions with regard to the various objects of 
examination may be privately felt by educators and students, they are rarely brought into our 
analyses and discussions in the public realm of scholarship and the classroom. As Handelman 
writes, “We so often write and research out of passionate personal concerns; yet these remain 
largely concealed as we carefully code and translate them into the discourse or our respective 
fields.”123 Likewise, most students have been socialized through their schooling not to engage in 
their academics on a personal and emotional level. If they did not learn this cultural norm, they 
are eventually taught it. Aside from the challenge that many students face of not finding the 
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subject matter and their assignments personally meaningful, they are instructed not to use “I” 
when writing papers, learn to have critical distance when they read,124 and are told to argue with 
evidence, reasons, and logic reasons as opposed to drawing on their feelings and personal 
experiences.  
What I have tried to do in describing the critical mode of engagement is to offer a sense 
of the kind of life the examined life tends to be in contemporary liberal education — the kind of 
life liberal educators are teaching students to live and the ways they are teaching them to relate to 
and experience the world. Understanding the experience of the examined life, I believe, is just as 
important as identifying its aims and practices for considering its risks and limitations and the 
extent to which it contributes to students’ flourishing, for flourishing, I will argue, depends in 
part on our relationship to the world and our experience of it. To say that educators are teaching 
students to live a certain kind of life may seem to be an overstatement. It might be said that, 
since the ideals and mode of engagement that I have argued are defining features of the Socratic 
ideal of liberal education have influenced the broader culture of American society, students are 
already immersed in the critical ethos before attending college. They also may have adopted the 
ideals and practices prior to attending college through primary and secondary schools and 
perhaps through the influence of their peers and other adults. To a certain extent, this is true. The 
academic realm, in general, is a space where abstract, reflective, and rational thought are 
nurtured. For the most part, however, prior to college, students experience more traditional 
teaching styles in which an authoritative teacher seeks to transmit information rather than a 
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Socratic style of teaching that emphasizes critical thinking. Accordingly, Perry’s study reveals 
that many students struggled to adjust to the expectations to be impartial and consider different 
points of view, and follow-up studies with students at different types of institutions have 
corroborated his findings.125 Similarly, Gerald Graff has argued that students must be explicitly 
taught the intellectual norms of “academic culture,” specifically referring to a dialectical style of 
argumentation.126 When the critical mode of engagement is the dominant mode and is enforced 
and given its dominant status through the grading system, the authority of the professor, and the 
pervasiveness of its intellectual norms, it can easily be adopted by students as the right or 
superior way to engage with the world.  
In addition, by focusing on the experience of the examined life, we can begin to see that 
it is distinct from other ways we might experience life. According to Taylor, the disengaged 
(rational-critical) stance “takes us out of our normal way of experiencing the world and 
ourselves.”127 I will explore in greater detail what this might mean in a later chapter and to what 
extent this is beneficial or detrimental, but it at least means, in Taylor’s view as well as my own, 
that we are beings who normally experience, engage with, and reason about the world through 
our emotions, desires, loves, and commitments.  
In its contemporary form, the examined life seeks to eliminate any reliance on what most, 
if not all, people have considered sources of substantive guidance and direction — authority 
figures, tradition, social norms, the beliefs they have internalized from these, and the ways they 
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are moved by and toward things in the world. In terms of its educational aims, the ideals of 
autonomy and critical thinking, the conception of the liberal educator as a gadfly who unsettles 
students, and the critical mode of engagement are all meant to develop students’ capacities to be 
intellectually and ethically self-responsible.  
This kind of academic culture is not only foreign for many undergraduates, but it is also 
part of the broader culture of higher education in which they are subject to minimal adult 
supervision and given irregular and compartmentalized support as they make their way toward 
independent adulthood, which is typically provided outside of the intellectual realm of their 
college experience. Together, the critical ethos and practices of the examined life and the 
institutional context in which students develop, I contend, create a deficient developmental 
environment for emerging adults. In the following section, I provide an overview of the 
institutional relationship between the educational concerns that have come to be called “student 
development,” which refers to the nonintellectual aspects of students’ development in college, 
and students’ academic lives in higher education today. As with the overview of the critical 
ethos, I will place this relationship in its philosophical and historical context to show how it is 
connected to some of the ideals of the critical ethos and how aspects of the ethos pervade the 
entire college experience. This background also delineates the contours of educational debate 
with regard to a college’s responsibilities for students’ development.  
2.2 Student Development and Academic Life: Separate Spheres 
Since its beginnings in Colonial America, college in the United States has been 
considered a time to prepare young people for the responsibilities of adulthood, but the scope of 
a college’s authority, if not influence, over different aspects of students’ development and the 
distribution of responsibility for these aspects has changed dramatically. Until around the mid-
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1800s, American colleges saw it as their mission to inculcate in their future leaders the virtues of 
Christian character, and “all learning ultimately was to coalesce into the values and actions of a 
Christian gentleman,” whatever one’s vocation.128 Colonial leaders and educators sought to 
shape not just students’ minds but their souls in a way that shaped their daily lives. Their aims 
for students’ intellectual, moral, and spiritual development were integrated on an institutional 
level and in the responsibilities of faculty. In other words, faculty were charged with the 
development of “the whole student,” to use a commonly heard term in contemporary higher 
education discourse. The Colonial colleges were therefore highly controlled environments, from 
the curriculum to classroom practice to social life, adopting “the role of in loco parentis, with the 
faculty and president offering supervision of student conduct and moral development.”129 A 
prescribed classical curriculum culminated in a senior-year course in moral philosophy, usually 
taught by the president, whose aim was to show that the various courses revealed a “unified and 
intelligible” world subject to a divine moral law and thereby “integrate … and give meaning and 
purpose to the student’s entire college experience and the course of study.” The course was to 
have normative force and “serve as a guide to right living.”130 Students experienced authoritarian 
and dogmatic teaching in the classroom and the vigilant enforcement of rules outside of it. 
Colleges now exercise very little oversight regarding students’ behavior and engage in 
almost no direct moral education, with administrative leaders stepping in only when institutional 
policies, laws, and campus community norms with regard to tolerance and inclusion are violated. 
Faculty responsibility for students’ development has also dramatically decreased in scope. 
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Today, “student development” is generally understood to be the purview of “student affairs” 
professionals,131 those who support undergraduates with nonintellectual, nonacademic, or 
extracurricular concerns, such as the bureaucratic aspects of academic advising, career 
counseling, mental health, residential and campus life, and, among the more recent 
developments, “spirituality,” a vaguely defined term that is not directly connected to religion and 
refers variously to students’ search for meaning and purpose in life, sense of the values that 
guide them, and feelings of connection to a larger human community.132 Conversely, the student-
facing responsibilities of a professor are generally focused on teaching, where teaching connotes 
classroom instruction in a particular subject and the cultivation of intellectual skills. Studies 
indicate that faculty and student affairs professionals are institutionally segregated and rarely 
collaborate, and that a status hierarchy exists, with the work of professors seen as central to the 
work of the institution, and that of student affairs professionals peripheral.133 This division of 
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labor owes much to the influence of Enlightenment thought on the nature of intellectual inquiry 
in modern higher education, as discussed in the previous section, and the professionalization of 
the faculty as researchers in specialized fields, a downstream effect of the ideal of open 
inquiry.134  
As higher education institutions adopted the ideal of open and rational inquiry in the 
latter half of the nineteenth century, and as more faith was placed in the power of scientific 
research, science faculty argued that what students needed to learn, both for their own maturity 
and societal progress, were the dispositions, intellectual habits, and methods required to conduct 
open inquiry — skepticism, objectivity, faithfulness to method.135 In other words, they promoted 
the procedural virtues of reason as educational aims. Rather than seeing the professor’s role as 
passing down substantive ideas of the good, they believed that “free inquiry would automatically 
lead to what was true and good.”136 The ideal of objectivity also curbed what many professors 
saw as the legitimate scope of their influence in students’ development. “Value-free” research 
required that scholars “excise their ethical concerns from the presentation of their research.”137 
Max Weber articulated this view in “Science [Wissenschaft] as a Vocation,” in which he 
admonishes modern scholars against inserting their “personal value judgments” into their 
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presentation of “facts.”138 He contends that the most a researcher can do with regard to students’ 
ethical concerns outside of the values inherent to research is to “confront [them] with the 
necessity of … choice” among various means to their ends.139 Consequently, he also admonishes 
students against seeking ethical guidance from their professors. It was the later philosophical 
movements of logical positivism, which claimed that “value statements are meaningless in 
science,” and emotivist ethics, which claimed that “morality was determined by feeling rather 
than intellect,” that firmly established the separation of fact from value and of knowledge from 
morality in the modern academy around the 1920s.140 The pervasive influence of these 
philosophies led to the “marginalization of morality” as an educational concern and the 
delegitimization of ethical inquiry as a means to guiding conduct.141  
Over time, moral education as well as any engagement with normative ethical questions, 
such as how one should live, and existential, or what René Arcilla calls “metaphysical,” 
questions, such as what the meaning and purpose of life might be, have been almost completely 
vacated from undergraduates’ academic lives.142 They have instead been relocated to 
extracurricular activities, student affairs units, independent religious and spiritual organizations 
on campus, or possibly to professional ethics courses, which are not generally part of a liberal 
arts curriculum.143 One exception to the peripheral status of moral education in undergraduate 
education is social justice courses, where the aim of critical pedagogy is to have students see the 
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world through the lens of power and adopt a concern for equality and the particular injustices 
that the educator wants rectified. As Henry Giroux writes, “At its most ambitious, the 
overarching narrative in this discourse [of critical pedagogy] is to educate students to lead a 
meaningful life, learn how to hold power and authority accountable, and develop the skills, 
knowledge, and courage to challenge commonsense assumptions while being willing to struggle 
for a more socially just world.”144 One of the criticisms of social justice education, however, is 
that educators may be too heavy-handed in their approach and even dogmatic in “advocating the 
correct ‘critical positions’”145 Douglas Yacek goes so far as to categorize social justice education 
as one that aims at “conversion.”146 Such an approach, he and others are concerned, limits 
students’ opportunity to question the authority of the educator and violates or inhibits the 
development of their autonomy. I take up this issue in Chapter 4.  
Another factor that narrowed the scope of influence that institutions and faculty sought to 
exert on students’ development was the German ideal of academic freedom, which was born out 
of the general embrace of intellectual freedom. Academic freedom had two meanings that had 
significant implications for undergraduate teaching and learning. On the one hand, it meant 
lehrfreiheit, the “freedom of the professor to investigate and teach the results of his researches 
without governmental interference.”147 Wissenschaft, or investigation with a spirit free inquiry, 
came to define the nature of scholarly work.148 Straying somewhat from the German meaning, 
many American scholars took it to specifically mean methodologically rigorous, specialized, 
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scientific research.149 On the other hand, it meant lernfreiheit, the “freedom study what one 
wishes”150 and therefore “the freedom of the student to choose his own studies.”151  
As faculty pursued their research interests, the number of academic disciplines expanded, 
separate departments were established “to defend the specializations,”152 and scholarly societies 
and journals were created, providing the infrastructure for universities to offer graduate training 
in specialized fields and for scholarly research to be a profession in its own right.153 These 
developments led to the establishment of the modern research university as a model for higher 
education and established a new conception of the professor. Whereas professors had mostly 
been former clergymen who retained their commitment to students’ spiritual development,154 the 
vocational focus of many faculty in the modern university shifted away from being an educator 
of undergraduates responsible for their holistic development to being a disciplinary expert 
responsible for teaching students a particular scholarly craft. Nearly all critiques of 
undergraduate education attribute some deficiency that the critic sees to the professional 
orientation of faculty. To be clear, the critique is not necessarily that professors do not care about 
teaching or even developing the whole student, though this is a common criticism. Rather, the 
critique is that even faculty who care about teaching or students’ holistic development, if they 
have earned a doctorate, have been socialized at research institutions to be scholars, not “to teach 
nonspecialist teenagers,”155 whether they realize it or not. The splintering of inquiry into 
specializations has also led to a narrowing of the intellectual breadth of each faculty member’s 
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scholarly interests and teaching.156 For students, academic freedom was reflected in the elective 
system, which replaced the highly regimented undergraduate curriculum and allowed students to 
choose among courses that faculty offered according to their scholarly interests. The creation of 
majors and minors gave students’ studies a focus, but they also made their studies more 
specialized in alignments with the scholarly disciplines of the faculty.  
In response to the rising influence of science, specialization, and the neglect of broader 
ethical aims, as well as growing instrumentalism in a rapidly industrializing society, humanist 
scholars advocated a prescribed curriculum under the label of “general education” to restore 
unity, breadth, and a focus on the cultivation of character to the undergraduate curriculum. 
Grounding it in Western cultural texts, they argued that engaging with “liberal culture” — 
literature, the arts, philosophy, history — would provide students the moral guidance they would 
not receive through the study of science. These efforts have been largely unsuccessful. Today, 
there is little agreement on what kinds of courses general education should involve, both across 
and within institutions, with a few exceptions.157 As faculty research interests have expanded and 
diversified, so have the types and number of courses offered, leading to intractable fragmentation 
of the undergraduate curriculum, a concern that continues to mire educators in debate. It is also a 
well-known and lamented fact that students often choose their “gen-ed” courses according to 
their preferred schedule and ease of earning an easy A to fulfill the requirement.158 Furthermore, 
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these humanist scholars were part of reform efforts that gave rise to the Socratic ideal of liberal 
education. While they relied on traditional texts deemed to best express the highest cultural 
values, they advocated Socratic ideals in their pedagogy, rejecting dogmatic teaching and 
favoring asking questions, facilitating discussion, and the “liberation of the intellect.”159 
The intellectual norm of objective rationality in science, the fact-value distinction, the 
disunity among educators about what should be taught, and the educational practices of the 
humanities have left colleges and faculty with little room to be involved in direct and substantive 
ethical guidance of students. The only values on which there is agreement today and that are 
likely to be deliberately transmitted are those related to intellectual inquiry. University of 
Virginia professor Chad Wellmon expresses as much in an opinion piece on what he considers 
the university president’s impotent response to a white supremacist rally in Charlottesville, 
Virginia: “The contemporary university… seems institutionally incapable of moral clarity…. 
[The president’s] missives … read like press releases from the bowels of a modern bureaucracy, 
not the thoughts of a human responding to hate. And that makes a lot of sense. What can the 
president of a contemporary university say?” Rather than robust moral visions to inspire and 
fight hate, what universities offer today are, he writes, “robust epistemic virtues — an openness 
to debate, a commitment to critical inquiry, attention to detail, a respect for argument — 
embedded in historical practices particular to the university. They provide those within and 
outside the university with essential goods.” He goes on to argue, however, 
As the hate on display in [the Charlottesville rally] made clear … these scholarly 
practices and virtues are also insufficient. The university has moral limitations. 
Universities cannot impart comprehensive visions of the good. They cannot 
provide ultimate moral ends. Their goods are proximate. Faculty members, myself 
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included, need to acknowledge that most university leaders lack the language and 
moral imagination to confront evils such as white supremacy. They lack those 
things not because of who they are, but, as Weber argued, because of what the 
modern research university has become. Such an acknowledgment is also part of 
the moral clarity that we can offer to ourselves and to our students. We have 
goods to offer, but they are not ultimate goods. And so universities need to look 
outside themselves and partner with other moral traditions and civic 
communities.160  
 
I will return to the question of whether or not contemporary higher education, and liberal 
education in particular, possesses potential internal resources for offering students any sort of 
moral clarity later, but I agree with Wellmon’s assessment of the insufficiency of contemporary 
higher education’s dominant ethos and practices for doing so. In the same vein, they are 
insufficient for providing the resources that emerging adults need — and that a liberal education 
is purported to provide — to reconstruct the beliefs on which they will build their lives after 
having critically examined their beliefs, and, as I will argue, for supporting them while they are 
examining these beliefs. 
2.3 Support for Emerging Adults and Liberal Education 
 Arnett and sociologist James Côté before him have argued that the path to adulthood for 
young people in modern, industrialized societies has become elongated due to large-scale 
cultural, social, and economic changes over the past several decades.161 These changes have 
created a developmental environment in which “the social and institutional structures that once 
both supported and restricted people in the course of coming of age have weakened, leaving 
people with greater freedom but less support as they make their way into adulthood.”162 
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Numerous scholars have written about the weakening of tradition, the loss of grand narratives, 
the disintegration of community, and cultural fragmentation that are considered features of 
modernity and postmodernity and are said to contribute to a number of psychological and social 
ills.163 The sheer number of options — in nearly every area of life — with few, if any absolute 
standards for which ones would be better or “right,” other than that of maximizing freedom and 
being authentic, leaves many emerging adults at sea. Drawing on his own research and other 
studies of 18–23 year-olds, sociologist Christian Smith writes, 
The features marking this stage are intense identity exploration; instability; a focus on 
self, feelings of being in limbo, in transition, in between; and a sense of possibilities, 
opportunities, and unparalleled hope. These…are accompanied…by large doses of 
transience, confusion, anxiety, self-obsession, melodrama, conflict, disappointment, and 
sometimes emotional devastation.164 
 
Other scholarly and popular investigations into college-educated emerging adults during and  
after college, including those who attend or attended liberal arts colleges, reveal that they also 
experience overwhelming “confusion and helplessness,”165 remain “adrift” after graduating,166 
and suffer from a “sense of meaninglessness.”167  
 We can easily see that the approach to student development in contemporary higher 
education and the Socratic ideal of liberal education are manifestations of the weakening of 
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support structures. One could argue that college effects a more dramatic loss of support 
structures for undergraduates, most of whom are accustomed to a prescribed curriculum, highly 
directive teaching (especially in an age of standardized testing), and close supervision by 
teachers and school staff, not to mention being supervised by parents or other guardians at home. 
If they attend a residential college, they leave the relatively controlled environments of school 
and home and enter one in which there is not only minimal adult supervision and direction but 
possibly minimal adult contact, and therefore significantly greater freedom and less guidance in 
all aspects of their lives, regardless of whether or not they are pursuing a liberal arts education. 
That is, the only adults with whom most students must interact on a regular basis at college are 
their professors (and more likely graduate student teaching assistants), and they see them one to 
three times per week for one to three hours at a time for a ten-week quarter or sixteen-week 
semester. In large lecture courses, students may have little to no individual interaction with 
professors at all. At the same time, students’ interactions with student affairs professionals, other 
than their academic advisors, is voluntary and may be irregular. Any guidance they receive will 
necessarily be fragmentary, given the compartmentalization of units and departments.168  
 If students undertake a liberal education that follows the Socratic ideal, they also enter, 
often without realizing it, an intellectual culture that deliberately seeks to detach them from and 
“deconstruct” the beliefs in which they are anchored, as well as a general environment in which 
almost everything is up for debate but never settled. As we will see in the following chapters, 
some students find the drastic change in teaching style particularly disorienting, but historian 
Frederick Rudolph offers this wry and poignant description of the undergraduate’s experience in 
the modern university of the early twentieth century that might just as easily apply today:  
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The lecture seemed to symbolize the cold impersonalization that had overtaken 
much of undergraduate life….To this must be added the professional orientation 
of professors, the posture of suspended judgment encouraged by the scientific 
spirit of the university, a spirit which saw truth as tentative and thus discouraged 
the kind of full-blooded commitment that was invigorating to self-identity. 
Moreover, while it was one of the arguments of the university that by being 
abandoned to the dictates of his own interests, his own passions, the student was 
being trained in the school of self-reliance, actually this did not always happen. 
Many young men and women knew the experience of being abandoned, but 
somehow the sensations of self-reliance never seemed to follow.169  
 
Rudolph and the proliferation of scholarship in the past few decades on mentoring in 
undergraduate education suggest that students need more support and guidance as they become 
independent in making choices about their lives, and that colleges are either neglecting or 
inadequately meeting this need.170  
If students are seeking personal guidance about what to believe and how to live from 
those who are more experienced in life, or if they are struggling with confusion and emotional 
instability because they are critically examining the beliefs that had anchored them, to whom 
should they turn on the college campus? Student affairs staff in residential life, career advising, 
and counseling services will be variably equipped to address these types of concerns, depending 
on the individual staff member. The purpose of these units is not to help students think through 
the “big questions” in life, though, certainly, conversations on these kinds of questions might 
arise as students seek their services. The staff may not provide a perspective that may be most 
helpful to them, because their foci, training in, and approaches to student support are not likely to 
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operate within the intellectual, conceptual, disciplinary, and topical terrain of students’ learning 
in the classroom, which may be the primary source of students’ specific questions and confusion. 
Students could also possibly speak with the leaders of the various religious organizations, but 
what if they are wary of or opposed to religion? As mentioned, some institutions now have staff 
dedicated to spiritual matters that are not tied to any particular religion or organized, creedal 
religion at all. In 2005, Harvard University appointed a “humanist” chaplain for Humanist, 
agnostic, and atheist students.171  
These developments indicate that universities are beginning to perceive both students’ 
interest in and need for such services and a gap in the support they currently provide, which are a 
result of the philosophical and institutional shifts that have marginalized metaphysical, ethical, 
and existential concerns. In fact, a November 2018 article in The Chronicle of Higher Education 
reports that some colleges are rethinking their aims in light of the challenges emerging adults 
face, asking in its title, “Colleges teach students how to think. Should they also teach them how 
to thrive?” The article features examples of institutions that have undertaken initiatives with 
goals such as “helping students ‘thrive,’ or supporting their ‘flourishing’ or ‘well-being.’” The 
author notes that “troubling rates of anxiety and depression among today’s students and the 
pressure they face to focus on careers make a strong case that students need more help in making 
meaning and staking out a direction in their lives.” Some of these initiatives seek to support 
students’ flourishing and well-being through their academic experiences, such as a first-year 
course, “The Art and Science of Human Flourishing.”172 Another 2018 article in Inside Higher 
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Ed reports the creation of similar courses at other colleges that “share a common goal: encourage 
students to slow down, relax, and learn how to manage problems they’ll face outside of college.” 
One course is on the topic of “Existential Despair” and another teaches students “different 
methods of contemplation and introspection” to provide them “ways in which we can keep 
asking important questions of ourselves and of others.” Such courses aligns with a recent trend in 
writings and studies by educators and scholars who argue for the reintegration of existential, 
ethical, and spiritual questions, or questions of “meaning and purpose,” into the intellectual 
realm of students’ college lives given the complexity of the challenges emerging adults face and 
their reported interest in exploring these matters.173 An education that gives students the 
opportunity to consider these types of questions with faculty and fellow students is, they assert, 
not so much a new proposal as it is the very heart of what liberal education is meant to be, an 
education of and for the whole student.  
The rationalistic and depersonalized culture of the modern academy, however, make 
discussing such matters in a personal way that befits their deeply personal nature feel ill-fitting 
or inappropriate to the classroom environment. Precisely for this reason and because there were 
no other existing structures that supported these kinds of discussions, a senior at Princeton 
University started a weekly gathering for students to “work through questions and problems 
students confront outside of their academic lives.” He explains, “Students didn’t have a place 
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where they could reflect on how to build more fulfilling lives. They often found that they 
couldn’t do that in classrooms, and students who weren’t involved in religious groups didn’t 
have a place they can do that.”174 An undergraduate interviewed in a study on students’ search 
for purpose in college expresses (perceiving) a similar boundary with professors: “I’ve never had 
a professor with whom I would talk about these types of things … I feel like there’s sometimes a 
line with some professors. They don’t want to talk about these things. It’s like it never really 
comes up.”175 The brief time that students spend with professors and their classmates or large 
lecture courses where students may have little to no individual contact with faculty might make it 
difficult to develop the kind of relationship that enables personal conversations. It is also 
important to acknowledge that some students do not look to professors for these kinds of 
conversations.176  
Even when classroom learning is meant to engage students in deep self-reflection, the 
nature of modern intellectual inquiry can create the semblance of self-knowledge without 
actually leading to commitment or conviction. One Oberlin graduate, featured in a book entitled 
Quarterlife Crisis, a term that refers to the common experiences of intense anxiety and confusion 
among twenty-somethings, reflects,  
Going to a liberal liberal arts school, we all practically majored in being 
incredibly self-aware, probably bordering on neurotic and self-indulgent. But it 
was always somehow a safe topic to discuss from the distance of academic jargon, 
literary and pop culture reference, and silly gossip. When I graduated … I was 
really struck by how much I didn’t have my “self” figured out.177 
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Having oneself figured out is surely a lifelong endeavor, but this quote points to what a growing  
number of scholars see as a disconnect between one of the main purported benefits of liberal  
education — a more definite grasp of who one is and wants to be, won through critical self-
examination — and what students are actually gaining from their education and truly need to 
flourish. This disconnect, I have tried to show, is largely attributable to the contemporary ethos 
and practices of the Socratic ideal of liberal education. Along with the current institutional of 
contemporary higher education, the critical ethos, pedagogy, and mode of intellectual inquiry 
create a deficient developmental environment for today’s emerging adult student population. 
 In the remaining chapters, I delineate the risks that the examined life today poses to 
students’ flourishing and propose a more holistic educational ideal, conception of the professor, 
and mode of engaging with the world in the context of intellectual inquiry that I argue better 
serves the purpose of helping students become independent and flourishing adults. I seek to 
generate viable paths forward for liberal educators, primarily in secular, pluralistic institutions, 
out of some perennial educational debates: Is there a fruitful middle ground between submission 
to authority and total autonomy? Indoctrination and liberation? An overbearing paternalistic 
involvement and professional impersonality? An unquestioning, unreflective acceptance of ideas 
and a thoroughgoing criticality? Coming up not only with better philosophical and conceptual 
approaches to these debates but also practical and effective pedagogical recommendations is 










The Risks of the Examined Life 
 
   
I think it’s very difficult for a person to examine his own beliefs…. It’s hard to examine yourself in 
that way … it’s quite unnerving. 
 — Student interviewed in Perry study178 
 
Plato’s Socrates says that the unexamined life is not worth living. He suggests thereby that more 
examination may make life more worth living. Whether this is true surely depends on what the 
examination reveals. 




The Socratic ideal of liberal education has been promoted and defended as an education 
that enables students to flourish, or to a live a life worth living, to use Socrates’ words. The 
practice of critically examining the beliefs that shape one’s life and world, or critical thinking, is 
thought to enable students to lead flourishing lives because it fosters students’ autonomy, their 
capacity to form their own beliefs about how to live. Autonomy, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, has become the highest cultural ideal of post-Enlightenment Western cultures and the 
dominant aim of liberal education. Critical thinking, within this cultural ethos, is an unqualified 
good because it is necessary for the unqualified good of autonomy. The basic thrust of my 
argument in this chapter is that critical thinking is not an unqualified good and that it is not 
necessarily conducive to flourishing. My central claim is that critical thinking can impede 
students’ flourishing because it can cause emotional and psychological upheaval that undermines 
certain conditions that are necessary for living a worthwhile life.  
Critical thinking is necessarily disruptive and destabilizing to some degree because it 
requires that we detach from and question views that we may have taken for granted. If the 
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beliefs that we critically examine, and that we possibly determine to be untrue and then discard, 
are fundamental to who we are and how we view the world, this process can cause considerable 
emotional pain and be highly disorienting, potentially precipitating a profound existential crisis. 
Socrates himself recognizes that becoming educated out of or liberated from certain ways of 
thinking and viewing the world leads to emotional pain and suffering, as he describes in The 
Allegory of the Cave the prisoner’s disorientation and alienation from his fellow prisoners upon 
getting a glimpse of a different possible reality.180 We also see in the Socratic dialogues the 
disorienting effect Socrates’ questions have on his interlocutors.181 What I also hope to 
illuminate by having placed this practice in the broader critical ethos of modern liberal education 
and in the current institutional, cultural, and societal context in which emerging adult 
undergraduates are developing is that the features of contemporary liberal education could 
intensify these disruptions and even create risks that are particular to their developmental stage.  
On the whole, there has been little serious consideration of the risks of critical thinking in 
the literature on liberal education. Despite Socrates’ own recognition of the profound pain the 
prisoner experiences in the process of his transformation, relatively few scholars or educators 
mention this consequence in their advocacy of critical thinking. Socrates assumes the freed 
prisoner would see his pain as wholly worth the truth he came to see and would “count himself 
happy”182 because he would “prefer to … go through any sufferings rather than share [his fellow 
prisoners’] beliefs and live as they do.”183 Likewise, a few scholars acknowledge that 
questioning one’s beliefs can cause emotional and psychological distress but see this 
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consequence as justified by the purported benefits of the process and do not consider their 
implications for educational practice.184 Others take seriously the fact that educators may be 
inflicting this kind of suffering on their students when they engage them in critical thinking but 
do not go on to explore what their corollary responsibilities might be.  
 There have, however, been some more extensive and thoughtful inquiries into the 
disruptive consequences of critical thinking for students, though not necessarily undergraduates. 
Within philosophy of education, Sharon Todd and Megan Boler have shed light on the intense 
emotional reactions students have in social justice education courses, such as guilt, anger, and a 
sense of loss. In addition, Douglas Yacek has explored the ethics of “transformative education,” 
which includes social justice education and education for critical thinking (Yacek does not 
specifically refer to liberal education), arguing that education that aims at transformation can 
induce an identity crisis. They each argue, as I do, that educators must attend to these 
disruptions, delineating specific responsibilities and proposing specific educational practices.185 I 
seek to build on this scholarship by framing the consequences of critical thinking in terms of 
what they mean for students’ flourishing. 
 Student development researchers have given more attention to the experiences of 
undergraduates (traditional and nontraditional) with encountering a diversity of perspectives and 
new ways of thinking that challenge their basic assumptions, building on and largely 
corroborating Perry’s study.186 Following Perry, their inquiries have aimed to understand and 
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develop a model of how students’ views of knowledge and truth and how they come to their own 
conclusions evolve as they encounter a diversity of perspectives. Although these later scholars do 
not focus on the developmental or psychological risks of critical thinking, their studies 
poignantly reveal the internal struggle that ensues when students begin to critically examine their 
beliefs and are confronted with questions never considered, conflicting viewpoints, and 
proliferating uncertainties. Perry’s work and the subsequent studies show that the intellectual 
shifts students make to accommodate the conflicts and uncertainties, such as adopting a more 
relativistic view of knowledge, had significant ethical and existential consequences. Mary 
Belenky and her colleagues, who studied women’s intellectual development in higher education 
and their “struggle to claim the power of their own minds,” offer this reflection on the existential 
import of this process: 
We do not think of the ordinary person as preoccupied with such difficult and 
profound questions as: What is truth? What is authority? To whom do I listen? 
What counts for me as evidence? How do I know what I know? Yet to ask 
ourselves these questions and to reflect on our answers is more than an 
intellectual exercise, for our basic assumptions about the nature of truth and 
reality and the origins of knowledge shape the way we see the world and 
ourselves as participants in it. They affect our definitions of ourselves, the way we 
interact with others, our public and private personae, our sense of control over life 
events, our views of teaching and learning, and our conceptions of morality.187 
 
These studies that give voice to students’ responses to the expectation to become and the process 
of becoming a critical thinker are invaluable for considering some of the ways that our 
educational practices can contribute to and hinder students’ flourishing, for we see that it is a 
process that continuously requires them to reorient and restabilize themselves. In other words, 
the loss of orientation and stability is not automatically restored. I will be drawing on much of 
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their work to give flesh to the specific losses students can incur when they earnestly engage in 
the critical examination of their beliefs.  
 Together, this philosophical and student development scholarship has provided rich 
insight into the inherent risks that critical thinking can pose for students’ flourishing, though 
these scholars do not frame the risks in this way. As mentioned in the previous chapter, there has 
been increasing concern among student development scholars and critics of liberal education in 
helping students live lives of “meaning and purpose” or in their “meaning-making” efforts. 
Although I align myself with these scholars, I have chosen not to frame my project in terms of 
meaning, for it is variously and often vaguely defined both in scholarship and common parlance. 
By setting flourishing as our end in view, however, I believe we can understand these risks more 
clearly and comprehensively, as the scholars referenced above either address only one or two 
risks while neglecting others that I believe should not be ignored in educating emerging adults or 
they do not discuss them systematically. The primary purpose of this chapter, then, is to 
synthesize and extend their work to identify the ways that critically examining beliefs can 
impede students’ flourishing, so that these risks can be addressed more effectively in our 
educational practices. 
But what does it mean to flourish? And what role do our beliefs play in our flourishing 
such that critically examining them can be so disruptive? Although a full-fledged account of 
human flourishing is beyond the scope of this project, I must offer an answer to these questions 
in order to justify my claim and to propose educational practices that I believe will help students 
flourish. I propose a conception of flourishing that is not primarily defined by autonomy and that 
I argue should be the aim that guides the practices of liberal education. I will then use this 
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conception of flourishing to specify the risks to students’ flourishing that are inherent to the 
practice of critical thinking. 
3.1 Flourishing as Wholehearted Engagement with the Good 
The term “flourishing” has a long history in philosophical literature as a translation of 
Aristotle’s term eudaimonia, which has also been translated as “the good life,” “happiness,” and 
“well-being.” Having as its etymological root the Latin word for “flower,” it has a holistic and 
normative meaning, as Daniel DeNicola points out,188 and connotes the healthy growth and a 
healthy state of being of a living being. In the case of humans, it is a word that indicates the state 
of a person’s life as a whole, as opposed to just one aspect, such as her physical growth or 
intellectual development. Philosophers of education generally assume that the aim of education 
is to cultivate students’ capacities to lead flourishing lives, though they may also, or instead, 
refer to the good life, happiness, and well-being, as well as a meaningful life and a worthwhile 
life.189 Although the term enjoys little usage in most education discourse and contemporary 
American culture in general, some universities, as mentioned in the previous chapter, have begun 
describing their educational aims in terms of “flourishing” and its related terms, indicating a shift 
toward supporting the overall well-being of students, rather than focusing only on developing 
students’ capacity to think critically. 
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I will not explore the philosophical arguments that distinguish flourishing from the 
various related terms.190 Without a specific connection to Aristotle’s conception, I use 
“flourishing,” which I equate with living a worthwhile life. I understand flourishing to have an 
objective and subjective aspect. A worthwhile life is one that is objectively worthwhile, as 
determined by certain criteria independent of an individuals’ beliefs, preferences, desires, and 
interests, but it is also one that the individual experiences as worthwhile. I will further explore 
and defend this view later in this section. In addition, my concern is with what I refer to as the 
existential conditions and dimensions of flourishing, those related to our sense of who we are, 
who we want to become, and our place in and relation to the world we inhabit. In other words, I 
will not be attempting to theorize human flourishing in its entirety, which encompasses the 
physical, material, economic, and social dimensions of human life, the importance of which are 
not to be discounted in education.191 Throughout this chapter, I will simply use “flourishing” to 
refer to its existential dimensions. That said, I believe that the various dimensions are intimately 
connected, such that flourishing, or unflourishing, if you will, in any one of them affects the 
overall flourishing of a person. How we are doing in the existential aspects of our lives—feeling 
lost and anxious about our lives, for example—can and often does have consequences, for our 
physical health, productivity, and relationships. Also, while I believe that liberal education can 
and should contribute, even if indirectly, to the other dimensions of students’ lives, it is the 
existential dimension that the critical practices of liberal education specifically target for the 
purpose of enabling them to lead flourishing, that is, autonomous, lives. Critical thinking is 
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meant to enable students to determine for themselves what they believe is important, good, and 
right in defining who they are and want to be in the world. At the same time, critical thinking, I 
will argue, can dismantle certain conditions that are necessary for and thereby impedes students’ 
flourishing in the existential dimension of their lives if these conditions are not restored in some 
way. Furthermore, it is primarily with regard to the existential dimension of flourishing that I 
believe the unique value of liberal education can be realized if its aims and practices are 
modified.  
Finally, I seek to offer a “thick vague” conception of flourishing, to borrow a phrase from 
Martha Nussbaum.192 It is thick because it is normative, offering criteria by which to evaluate 
whether or not someone is leading a flourishing life. It is vague, however, because there are 
multiple, though not infinite, specific ways to fulfill these conditions, depending on an 
individual’s personality and values. My initial definition will be rather abstract but should 
become much more concrete in its description of what I believe are common human experiences 
as I delve into the specific conditions that critical thinking affects. Even so, my conception of 
flourishing will be largely formal, identifying aspects and conditions of flourishing in general 
terms rather than characterizing human flourishing in terms of particular beliefs and goods, as 
secular, pluralistic higher education institutions are limited in their ability to promote substantive 
ethical ideals at an institutional level, as discussed in the previous chapter. I leave as an open 
question for now whether or not individual educators can do so in some way.  
Offering a normative conception of human flourishing — that is, a conception of what 
flourishing means for all humans — may raise a red flag for many people. It has become passé to 
assert any universal or essential features of humanity, especially in the field of education, in 
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which much scholarship rightly seeks to illuminate the complex differences in how students 
within particular social locations experience and are affected by their interactions with formal 
educational institutions. In addition, in a culture that values the authority of one’s own judgment, 
the claim that there are universal criteria for anything will inevitably lead someone to ask, who is 
anyone to declare them so? And is it not paternalistic for educators to impose a conception of 
flourishing on their students? With regard to the first objection, I follow Nussbaum in contending 
that we can give a generalized and helpful account of “the shape of the human form of life”193 — 
and, in the context of this project, its existential shape. While the experiences of different 
individuals cannot be identical, much work in philosophy and qualitative social science research 
offers frameworks, concepts, and testimonies that show us commonalities in human experience 
that traverse both the demographic variables with the most currency in American society today 
(race, class, gender, sexual orientation) and other cultures and times, as we have come to know 
them through their writings and artifacts. As Côté and Vincent Tinto admonish in their studies of 
the elongated path to adulthood and patterns of leaving college, respectively, we should not, on 
the one hand, “focus on difference … to the exclusion of commonality … [and thereby] distort 
the ‘reality’ of people’s lives,”194 which are shaped by features of a modern society that affect all 
of us, and, on the other hand, “assum[e] that all members of a particular group share the same 
experience.”195 Not having conducted a large-scale empirical study myself, I also rely partly on 
the word of educators such as Robert Nash, a white male, and Michele Murray, a black woman, 
who emphatically state that they witness similar existential struggles among undergraduates of 
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“all socioeconomic, racial, and ethnic groups, in all major and minor concentrations of study, in 
all campus locations, and at all ages and stages of development.”196  
With regard to the paternalism objection, I argue, along with other thinkers, that 
education is essentially a paternalistic endeavor, whether on the level of the individual educator 
or the state.197 Educators should, and in fact already do, as Higgins argues, carry out their work 
guided by some idea of what it means for students to flourish, some idea of what is good for 
them, according to which they select course materials, direct classroom activities, and choose 
how to relate to students. (If they are not concerned with students’ flourishing, then they should 
not be educators.) As Harry Brighouse writes,  
At its limits, [the objection to paternalism] calls into question the very idea of 
parental obligation. If I feel uncomfortable with the role of facilitating a child to a 
lead a flourishing life, or making judgments about what a flourishing life will be 
for her, then I should feel equally uncomfortable forcing her to eat what I regard 
as healthy, or good, food, or to listen to what I believe I good music, or to read 
what I regard as enjoyable books…. Once we have accepted the principle of 
paternal obligation, we have accepted the paternalistic principle that we know 
better for the children what should happen to them than they do themselves.198  
 
College students are not children, but, as I argued in the previous chapter, it is well recognized 
that emerging adult undergraduates are not quite adults either and still need guidance. Of course, 
educators should not seek to force students to flourish in a particular way. Our views of what it 
means to flourish should be based on a combination of an understanding of something like the 
general shape of a human life and the particular needs and interests of individual students.  
Turning now to what flourishing means, my conception of flourishing is premised on the 
view that all human beings have certain psychological, emotional, and existential needs that are 
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fundamental to their flourishing and that they seek to fulfill. Psychologists and psychotherapists 
such as Erik Erikson, Erich Fromm, Abraham Maslow, Rollo May, and Viktor Frankl 
extensively theorized existential concerns, such as developing a stable and coherent identity, a 
sense of meaning and purpose in life, and a positive emotional attachment to the world, in terms 
of basic needs.199 Likewise, philosophers and sociologists such as Karl Marx, Martin Heidegger, 
Charles Taylor, Jonathan Lear, Rahel Jaeggi, and Anthony Giddens have also written about 
similar dimensions of human experience that have been or are being disrupted by cultural and 
social forces in modernity and late modernity, leading to internal fragmentation and a sense of 
alienation from oneself and others, as well as the need to experience the world as a hospitable 
environment for a meaningful human existence.200 (Much modern and contemporary literature, 
of course, also explores these experiences with great depth.) I am in agreement with these 
thinkers that, above and beyond physical survival and bare adaptation to the vicissitudes of life, 
human beings need, desire, and seek 
• what is and what they believe to be good, pleasing, and worthwhile, rather than what 
is and what they believe to be bad, painful, and worthless; 
• stability and security rather than instability and insecurity 
• coherence and integration, both in their inner lives and the world they see, rather than 
fragmentation; 
• purposefulness rather than aimlessness, both in their individual lives and with regard 
to external events 
• a sense of belonging, acceptance, and esteem by some community rather than 
isolation and rejection; and 
• involvement in the world through worthwhile projects and relationships rather than 
detachment and estrangement from the world and others 
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When these needs are met, we have a sense that life is worth living and worth investing in, and 
we have a sense of hope, an anticipation of some higher good to be realized in our lives, without 
which we lose the motivation to live at all. This outlook also fuels our motivation to continue to 
seek those goods that fulfill these needs and nurture our flourishing. I believe the items listed 
above are not particularly controversial, but it is worth noting that scholars in the relatively new 
field of positive psychology, which seeks to scientifically determine the elements necessary for a 
flourishing life, have come up with similar lists, though the definitions of each element they 
propose are much less specific with regard to the subjective experience I have tried to 
describe.201  
Based on these assumptions, I offer a brief definition of flourishing as “wholehearted 
engagement with the good.” This definition is meant to characterize the objective and subjective 
aspects of flourishing,202 some of which I have described in the list above but that I now want to 
integrate into a portrait of flourishing, which I will do through components of the phrase. By 
“wholehearted engagement,” I mean a relationship to the world that is characterized by 
involvement, through the pursuit of particular projects, relationships, and ideals in which an 
individual is personally invested because she feels it aligns with her own values, purposes, and 
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interests, and through which she feels a positive attachment to the world she inhabits. In this 
wholehearted engagement, she does not feel alienated from herself or the world; or, positively 
stated, she feels in harmony and at home with herself and in the world. Furthermore, as a 
wholehearted engagement, rather than a half-hearted pursuit restrained by a lack of interest or 
conviction, it is anchored by a commitment to the pursuit, which lends her life stability.  
“Engagement with the good” connotes both her subjective experience of believing and 
feeling that she is involved in something good and worthwhile, and an engagement that is 
objectively good and worthwhile. (I will return to why it is singular in a moment, but I do not 
mean that the individual is engaged in only one pursuit). To explain, it is not sufficient for an 
individual to believe and feel that she is engaged in something that is good; it must be 
objectively good. We can think about the objectivity of the good and its necessity in three ways. 
First, as Richard Kraut formulates it, what is objectively good is what is good for the person’s 
flourishing, if we accept that we can articulate universal conditions for and features of human 
flourishing.203 Those engagements that are objectively good are those that contribute to the 
conditions listed above. I take Brighouse’s assertion that there are “objectively valuable goods” 
and that “it is not very controversial that there exists a wide variety of goods, nor that there is a 
basis for distinguishing them from, at least some, very bad things” to be partly premised on this 
view.204 He writes, “however much a miser enjoys his hoarding, his life is not made worthwhile 
by it, because a life devoted to hoarding money is not worthwhile,” relying, I believe, on the 
view that being greedy is not a good way to live for a human being and, or because, morally 
wrong.205 It is possible that Brighouse is only basing his assertion on the view that it is morally 
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wrong to be greedy. I will only suggest here that living in ways that are morally wrong is also 
bad for a person, that is, detrimental to their flourishing. 
Second, what the individual believes to be good must also be recognized and validated by 
others as good, for our understanding of what is good and worthwhile is necessarily socially 
derived. As Taylor argues, what has significance to us as good and valuable, whether something 
we see in the world or something about ourselves, acquires that significance through a shared 
outlook against which what is good and valuable are evaluated.206 Thus, a life devoted to 
“counting blades of grass” in John Rawls’s famous thought experiment would not be considered 
by most people to be a worthwhile life, either for themselves or others.207  
Third, although I cannot fully argue for this view here, I will simply assert that the good 
excludes ideals and actions that are based on selfish interest and ill will toward others. I think it 
is uncontroversial to say that other-regarding concerns and actions, that is, those rooted in a 
genuine care and love for others, are necessary for a worthwhile life, a view espoused by the 
major religious traditions, spiritual thinkers, ethicists, and psychologists.208 We can, therefore, 
rule out of the possibilities for a flourishing life the activities of an ISIS-inspired terrorist, for 
instance, even if the individual understands himself to be doing something worthwhile and is 
affirmed by ISIS members and supporters, because a life that seeks to harm or kill people 
through violent or other means simply is not good. Of course, there are less clear-cut cases, but I 
think there is more consensus about what is good than what might be argued within a critical 
                                                 
206 Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity, 43–53. 
207 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1971), 432. 
208 Outside of religious traditions, see, for example, Thomas Nagel, On the Possibility of Altrusim (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1970); Seligman, Flourish: A Visionary New Understanding of Happiness and Well-
Being; Graham Music, The Good Life: Wellbeing and the New Science of Altrulsm, Selfishness, and Immorality 
(London: Routledge, 2014).  
 78 
ethos that questions nearly everything. As Iris Murdoch writes, with all seriousness in her 
implication of philosophy,  
It seems that we really do know a certain amount about Good and about the way 
in which it is connected with our condition. The ordinary person does not, unless 
corrupted by philosophy, believe that he creates values by his choices. He thinks 
that some things really are better than others and that he is capable of getting it 
wrong. We are not usually in doubt about the direction in which Good lies. 
Equally we recognize the real existence of evil: cynicism, cruelty, indifference to 
suffering.209 
 
Aside from indicating the objectivity of the good (as opposed to only what is good to 
me), the good in its singular form refers to a coherent and integrated set of beliefs about what is 
good and worthwhile that orients and provides an overall direction for an individual’s life. There 
are numerous goods, ideals, and worthwhile engagements a person can pursue, whether character 
virtues, such as loyalty and courage, the cause of justice, or activities, such as learning to play 
the violin, spending time with family and friends, volunteering at homeless shelter, working as a 
teacher, and hiking in the mountains, just to name a handful. There are innumerable variations of 
these, and they cannot all be pursued at the same time, either because of time constraints or 
because there may be deeper moral or philosophical conflicts between our options. Our choices 
must be guided by a certain higher ideal against which we evaluate our options, what Taylor 
calls “‘hypergoods,’ [that is,] goods which not only are comparably more important than others 
but provide the standpoint from which these must be weighed, judged and decided about.”210 Not 
having a basis for such judgments leads to confusion, arbitrary decisions, and/or aimlessness. 
Integrating the strands of the discussion above, a flourishing life that is characterized by 
wholehearted engagement with the good is one in which we are purposefully engaged in pursuits 
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that are both objectively good, to which we are personally committed, and that we experience 
and believe to be good and worthwhile, such that we feel at home with ourselves and in the 
world as a place hospitable to our needs and desires. By contrast, a life that is not flourishing 
would be characterized by a lack of purposeful engagements with the good and a sense of 
alienation from oneself and the world. 
It might seem like a conspicuous omission to some that I did not include autonomy in my 
conception of flourishing, but I believe it is possible to live a flourishing life that one has not 
autonomously chosen. It is important to distinguish here between wholehearted engagement and 
an autonomous engagement. First, there may be individuals who do not have the capacity to 
make autonomous choices, due to their developmental stage (such as infants) or severe cognitive, 
intellectual, or other mental impairment. I would not say that such individuals cannot lead 
flourishing lives within their given conditions or limitations. In fact, Barry Schwartz argues that 
those who are not burdened with making autonomous choices are more satisfied and happier than 
those of us who live under the “tyranny of choice.”211 Furthermore, it is possible for someone to 
be wholeheartedly engaged with the good — that is, engaged in something objectively good and 
to be personally invested in this engagement — without having autonomously chosen to do so. 
As Brighouse writes, “Someone can know their way of life suits them well without knowing or 
thinking much about alternatives, so they don’t have to think critically about the alternatives in 
order to identify with their life.”212 In the case of today’s undergraduates, however, I take it as a 
given that most, if not all213 — especially in secular, pluralistic institutions — will be confronted 
with the necessity of choosing among alternatives by the sheer number of options they face in 
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their college experience, in popular media, and in the market-driven, consumer-oriented culture 
of American society. Ideally, liberal education cultivates the capacity not just to choose, but to 
choose well, to thoughtfully choose the options that contribute to their flourishing.  
I have proposed this conception of flourishing to serve both as a framework for 
understanding the kinds of risks critical thinking poses to students and as an educational aim for 
liberal education that will better support students’ development. I now take a closer look at the 
role of beliefs in our lives and our flourishing to show the specific ways critically examining 
them can dismantle the conditions of flourishing.  
3.2 Beliefs and Flourishing 
In liberal education discourse, there is frequent discussion about getting students to 
question and engage in dialogue about their “deeply held beliefs” or “deeply held values.” The 
phrase implies that certain beliefs play a fundamental role in our lives and that they are 
something we hold dear. There is also an understanding that discussion about such beliefs, in 
which they might be challenged, can lead to offense and anxiety and requires tact and sensitivity, 
especially on the part of the educator. To understand why examining and having our beliefs 
challenged can be so unsettling, we have to understand the existential nature of our relationship 
to our beliefs.  
I use “belief” to refer to a subconsciously or consciously held understanding of an object, 
an issue, a person, including ourselves, or any aspect of the concrete and abstract reality in which 
we live, however that belief was acquired. As I have defined it, we can see that our entire lives 
rest on beliefs of different kinds. Recalling from the previous chapter the various domains of 
knowledge in which academic inquiry is conducted today, we hold beliefs about 
 81 
• physical, social, existential, and spiritual reality: about nature and the cosmos, what 
society is like and how society functions, the human condition (existential, spiritual, 
material) 
• the past and future of these realities: how all of these have come to be as they are and 
how they will be in the future 
• ethical beliefs: beliefs about what is good and right to be and do, what we bear 
responsibility to be and do, the standards by which we judge these 
• the nature of truth and knowledge: what truth and knowledge amount to, how we know 
what we know and justify it 
 
It is not an exaggeration to say that our beliefs constitute the entire understanding of reality in 
and by which we live. I am not arguing for a solipsistic conception of reality, where there is no 
such thing as an objective reality or fact; rather, I am stating that our beliefs about reality are 
simply what we take to be the case about what is real and true, however partial or incorrect they 
are. Our beliefs, therefore, are fundamental to the way we live and experience our lives, 
informing all of our responses to what and whom we encounter and all of our choices for how to 
think and act, even the most mundane.  
We are usually unaware of the most basic beliefs we hold and by which we live until they 
are challenged, whether in conversation with someone who disagrees with us or perhaps more 
commonly through circumstances that defy our expectations. As Heidegger brings to light, in our 
everyday lives, we are immersed, mentally and emotionally absorbed, and wholly invested in the 
world as we understand it, taking for granted these understandings as we pursue our various 
purposes, even if we never consciously chose them. They make up the world into which we are 
“thrown.”214 It is only when things do not go or work as expected that we begin to examine the 
beliefs that formed our expectations. Prior to this moment, we may not have ever explicitly 
acknowledged or articulated our beliefs about the matter. Moreover, we do not hold our beliefs 
in isolation from each other. They are connected to each other in an understanding of reality, 
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perhaps as premises or conclusions that follow from other beliefs that form part of a larger 
narrative framework through which we interpret our experience. Thus, if a belief in one domain 
is challenged or contradicted by an experience, we may discover that a whole set of beliefs must 
be reconsidered.  
 Despite its usage and connotations in modern English, to believe something, as 
suggested by Heidegger’s conception of our relation to the world, is not a solely rational, 
intellectual act of agreement with a proposition. In his illuminating etymology of the word 
“believe,” Wilfred Cantwell Smith traces the evolution of its meaning, beginning during the 
Enlightenment period, whereby it once connoted an act that involves the commitment of the 
whole person but has shifted “toward the impersonal, the non-committal, and the dubious.”215 He 
writes “Literally, and originally, ‘to believe’ means ‘to hold dear’: virtually, to love,’” which is 
apparent in the German word belieben, where lieb means “love” and “belieben, then, is to treat 
as lieb, to consider lovely, to like, to wish for, to choose.”216 In its earlier usages, belief connoted 
a personal commitment to someone or some truth (as in, “I believe in”); it meant to “set one’s 
heart”217 on a person, object, or truth with an attitude of “trust.”218 Because belief involves a 
commitment of the self and the whole person, what one believes should be manifested in one’s 
actions: “To believe is to follow through in practice what one recognizes intellectually.”219 
Furthermore, statements of belief were a personal declaration of one’s commitment to the truth, 
and the verb was typically used only in the first-person formulation, “I believe.” Over time, 
belief has come to be associated with intellectual (rational) assent to a proposition, is often used 
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in a descriptive, third-person context to refer to beliefs that are not one’s own, and is applied 
especially to ones that might be or are false, as in “the belief that the earth is flat.”220 As this 
example suggests, “belief” no longer carries the same personal, or as Smith puts it, “existential” 
weight of the speaker committing to the truth.  
Even though our usage and understanding of the word has changed, the fact that our 
beliefs involve a commitment that is embodied in how we actually live has not. If we truly 
believe something, if we trust that it is true, and if that belief is not challenged by a conflicting 
view we take seriously, we will internally respond and outwardly act accordingly. It is also worth 
noting that recent work among analytic philosophers has pointed to the fundamental role that 
trust plays in what we (think we) know and believe, whether trust in our own rational capacities, 
in others’ rational capacities and testimony, in authority, or in our emotions.221  
As this brief exposition of “believe” indicates, from the perspective of lived and felt 
experience, the reality in which we live and with which we interact is not composed of neutral 
facts about the world towards which we take a detached stance. First, the reality we subjectively 
inhabit, until disrupted in some way, is emotionally characterized by a relationship of attachment 
and trust. The most fundamental beliefs we hold about the nature of reality and the human 
condition are the basis for what Anthony Giddens calls a sense of “ontological security.”222 “To 
be ontologically secure,” he writes, “is to possess, on the level of unconscious and practical 
consciousness, ‘answers’ to fundamental existential questions which all human life in some way 
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addresses.”223 It is in virtue of these answers, or our beliefs, with regard to questions about the 
nature of the objects and events we encounter, human finitude, our relations to others, and our 
identity that we are able to go about our daily lives. In trusting these answers, we “[bracket]… a 
potentially almost infinite range of possibilities open to the individual.”224 Our beliefs about the 
way things are and should be are our “framework of reality,” and in the mode of practical 
consciousness, which is our “natural” or dominant mode of being, we simply take these beliefs 
for granted.225 Experientially, this framework of reality could be described as our existential 
home,226 where home connotes a place in which we feel safe, secure, and at rest. One of the 
students in Perry’s study expresses just this relationship between our fundamental beliefs and our 
sense of security: “I’d feel (laughs) rather insecure thinking about these philosophical things all 
the time and not coming up with any definite answers. And definite answers are well, they, 
they’re sort of my foundation point.”227 
In addition to being the ground of our existential sense of security, our beliefs also imbue 
the objects (including people, facts, and ideas) we encounter with particular meanings and value 
relative to our (perceived) needs, desires, and purposes or because of some intrinsic good we 
apprehend in particular objects. In other words, all of our encounters with the world are mediated 
by some understanding of the objects, an understanding that primarily concerns the particular 
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significance that these objects have in and for our lives. That significance has an ethical value. 
Our assessments (whether tacitly or explicitly held) define “a moral space” in which we are 
oriented, “a space in which questions arise about what is good or bad, what is worth doing and 
what not, what has meaning and importance for you and what is trivial and secondary.”228 The 
capacity to make these distinctions among our options enables us to make decisions and set the 
direction that we want our lives to take, whether in the short or long term; this capacity is 
fundamental to human agency. These evaluations, these ethical beliefs, point us toward the 
goods, projects, and relationships in which we choose to engage, and, together, they form what 
Taylor calls the “inescapable frameworks” by which we view, organize, and make sense of our 
experiences and out of which we live our ethical lives.229  
Importantly, the distinctions most central to our lives are those that are not about what 
most would consider of trivial significance, such as whether vanilla or chocolate ice cream is 
better, but those that involve “strong evaluations,” those that bear on the question of how to live 
a worthwhile or meaningful life: “These are issues of strong evaluation, because the people who 
ask these questions have no doubt that one can, following one’s immediate wishes and desires, 
take a wrong turn and hence fail to lead a full life.”230 The weight of this question and the 
pressure of “getting it right” is exemplified in the question that induces so much anxiety in many 
undergraduates today, “What should I do with my life?” Whether the student is weighing 
parental expectations against their own dreams or trying to decide among multiple, conflicting 
aspirations, there is the fear that making the wrong decision will lead them down the path of 
failure, regret, and misery. While moral distinctions between what is right and wrong are 
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important for orienting our lives, most of the decisions we make about how to live are not quite 
so stark: “There are questions about how I am going to live my life which touch on the issues of 
what kind of life is worth living, or what kind of life would fulfill the promise implicit in my 
particular talents, or the demands incumbent on someone with my endowment, or of what 
constitutes a rich and meaningful life—as against one concerned with secondary matters or 
trivia.”231 As suggested in the earlier discussion of the good, within our ethical frameworks, not 
all goods, ends, and ideals are equal, and how we answer these questions, what we believe the 
answers are, orders and gives direction to our lives because we will move towards and commit 
ourselves to those goods we deem better or “higher” because we believe they constitute a 
worthwhile life.232 Our choices cohere around a hypergood — whether it be a career aspiration, a 
particular romantic relationship, eternal life — and the attainment of it serves as the measure of 
the worth of our lives.  
This orientation and commitment to particular, higher goods is central to our identities. In 
other words, beliefs about what is right and good and what makes for a worthwhile life, 
particularly those commitments that we see as essential, are part of how we understand and 
define ourselves. Taylor writes, “Our identity is what allows us to define what is important to us 
and not,”233 and a stable sense of identity depends on the coherence and sense of continuity of 
these commitments. An identity crisis is precisely that experience where there is deep uncertainty 
or conflict about just what is most important to us in choosing how to live and in knowing where 
and with whom we stand. In the United States, identity has become almost synonymous with 
sociological markers of difference — race, ethnicity, class, gender, sexual orientation, religion, 
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to name the most prevalent in public discourse. From the perspective of how an individual 
understands herself, however, it is not the marker itself that defines her identity; it is the extent to 
which that marker means something in terms of what is important to her.234 A marker itself can 
be more or less central to her identity and can have more or less of a defining influence on the 
choices she makes. To offer a personal example, I am a Christian, Korean American, female 
graduate student. On the level of my commitments, my religious faith has been a stronger 
determinant of what I value and endorse, the relationships I develop, and my professional 
aspirations, though there are important ways in which my faith intersects with my ethnic and 
gender identity (and there are certainly important distinctions to be made within Christianity); 
and my crisis of faith has led to the most intense identity crisis. Next to my religious identity, my 
vocational identity as a college teacher (more so than a scholar) has a stronger influence on how 
I use my time than my being Korean American or a woman (and I have left out my being a 
daughter and an aunt from among the roles that shape my commitments). Conceiving of identity 
in terms of our ethical orientation helps us understand what it means when we say that certain 
beliefs are fundamental to who we are and why a change in our deeply held beliefs can create 
such anxiety or a deep sense of loss. 
Finally, our beliefs are central to our social attachments and identity as a member of 
certain groups both because they are inculcated and/or shaped by the communities and cultures 
in which we were socialized and because shared commitments, whether acquired in childhood or 
developed consciously as an adult, create a sense of affinity with others. Our beliefs are often the 
very basis for being able to belong to a community. We often think of communities as being 
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bonded by shared ethical beliefs (for instance, religious and political, as well as communities of 
practice that consider both the practice itself and the values that inhere in the practice important 
for a worthwhile life), but beliefs about reality can be just as integral when they are linked to a 
broader ethical outlook. For instance, belief in God or any supernatural order as well as the 
rejection of this belief, and all that these may imply, are defining features of certain 
communities. Thus, there are explicitly atheist or secular organizations. An example of a belief 
about social reality that has implications for political affiliations is the belief that structural 
racism is operative in American society, which divides many conservatives and liberals in the 
United States.   
Our beliefs, we can see, form, at least partially, the basis for the various conditions for 
flourishing I delineated. What we believe about certain existential questions gives us a sense of 
security. Our ethical beliefs order and give direction to our lives by pointing us to the goods we 
deem worthwhile and with which we choose to engage. The communities to which we belong are 
often defined according to our beliefs. Furthermore, while there is a cognitive component to all 
beliefs and while our assent to a particular view that becomes our belief may be intellectually 
justified, beliefs have profound existential significance and are emotionally anchored in our 
lives. When we detach ourselves and become unanchored from the beliefs that play a central role 
in these aspects of our flourishing, we cannot but help but be disturbed.  
In the remainder of this chapter, I will examine more closely the ways critical thinking 
can disrupt the conditions of flourishing for undergraduates, taking into account the educational 
and cultural contexts in which they live and their developmental stage.235 
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3.3 Disrupting the Conditions of Flourishing 
 The practice of critically examining one’s beliefs, we will recall, embodies a general 
mode of engaging with the world and scrutinizes beliefs through specific questions. Both of 
these aspects can undermine students’ flourishing. As a mode of engagement, it is detached, 
rationalistic, and skeptical or suspicious. This mode is in tension with the wholehearted 
engagement with the good that I have argued characterizes a flourishing life, in which a person 
seeks to be involved and personally invested in the world through the pursuit of what she 
believes — trusts — to be good. The specific questions that frame critical thinking express the 
general skepticism or suspicion of the critical mode: 
1) Is X [some belief/view] justified, or valid? 
2) In what ways can a text or event be interpreted to challenge our assumptions?  
3) How does this text or interpretation of a text promote or undermine the status quo 
(where the status quo is seen to be negative and/or oppressive)? 
4) In what ways does this X [some idea/situation] fail to live up to Y ideal? 
5) Who benefits from or is disempowered by X [some belief/view/situation]? 
 
Students can confront these questions and be unsettled with regard to any of the beliefs that 
shape their reality and many of them at the same time within courses in different disciplines. As I 
discussed in the previous chapter, for many students, college will be the first time they are asked 
(or required) to examine their beliefs in these ways, although certainly some may have already 
begun to ask at least the first question, if not others, regarding some of their beliefs on their own 
by virtue of the fact that they are emerging adults who are in a period of exploration about their 
identities and values.  
 Taking these factors into account, there are four specific risks to students’ flourishing that 
I argue critical thinking poses: (1) a loss of epistemic stability; (2) a loss of orientation, purpose, 
and hope for one’s future; (3) a loss of faith in the world and hope for the human condition; (4) a 
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loss of belonging.236 Losses in these dimensions can be seen as different forms of alienation, 
different forms of detachment rather than wholehearted engagement with the world as a place 
students believe is good and good for nurturing a life worth living. In explicating these 
dimensions, I rely on student voices wherever possible to describe their experiences with critical 
thinking, much of which I have garnered from Perry’s study, as well as the work of other student 
development researchers and the written work of my own students. In addition, these dimensions 
are not discrete but rather are intimately connected with one another, such that instability in one 
area easily, though not always, creates instability in another. Thus, there will be hints or direct 
references to multiple dimensions in some of the quotations I use, but I will focus on one 
dimension at a time.  
 Finally, while I maintain that the possibility of these risks is universal, I do not claim that 
the particular ways that individual students experience destabilization in the four realms is  
exactly the same or that all students experience each of them or any one of them to the same  
degree or with regard to same subject matter. Students will experience these instabilities with 
lesser or greater intensity and have different beliefs unsettled depending on the traditions, 
cultural norms, and social identities that have shaped their lives prior to college, including race 
and ethnicity, socioeconomic status, religion, gender, and sexual orientation. Those whose 
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beliefs and social backgrounds differ from the dominant norms of their higher education 
institution may experience greater destabilization in any one of dimensions that critical thinking 
disrupts because entering the college environment can itself be a highly disruptive transition.237  
(1) Loss of Epistemic Stability 
Many, if not most, students enter college with a largely dualistic view of the world, where 
they believe there are right and wrong answers to most questions that, within an educational 
context, the educators (as the authority figures) possess and that students are there to learn.238 
Most K-12 schools still work within what Philip Jackson calls the “mimetic” tradition of 
teaching or what Paulo Freire calls the “banking” method, where the aim is to transmit what is 
known from the teacher to the student who does not know.239 One of the most difficult 
adjustments first-year undergraduates must make, particularly in humanities and social science 
courses, is grasping the notion that there are multiple interpretations and perspectives on almost 
everything and that the teacher, whether they “know the answers” or not, is not there to simply 
tell them what they are. Of course, students often face this multiplicity of perspectives among 
their peers within the college environment in general, but exposure to diverse and conflicting 
perspectives along with explicit challenges by the educator to particular views that students 
express are deliberate pedagogical methods for unsettling their beliefs, stimulating critical 
thinking, and getting students to “think for themselves.” Moreover, the sheer number of open 
questions students face can be overwhelming. Perry observes, “The function of the college … is 
                                                 
237 Tinto, Leaving College: Rethinking the Causes and Cures of Student Attrition; Daniel F. and Chrisotopher G. 
Takacs Chambliss, How College Works (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014). 
238 Perry, Forms of Intellectual and Ethical Development in the College Years: A Scheme; Belenky et al., Women’s 
Ways of Knowing: The Development of Self, Voice, and Mind; Baxter Magolda, Knowing and Reasoning in College: 
Gender-Related Patterns in Students’ Intellectual Development. 
239 Philip W. Jackson, The Mimetic and the Transformative: Alternative Outlooks on Teaching (New York: Teachers 
College Press, 1986); Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (New York: Continuum, 2005), 72. 
 92 
to present to the students’ attention in concentrated form all the questions that the sophomore in 
man has raised for himself through the ages and which he has then spent the rest of his history 
trying to resolve, rephrase, or learn to live with.”240  
For students, this difference is not just a change in teaching methods; it presents to them 
an entirely different way of viewing the world, that is, a different reality that challenges their 
fundamental beliefs about the nature of reality, and consequently, they must suddenly figure out 
how to make their way in it. One student in Perry’s study who had a particularly difficult time 
adjusting to this shift remarks: 
Ah, they [the teachers], they-ah keep throwing out questions…. I mean, we never 
seem to find an absolute answer to it…. I mean, maybe I like science more 
because there is a definite answer to certain things. There’s a definite reason for 
certain, why certain things occur… And Soc. Sci. seems to be left open; there 
seem to be too many ways…. Here,... you’ve got to read a book, and they, they, 
they don’t give you a question on the book. They, they give you a big 
generalization, bit questions to answer, and you pick out all the facts, and you 
form them into some kind of a[n] answer which you can give them, why. You find 
out the “why.” At [high] school, I mean, they told you exactly. 
There’s too much, too much of a change to get from one to the other, I 
mean, all in one year. I haven’t even been able to get hold of it yet. I can’t get a 
hold of it. I mean I haven’t even been able to-ah, I haven’t had enough practice in 
being able to think that way.241 
 
This student reveals that he has more insight than he perhaps realized — that questioning and  
searching for an answer is a way of thinking that is learned through practice. 
This change in the approach to learning and knowledge is a tectonic shift that can be 
highly destabilizing and disorienting. Remarking on their242 first-year of college, another student 
in Perry’s study observes,  
It has involved the tearing away of a lot of beliefs in what has been imposed by 
convention…. in the past months, it’s been a matter of having really … having 
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reduced to the level where I really wasn’t sure there was anything in particular to 
know. I, you do begin to wonder on what basis you’d judge any decision at all, 
‘cause there really isn’t … too much of an absolute you can rely on … Well, it’s 
just that right now I’m not sure … [of] how to make any decision at all.243 
 
If we recall that we hold beliefs with an attitude of trust, we can interpret the student’s comment 
that there isn’t “much of an absolute to rely on” to mean that they are not sure what to trust with 
regard to what is true and right. They have lost, as the student previously quoted put it, the 
“foundation point” on which they can firmly take their next steps. 
Perry and his colleagues conducted this research in the 1960s, and it might seem that 
students today might not experience as drastic a change when they enter college, given that 
nearly unfettered access to vast amounts of information from all over the world allows for 
greater exposure to a diversity of perspectives. But Lucas Blake,244 a junior Music Education 
major whom I taught in the fall of 2016 expressed the same sentiment, in the same terms I have 
been using, in response to Richard Rorty’s proposal that K-12 education be concerned with 
socializing the young into “what their elders take to be true, whether it is true or not”245 and that 
college be concerned with “encourage[ing] Socratic scepticism” about these truths.246 He writes, 
“The problem is not that of the order of socialization and individuation. Rorty is spot on. It is the 
most logical progression of these two processes. The problem is the all too sudden flip between 
these two that causes confusion, disillusionment, and hardships for students; sometimes even 
when their formal schooling has passed.” Lucas had not yet graduated at the time, so, perhaps, in 
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looking into his own future, he could not see a way through or out of his confusion,247 and he 
goes on to theorize (astutely, I think) how this confusion affects students’ development:  
[Students] will believe [what they have been taught in primary and secondary 
education] to be the absolute truth. The developmental years of school (sixth 
through eighth grade) will shape their personalities and minds with faith that these 
truths are just. Students will go through some of their most psychologically and 
mentally taxing years, years that make them who they are, just to have key truths 
be denied. Seeing the lies pile up and the faith dwindle away as they enroll in 
higher education, students will develop themselves around this disillusioned 
feeling. It will become a part of them that is hard to break free from…There was 
faith and trust that was broken. 
 
Without this faith and trust, it is hard to know to what one should commit and what or whom to 
believe. 
Perry notes several times the potential slippery slope towards an all-encompassing 
helplessness and nihilism towards which critical thinking can lead when students face the 
“multiplicity” of ideas but do not sense that there is a way to find an answer or are not given 
guidance with regard to how to navigate life without ultimate answers. He gives voice to their 
outlook as follows: 
It may be easy enough to see at the outset that interpretations of a book may lie on 
a range, with those demonstrating the greatest integrity near the center, and others 
grading off to either side toward the relatively untenable. Next it would be clear 
why different interpretations, from either side, might be assigned the same 
value… If this defines the truth for term papers, how about people? Principalities? 
Powers? How about the Deity himself?... And my enemies? Are they not wholly 
wrong?... Will no one tell me if I am right? Can I never be sure? Am I alone?248 
 
While only a few students went down this path, and while factors related to students’ personal 
lives may have influenced their responses to their academic experiences, the fact that there are 
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any students who do, then and now, should give us pause.249 Most students eventually found a 
way move forward, but, for a handful, their confusion lasted throughout college and left them in 
a state of limbo. In my experience, it has been the students who most genuinely and deeply 
engage with the questions and ideas that are prone to experience this deep existential confusion 
most intensely. Other students in Perry’s study were unable to cope with the uncertainty and 
“retreated” back to their dualistic framework. 
Perhaps what is most unnerving in losing their trust in any absolute on which to rely is 
that students lose their trust in their own capacity to come to a conclusion about what is true and 
right. One student in Perry’s study confesses, “I’m very anxious to have some true beliefs. But 
then it goes away, very quickly; I can’t really trust my beliefs.”250 Philosophers Keith Lerher and 
Linda Zagzebski have brought to the fore the fundamental role of epistemic self-trust in belief 
formation and intellectual autonomy itself.251 In their study of women’s identity and intellectual 
development, Belenky and her colleagues found that one of the primary challenges for many 
women is to maintain trust in their own cognitive and intellectual abilities in a culture where 
women’s voices are less heard and most authority figures are male.252 One woman recounts one 
of her first introductory science courses in college, in which the professor asked students to guess 
how many beans were in a jar. After several students offered a number of extremely varied and 
inaccurate estimates, he “revealed the correct answer and announced, ‘You have just learned an 
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important lesson about science. Never trust the evidence of your own senses.’” Belenky goes on 
to describe the woman’s reaction, which she shared in her interview thirty years later:  
The seventeen-year-old girl could not accept or even hear the invitation. Her 
sense of herself as a knower was shaky, and it was based on the belief that she 
could trust her own firsthand experience as a source of truth. This man was saying 
that this belief was fallacious. He was taking away her only tool for knowing and 
providing no substitute. “I remember feeling small and scared,” the woman says, 
‘and I did the only thing I could do. I dropped the course that afternoon, and I 
haven’t gone near science since.”253 
 
The young woman’s fear and decision to flee are understandable if she felt she had no other way 
of knowing what is real and true except through her senses, which may be our most immediate 
mode of apprehending the world. In Perry’s study, some students did not just avoid a course; 
they avoided college: “We have known some students, in our work as counselors, who indeed 
found the impact of diversity so disruptive and unassimilable that they left college.… others 
somehow survived, but only at the cost of a bitter, uncomprehending entrenchment.”254 
Erikson, on whose theory of identity Giddens’s conception of ontological trust is based, 
argues that “a sense of basic trust,” which he defines as “an essential trustfulness of others and a 
fundamental sense of one’s own trustworthiness,” is “the most fundamental prerequisite of 
mental vitality.” I would argue that “mental vitality” is one of the ways that Erikson seeks to 
capture what it is and feels like to flourish and thrive in the face of life’s challenges.255 (Others 
include “psychologically alive,”256 “psychosocial strength,”257 and having “capacity to adapt to 
life’s necessities—with some vital enthusiasm to spare”258). Erikson focuses on trust in other 
people’s and our own character and behavior, with its beginnings in maternal love, but cognitive 
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and intellectual self-trust would seem even more or just as basic with regard to agency and 
developing our identities. Recalling that our identities are constituted by our commitments, if we 
cannot trust our own cognitive and intellectual capacities, then we have limited agency in 
making choices about what we believe and do and can only make tentative, and not 
wholehearted, decisions. 
(2) Loss of Orientation and Purpose and of Hope for One’s Future 
The uncertainty that critical thinking injects into one’s understanding of reality very 
naturally extends to one’s ethical beliefs, the kind of deeply held belief with which most 
educators who promote the civic benefits of critical self-examination are concerned. Even those 
courses that do not have explicitly civic aims, however, can lead students to question their 
values, as Perry points out: “Students whose need for certainty has caused them to focus 
narrowly on science can experience severe shock in advanced theoretical courses; and the 
conscious question ‘Is everything relative?’ can lead to the question ‘Even me? My own values? 
My own certainties?’ Some courses in psychology or cultural anthropology are known to 
precipitate explicit crises of identity.”259 Given that our ethical beliefs form a framework in and 
by which we orient our lives — in and by which we find some sort of direction for what matters 
and is worth doing — then uncertainty about these beliefs leads us to become disoriented, unsure 
of which direction we should face in taking our next steps. Quite literally, disorientation is often 
manifested in sitting or standing still until we can get our bearings, and indecision is manifested 
in taking a few steps in one direction and then another until we figure out what to do. 
Accordingly, Socrates characterizes a true education in which we discover the good (and come to 
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see the reality in which we were living to be utterly inferior) to be a turning of the soul, and this 
process of turning leads to dizziness, confusion, and pain as the prisoner adjusts to a new reality.  
 A more specific form of orientation that is of particular concern for young people and 
that can be unsettled through critical thinking is that of purpose. In recent years, scholars of 
youth and college student development have focused on the development of purpose as one of 
the most pressing needs of our students and therefore one that educational institutions should 
seek to address. A number of titles are indicative of this concern: The Path to Purpose: How 
Young People Find Their Calling in Life; Helping College Students Develop Purpose: A Campus 
Guide to Meaning-Making; Big Questions, Worthy Dreams: Mentoring Emerging Adults in their 
Search for Meaning, Purpose, and Faith; Liberal Learning as a Quest for Purpose; The 
Purposeful Graduate: Why Colleges Must Talk to Students about Vocation.260 As suggested by 
these titles, the question of purpose is not merely the question of the kind of job or even career a 
young person might pursue, though their professional lives may be one of the main avenues for 
seeking to fulfill their sense of purpose. Indeed, in asking “What should I do with my life?,” the 
answer students seek is usually a specific career path.  
 Purpose is more than an interest in some activity; it is an overarching aim that motivates 
one’s life — an aim to be a certain kind of person, live a certain kind of life, fulfill a particular 
role well, and accomplish certain goals — and gives existential significance to it. Scholars who 
consider the development of purpose an essential task for the flourishing of young people often 
use “vocation” and “calling” interchangeably with purpose, words that connote a commitment to 
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serve the good of others in response to a perceived need in the world, which “calls” out to an 
individual to use her abilities for this purpose. This aspect of calling is what distinguishes it from 
simply an overriding personal interest. A person can feel called to be a good parent or a loving 
daughter to one’s elderly parents (or both), to a life alleviating poverty or fighting injustice, in 
whatever ways he or she can, or to create new technologies for a specific domain of life. The 
altruistic dimension of purpose stems from its religious and specifically Christian roots, in which 
selflessness and a concern for others are central to living out one’s faith, but psychologist 
William Damon, for example, relies on his own observation in stipulating that only “noble” 
purposes — those that are worth pursuing and are pursued honorably to promote the well-being 
of others — are truly fulfilling.261 
 The existential dimension of purpose is expressed in its common coupling with the word 
“meaning.” Having a sense of purpose is one of the elements in a life that is said to give it 
“meaning,” where meaning could be understood in this context to mean a “reason for living” that 
is constituted by aspirations of one’s own, the pursuit and fulfillment of which makes one’s life 
feel worth living. Purpose provides existential significance to one’s life not only through the 
personal fulfillment of engaging in an authentic pursuit but also from the way it connects one to 
the broader world as a place that gives recognition to and is responsive to one’s goals and 
projects, giving a sense, to speak rather starkly, that “there is a reason for me to be here (on this 
earth).” Having a purpose, or “a worthwhile goal, a freely chosen task,” is one of the ways that 
Frankl, a concentration camp survivor who developed his psychoanalytic practice and theory 
while a prisoner, posits humans can find meaning in the face of circumstances that strip you of 
everything that would make life worthwhile.262 Through the pursuit and fulfillment of a personal 
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purpose, we sense that our lives have significance in “the grand scheme of things” and that we 
are meant to be on this earth. When we have and believe we can fulfill our purpose, we do not 
feel alienated from the world. Because purpose is often other-regarding, it is also a way in which 
to feel connected to others.  
Perhaps the importance of a sense of purpose in human flourishing can best be grasped 
by contrast with a life that lacks purpose. Such a life, in John Dewey’s words, is characterized by 
“aimlessness, capriciousness, the absence of cumulative achievement in experience.” These 
words evoke the image of a lost soul merely passing through life, gleaning little from and 
offering little to it, wondering, “Why am I here?” Dewey captures well the deep longing to know 
the answer to this question: “To find out what one is fitted to do,” he observes, “and to secure the 
opportunity to do it is the key to happiness. Nothing is more tragic than failure to discover one’s 
true business in life, or to find that one has drifted or been forced by circumstance into an 
uncongenial calling.”263  
While purposes arise from one’s desires (as well as from an affective response to some 
situation in the world), they are embedded in beliefs about the world and oneself in relation to 
the past, present, and future. In other words, purposes take the form of an imagined narrative of 
one’s life. This narrative is an interpretation of or a lens for interpreting past experiences, is 
shaped by larger narratives about the world, is grounded in an assessment of the current state of 
the world and of one’s capacities and resources, and extends into a future situation, which one 
evaluates as good and hopes to affect. Our purposes and hopes for fulfilling them can be derailed 
when any aspect of this narrative is disrupted. 
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Critical thinking that aims to help students see that reality is more complex than they 
thought and that there are no simple solutions to social and ethical issues can have just this 
effect. Moreover, some educators, particularly in social justice education, see it as their 
responsibility to ensure that students see the world “as it is,”264 that is, not with a “naive hope” 
that is ignorant of or blind to the injustices that certain groups suffer and that are embodied in 
and perpetuated by social norms and institutions.265 These are not bad aims. An important aspect 
of “growing up” or what most would consider a mature outlook is realizing that life has many 
gray areas and that there are people who have less than noble intentions or simply have 
significant blind spots that can lead them to inadvertently harm others. Social justice educators 
have written about the guilt, shame, grief, and overwhelming hopelessness that are common 
among students from privileged groups when they are confronted with the pervasiveness of 
inequality and injustice, as well as anger and frustration among minority students who are 
confronting the injustices of inequality, possibly for the first time from a systemic perspective, 
and white peers who are unable or unwilling to see these injustices.266 Certainly, some young 
people learn these lessons very early, perhaps too early, in life, such that we lament that they 
have lost their innocence at such an early age.  
In a later essay, Perry reflects on the “costs of growth” and articulates a student’s 
perspective on the tragic nature of coming to see the world in these ways: “It may be a great joy 
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to discover a new and more complex way of thinking and seeing; but yesterday one thought in 
simpler ways, and hope and aspirations were embedded in those ways. Now that those ways are 
to be left behind, must hope be abandoned too?”267 This sentiment captures precisely the 
response of one of my former students to what we discussed in a course that explored the aims of 
education and the particular ideals and sociohistorical influences on the American public 
education system.  
Jack, a junior English major, was planning to become a public high school teacher, and I 
was the Teaching Assistant for his discussion section. Jack was a nontraditional student, a couple 
of years older than those in his class, having spent some time hiking around the country before 
entering college. He had a philosophical nature and was earnest in engaging with the issues 
discussed in the course. Much of the course was dedicated to showing students the ways the 
American public school system is not living up to our noblest ideals of how formal education 
could and should serve students, both individual students and certain groups of students, and our 
society — from the narrow and increasing emphasis on standardized testing, which thwarts 
teachers’ best intentions to educate students in a meaningful way; to the ways that school 
curricula and socialization can hinder the development of students’ individuality; and to the ways 
that socioeconomic status and race play a significant role in determining the quality of education 
students receive, despite various reform efforts, thereby reproducing the very social inequalities 
that public education was meant to eradicate. In Week 14 of our sixteen-week course, Jack 
posted the following remarks on the online discussion forum: 
Is it me, or has this whole semester been about the failing of modern education?... 
I agree with … every author of our readings, education is broken, but now what. 
Can I fix it? Sadly, the answer is no. Reform has been pushed for… a long time, 
yet we see no change. Why would I think I could change it by becoming an 
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English teacher in some high school somewhere? Like I’ve said before, I’m not 
here to teach kids how to score well on college prep tests. If that['s] what teaching 
is, I want nothing to do with it.  
 
Through the assigned readings, documentaries, and podcasts, as well as course lectures and 
discussions, Jack’s belief and hope in the promises of education, for students and for his personal 
fulfillment as a teacher, were shattered. They painted, for him, an image of a hopelessly broken 
system and insurmountable obstacles to positive change. They replaced his perhaps naively 
idealistic vocational narrative with an overwhelming Sisyphean narrative in which he became a 
helpless actor.   
For Jack, the problems in education with which we grappled not only led to a complete 
disenchantment with the prospect of becoming a teacher, but they (along with his experiences 
outside of school) led him to reflect more critically on and lose respect for his own educational 
experience in college. After the previous remarks, he went on to confess:  
I’m like 95% sure that I’m dropping out after this semester. I can learn on my 
own. I can freely chase my passions without being enrolled and tied down to 
assignments and readings. It will save me $20,000 to drop out now. I can almost 
earn a teacher’s salary by being a full-time waiter. I’ll be able to read whatever I 
want! I’ll be able to travel. Live where I want. Focus on what I want. I’m kinda 
excited for it. I dropped out of school three years ago. For three years I walked 
and hitch-hiked all around this country. It was incredible, and enlightening. Like 
seriously, I was living the dream. I didn’t need college, I didn’t need a high-
paying job, and I know I could go live that life again at any time... So, it may 
sound rude but I’ve been wanting to ask people who are engaged in academia a 
question. With all of its problems, its constrictions, contradictions, and expenses, 
why do you still choose to be in school? 
To be sure, Jack was a “free spirit” and his previous experiences off the beaten track probably 
would have made learning under the constraints of all the requirements of formal schooling feel 
inauthentic regardless of the course. He loved reading literature and had already expressed 
discontent to me with having to read fiction through the lens of various literary theories in his 
English courses, a sentiment with which I empathize. Moreover, he had told me that, while he 
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found our course intellectually stimulating, the more technical and applied courses that comprise 
most of the requirements for earning a teaching certificate did not suit his philosophical bent. 
Still, much of what we discussed made salient the “constrictions, contradictions, and expenses” 
and seemed to stir up his discontent. 
 I ran into Jack the following year at a local outdoors store where he was working. 
Although he had not dropped out of school, he had switched out of the Education and English 
majors and into Philosophy. While Jack’s utter disillusionment was not the norm, he was not the 
only student in the course as a whole to respond this way, and, again, these were the ones who 
approached their studies most earnestly. Other students in my section over the five semesters I 
have taught for this course have also felt deflated. One student, in response to Jack, admitted that 
she, too, was discouraged, but hoped that, even if she could not change the system, she could at 
least have a positive influence on individual students and was considering trying to move into 
administration where she could “make a larger impact.” By the end of the course, the questions 
students asked had mostly do with what could be done to improve education or whether anything 
was going right, but there was no time to delve into any substantial answers. They were eager if 
not quite desperate to hear something that was more hopeful, some possibility that they could 
still make a difference in their work.268 
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(3) Loss of Faith in and Hope for Humanity  
In addition to a loss of purpose, critical examination of one’s beliefs and the state of our 
society can lead to a loss of faith in and hope for humanity or the human condition. These two 
losses are often related, as I will explain. By “faith,” I do not mean belief in God or a 
commitment to a particular religious tradition, as the word is commonly used today, but rather a 
particular outlook on the world that undergirds and by which we interpret our entire experience. I 
define faith as a sense or judgment that human existence ultimately has a good, coherent, and 
dependable order and that the world provides a viable home for realizing our purposes and hopes, 
both individual and collective. The world, on the whole, is a place we trust, and life in it worth 
living. This faith is what sustains our highest ideals.  
Faith can be secular or religious, and the word has often been used specifically in writing 
about secular matters in order to point out that rather than living faithless lives since the “death 
of God” was pronounced, we moderns have instead just shifted our faith to a different object —
Reason, the market, technology, democracy. As Smith writes,  
The secular tradition … in its positive rather than a negative sense, is not 
alienated nihilism into which in our day some irreligion threatens to disintegrate. 
Rather, it has been an orientation of nobility and force, dignity and commitment, 
coherence and trust, inherited ultimately from the classics of Greece and Rome. 
We have to do here with a living tradition with its own metaphysical 
underpinnings, its own apprehension of or by transcendence, and, for our present 
purposes, its own type of faith. 
 Secularism has to be thus positive, and has to be ‘believed in,’ in the old 
sense, if it is to avoid being inert, vacuous, and destructive. It has to be, as its best 
it has mightily been, a matter of faith: faith in reason and truth, in justice, and in 
man. Or one might say: faith through these. Whether in or through, persons were 
related to these as to ideals transcendentally apprehended and given a pledged 
allegiance.269  
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The complete loss of this faith at an intellectual level is the judgment that the human existence is 
absurd, that there is no inherent “meaning,” an intelligible order or coherence in the events —
especially those involving devastating suffering and blatant evil — that occur. On an emotional 
level, such a judgment can lead to despair about the human condition (including one’s own), 
another aspect of the experience of “meaninglessness.” As thinkers from a variety of disciplines 
have argued, the loss of grand narratives that once imposed structure on a chaotic world has 
made a sense of meaninglessness a greater threat to the modern psyche.270 
Having faith that there is some ultimate order, some ultimate reason behind all that occurs 
in one’s life and in the world, undergirds our hopes and partially answers the question of “why 
live at all?” The intimate relationship between this kind of faith and this question is the subject of 
Albert Camus’s The Myth of Sisyphus, in which he declares at the outset, “There is but one truly 
serious philosophical question, and that is suicide. Judging whether life is or is not worth living 
amounts to answer the fundamental question of philosophy.”271 Although Camus argues that it is 
possible, and even that it is the greatest affirmation of our human dignity, to continue to live 
squarely facing the absurdity of human existence, as does his absurd hero Dr. Rieux in the face 
of the indomitable plague,272 I think most people might side with T. S. Eliot’s assessment that 
“human kind cannot bear very much reality.”273 Thus, psychologists advise people not to spend 
too much time watching the news after massive tragedies, such as the 9/11 attacks or large-scale 
natural disasters. 
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In higher education today, students’ faith in and hope for humanity can be shaken when 
educators seek to awaken them to the many injustices and problems in the world and to teach 
them to critique texts and ideas according to the hermeneutics of suspicion. I believe it is 
important to develop students who are thoughtful human beings and citizens who can be and 
who can hold others responsible for the state of our society. I also believe that learning about 
injustice, cultivating compassion for others, particularly the marginalized and oppressed, and 
learning not to take everything at face value is an important aspect of this process. But there are 
serious risks to a predominant emphasis on this kind of learning. Hannah Arendt writes that 
“schools function to teach children what the world is like” and that “the educators … stand in 
relation to the young as representatives of a world for which they must assume responsibility 
although they did not make it.”274 Undergraduates are not children, but they do, on the whole, 
come into college viewing their teachers as authorities on subjects of which they (the students) 
have little knowledge and who are teaching them “facts.” In exposing students only or primarily 
to the ways that our society and its institutions fall short of our ideals and to a suspicious 
approach to authors and their ideas, we risk portraying a world that has no or little good and few 
trustworthy in it.  
Although having enough faith in humanity and the human condition is necessary for 
anyone to view life as worth living, Erikson saw “fidelity” — a loyalty to some ideal or person 
embodying that ideal that is inspiring — as the “vital strength” that must be nurtured during 
adolescence in order for the young to envision a worthwhile future and a significant place for 
themselves in the world.275 In their search for “something or somebody to be true to”276—youth 
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select their “heroes” from any of the realms in which they interact with “representatives of the 
adult world” who may be “advocates and practitioners of technical accuracy, of a method of 
scientific inquiry, of a convincing rendition of truth, of a code of fairness, of a standard of artistic 
veracity, or of a way of personal genuineness.”277 Erikson saw evidence of this search in “the 
acceptance by youth of mythologies and ideologies predicting the course of the university or the 
historical trend; for even intelligent and practical youth can be glad to have the larger framework 
settled so that it can devote itself to the details which it can manage, once it knows (or is 
convincingly told) what they stand for and where it stands.”278 This need for an inspiring ideal 
might explain why German university students, whom Weber admonished, looked for leaders 
among their professors. Or it might explain the popularity today of Canadian psychologist and 
University of Toronto professor Jordan Peterson, whose charismatic lectures on a wide range of 
self-help topics and cultural and social issues, has won him an impressive, or, to some, alarming, 
number of “die-hard disciples” among young men in particular.279  
That young people see the world as a place where there is good that they can experience 
and in which they have efficacy to enact is necessary for sustaining their engagement in and with 
it. In addition to having their desires and capabilities affirmed, Erikson writes, young people 
must also recognize society as a living process which inspires loyalty as it receives it, maintains 
allegiance as it attracts it, honors confidence as it demands it.”280 In coming to see how “broken” 
the education system is, my student Jack experienced not only a loss of personal purpose and 
hope for his own prospects of effecting positive change, but also a loss of faith in anyone’s 
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ability to do so through education. His reaction could appropriately be described as disgust that is 
moving towards, if it is not already, cynicism. More than disappointment, his response is one of 
moral indignation that is generalized to all of education, where the possibility of any good in it or 
to be made from it is closed off, compelling him to leave education altogether.  
It is fortunate that Jack still saw the possibility of a worthwhile life outside of college, but 
one could imagine that the critical lens that was used to view education could, with enough time 
and intensity and applied to other realms of society, easily tear down his faith and hope in all 
other areas of life. Indeed, anyone who maintains their youthful idealism throughout their young 
adulthood realizes soon enough when they enter the “real world” that they are not so easily if 
ever realized in our lifetimes.  
(4) The Loss of Belonging 
Today, one of the main aims of having students critically examine their beliefs and 
engage with different perspectives on various existential, ethical, and political questions is to 
help them see the world from outside of the particular traditions and communities in which they 
were raised and socialized. Doing so is considered an important aid to developing their 
autonomy, as students become aware of other options for how to live281 and to cultivating 
tolerance and respect for people with views that are different from their own.282 The beliefs and 
values inculcated in students within their particular traditions and communities are seen as 
hindrances to autonomy and the source of prejudice against others, hindrances from which they 
must be freed.  
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Colloquially, we speak of this notion in more positive and romantic terms, saying that 
college is a time when students expand their minds or their horizons and discover new 
possibilities for themselves, an idea Michael Oakeshott poetically captures:  
Each of us is born in a corner of the earth and at a particular moment in historic 
time, lapped round with locality. But school and university are places apart where 
a declared learner is emancipated from the limitations of his local circumstances 
and from the wants he may happen to have acquired, and is moved by intimations 
of what he has never yet dreamed. He finds himself invited to pursue satisfactions 
he has never yet imagined or wished for.283 
 
Oakeshott’s words resonate with what many educators would see as college and perhaps school 
in general at its best. Dewey sees this emancipation as one of the democratic aims of public 
education, writing that “it is the office of the school environment … to see to it that each 
individual gets an opportunity to escape from the limitations of the social group in which he was 
born, and to come into living contact with a broader environment.”284 To be sure, there are 
inspiring stories of just this outcome for a number of prominent individuals in American society 
who specifically credit their education.285  
As stated earlier, however, our beliefs are central to our identity (or identities) as a 
member of certain groups because our sense of attachment and belonging to those groups is 
intimately related to our shared outlooks, among other things. Hence, the only way to keep the 
peace among family members and friends is usually to avoid discussing controversial issues. 
Critically examining one’s beliefs opens up the possibility that we will reject those beliefs and 
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adopt views that conflict with those that are the source of connection to the community, define 
one’s membership, and enable one’s identification with and acceptance by that community. Put 
simply, it can lead to social alienation and a loss of a sense of belonging.  
W. E. B. Du Bois poignantly captures this loss of belonging in “Of the Coming of John.” 
John Jones, a young black man from a small town in the segregated South, goes away to a 
college preparatory school and then on to college somewhere North, where he, in words 
reminiscent of Oakeshott’s, “found himself shrinking from the choked and narrow life of his 
native town.”286 But John’s emancipation is bittersweet, and mostly bitter. After seven years 
away, he returns to a hero’s welcome and is asked to speak at the church of his childhood, not 
only to his own Baptist congregation but to “all the dark Methodists and Presbyterians.”287 
Before he even speaks, the people notice he has changed — he is serious, he is cold. He tells the 
people that “the age … demanded new ideas … broader ideas of human brotherhood and 
destiny,” introducing an array of possibilities for “what part the Negroes of this land would take 
in the striving of the new century.” In his concluding remarks, he declares “Today, the world 
cares little whether a man be Baptist or Methodist, or indeed a churchman at all, so long as he is 
good and true. What difference does it make whether a man be baptized in river or wash-bowl, or 
not at all? Let’s leave all that littleness, and look higher.”  
At this, “A painful hush seized the crowded mass. Little had they understood of what he 
said, for he spoke an unknown tongue, save the last word about baptism.” Eventually, one of the 
elders of the community takes to the pulpit and decries him “with rude and awful eloquence.” 
Just as the people did not comprehend John, he “never knew clearly what the old man said; he 
only felt himself held up to scorn and scathing denunciation for trampling on the true 
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Religion.”288 After the congregants disperse, John makes his way to a nearby bluff, with his 
sister following. 
“John, she said, “does it make everyone — unhappy when they study and learn lots of 
things?” 
He paused and smiled. “I am afraid it does,” he said. 
“And, John, are you glad you studied?” 
“Yes,” came the answer, slowly but positively. 
She watched the flickering lights upon the sea, and said thoughtfully, “I wish I 
was unhappy, — and — and,” putting both arms around his neck, “I think I am, a 
little, John.”  
 
Several days later, John comes to feel how utterly estranged he is from his social environment: 
What on earth had come over him? Every step he made offended some one. He 
had come to save his people, and before he left the depot he had hurt them. He 
sought to teach them at the church, and he had outraged their deepest feelings … 
some how he found it so hard and strange to fit his old surroundings again, to find 
his place in the world about him. He could not remember that he used to have any 
difficulty in the past, when life was glad and gay. The world seemed smooth and 
easy then. 289  
 
John becomes alienated not only from the black community but also from the white community 
in his hometown, whose favor he had earned prior to going away for being hard-working, 
pleasant, and “respectful.”290 When he asks the white Judge Henderson for a teaching job at the 
school for black children, the judge places a condition on his employment: “Now, John, the 
question is, are you with your education and Northern notions, going to accept the situation and 
teach the darkies to be faithful servants and laborers as your father were … or are you going to 
try to put fool ideas of rising and equality into these folks’ heads, and make them discontented 
and unhappy?”291  
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 In advocating the necessity of Socratic self-examination for cultivating in students the 
capacities for democratic and global citizenship in an increasingly diverse world, Nussbaum 
states matter-of-factly, “Becoming a citizen of the world is often a lonely business. It is, in effect, 
a kind of exile … from the warm nestling feeling of being surrounded by people who share one’s 
convictions and passions.”292 In the United States, the Emersonian individual who is willing to 
stand apart from the familiar and familial to find and follow what he believes to be true may 
captivate our heroic impulses, but the loss of that “warm nestling feeling” should not simply be 
overlooked as a necessary sacrifice, particularly by educators of young people who are struggling 
to figure out their places in the world. Students themselves may well be apprehensive of the 
potential loss before it even transpires. Belenky and her colleagues found that for many women, 
the freedom to think differently from “external authority” is also attended by fear: “Unlike the 
male student [in Perry’s study], who takes up the banner of multiplicity with vigor, the young 
woman … feels at times overwhelmed with options and fearful of ultimately being alone in her 
choices. To take a stand against others means to isolate herself socially. She fears that engaging 
in combative measures in support of her opinion may antagonize and jeopardize her connections 
to others.293 
Abraham Maslow considered “belongingness” a basic human need, which he 
characterizes as “a hunger for affectionate relations with people in general, namely, for a place in 
his group or family.”294 He notes that in 1954, when he was theorizing about basic needs in 
Motivation and Personality, there was little research on the need for belonging, but, since then, 
and particularly since Roy Baumeister and Mark Leary developed their hypothesis about “a need 
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to belong” in 1995,295 much research in psychology has found a sense of belonging to be a strong 
indicator for various aspects of well-being, including “self-esteem, self-efficacy, and life 
satisfaction.”296 Definitions of a sense of belonging vary, but they generally incorporate the 
individual’s feelings of identifying with, being accepted and supported by, and being involved 
with of a group of people, all of which generate positive emotions and the feeling of being 
integrated into a community that affirms what one cares about.297 Though she does not use the 
term “belonging,” in her “essentialist” and “thick vague conception of the good,” Nussbaum 
herself identifies “affiliation with other human beings” as necessary for humans to “function 
well” 298 as human beings, writing, “All human beings recognize and feel some sense of 
affiliation and concern for other human beings. Moreover, we value the form of life that is 
constituted by these recognitions and affiliations. We live for and with others and regard a life 
not lived in affiliation with others to be a life not worth living.”299 Nussbaum does not elaborate 
on the reasons we hold this view, but it is not hard to imagine why. Maslow contrasts having the 
belongingness need met with “feelings of alienation, aloneness, strangeness, and loneliness,”300 
and the recent research on belonging confirms these outcomes. A life in which such feelings are 
pervasive is one lived in a state of disengagement from others, a state in which the individual has 
difficulty feeling that he has a place in the social world and in the world at all.  
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Although my concern here is the way that critical thinking can disrupt students’ sense of 
belonging within the communities to which they were closely connected before entering college, 
it is worth noting that a Google search for “need for belonging” retrieves over 2.2 million results, 
over half of which (based on a rough estimate from the first five pages of results) have to do with 
the importance of a sense of belonging for students within the school community for their 
motivation and engagement in learning, with the top result being Karen Osterman’s, “Students' 
Need for Belonging in the School Community” (cited 2300 times). In his 2012 book, College 
Students’ Sense of Belonging: A Key to Educational Success for All Students, Terrell Strayhorn 
explores how a sense of belonging affects the experiences of college students, both in general 
and with regard to particular subgroups, namely first-year, Latino, gay, and black male students, 
and STEM students of color.301 I will take up the need for a sense of belonging within the 
classroom community specifically in a later chapter that discusses ways to address the risks of 
critical thinking. 
Our educational practices must take into account how students’ social identities and 
social position affects their sense of belonging within the school environment, as disrupting their 
ties to their home communities can intensify their overall sense of social alienation. Du Bois’s 
story is rich and multi-faceted, and the conundrum for the educated black man (of his time and 
many might argue even today) that Du Bois portrays is not merely about the rifts created 
between a young person and his community due to his acquiring different beliefs during college, 
which can occur regardless of race. Throughout the narrative, Du Bois illustrates in exquisite and 
tragic detail the many social, psychological, and cultural barriers this young black man faces in 
adjusting to and trying to be accepted by an educational institution governed by norms with 
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which he is unfamiliar and people who have little understanding of him, the profound 
transformation he undergoes in the process of becoming educated, and finally the futility of this 
education in a society that denies his entire race legitimacy as a capable and equal member.302 
Whatever social alienation John experienced before college in virtue of the fact that he was a 
black man in a white man’s world was further intensified when the ties to his community were 
severed. 
More than one hundred years after its publication, the story could speak for many first-
generation and minority undergraduates today. As the college student population has become 
increasingly diverse over the past few decades, higher education and student development 
researchers have shed light on not only the challenges of making a successful transition into what 
is for many minority and first-generation students a foreign environment, but also the separation 
created between students and their family and community members as their aspirations and ways 
of life change, requiring them to “break away” from these relationships.303 Richard Rodriguez 
tells of his enduring ambivalence about his initiation and education into the American public 
school system and then into the highest ranks of academe, as he grapples with the fact that his 
academic success required mastering the ways of thinking and speaking that created greater and 
greater distance from the ways of life of his Mexican American working class parents.304 To be 
sure, going to college, for any student, is a process of leaving one community and entering 
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another305 — Howard London even calls higher education “a vehicle of separation”306 — but 
college takes some students farther away than others.  
3.4 An Examined and Alienated Life 
The conditions of flourishing discussed above — epistemic stability, orientation and 
purpose, faith in and for humanity, and belonging — are all components of the basic sense of 
trust and security and of the experience of being at home in the world, which infuse a flourishing 
life, one that is and experiences itself to be wholeheartedly engaged with the good. Critical 
thinking in higher education today inherently carries the risk of dismantling these conditions by 
disrupting students’ sense of trust in the beliefs on which they have relied in navigating their 
lives, which can lead to a sense of alienation from themselves and the world itself as an 
existential home and from the relationships in which they experience affirmation. We can accept 
that some degree of alienation is just a part of the human condition by virtue of possessing a 
conscious mind, the capacity to make choices, some of which are truly not good for us, and of 
being irreducibly an individual among others. It is detrimental to a students’ flourishing, 
however, to experience a deep or prolonged sense of alienation at a time when one’s identity and 
view of the world are most in flux and when that instability and vulnerability makes finding 
something or someone trustworthy all the most urgent. Perry describes the overall psychological 
and emotional effects on those students in his study that experienced a stultifying alienation: 
Alienation (let alone recovery) varies widely in complex ways from person to 
person. Yet for all, the pervasive underlying tone is of the defeat of care. Whether 
the person sees society as having failed, or despairs of his own efforts to sustain 
his purposes, or just damn well asserts that he doesn’t give a damn, the speaker 
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always conveys a nostalgia for a care and involvement that once was, or might 
have been, or might yet be … if only.307  
 
These students had lost, as Erikson might say, their vitality and, rather than looking forward to 
the future, longed for their for a past in which life was not just simpler but in which they were 
wholeheartedly engaged with the world — through particular commitments, purposes, and 
communities that embodied and affirmed the good that made their lives worth living. 
More generally, the detached, critical, and skeptical stance toward the world 
fundamentally changes the experience of living itself. One student in Perry’s study remarks on 
the loss of “a spirit, a subjectivity,” or, in Perry’s words, “the loss of immediacy that is the cost 
of detachment,” of having to critically assess everything they encounter in their courses:  
I think I’m a little more objective in formal thinking now, than in the past…. 
Objectivity makes a lot of things clearer, I think… Then I think that subjectivity 
… it’s much better there…. I mean, you have to be objective, to step out and look 
at [things], but I don’t know, I think there’s a spirit, a subjectivity, which, well, it 
certainly holds you…. for instance, last year, I know in my Gov 1b … I did the 
assignment every week, I mean just like it was to be done, and I got caught up in 
it, and I think that’s good. I liked it very much, but perhaps I didn’t judge-ah as 
much… I think it’s more fun to, I don’t know, just get caught up in something … 
and just … flow with it.”308  
 
I read this student’s experience of being “caught up” in the work to be another way to describe 
wholehearted engagement in something that is only possible when its goodness and legitimacy 
are not being questioned, at least in the moment. In such instances, one can commit oneself fully 
to the task and wholly embrace it. Although the context is different in important ways, Rodriguez 
describes a similar change with regard to his family life due to a rational, academic culture. 
Identifying with Richard Hoggart’s “scholarship boy,” a certain type of a working-class student 
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who is “uprooted from [his] class”309 in the process of achieving academic success, Rodriguez 
writes, 
With his family, the boy has the intense pleasure of intimacy…. Lavish emotions 
texture family life. Then, at school, the instruction bids him to trust lonely reason 
primarily. Immediate needs set the pace of his parents’ lives. From his mother and 
father the boy learns to trust spontaneity and nonrational ways of knowing. Then, 
at school, there is mental calm. Teachers emphasize the value of a reflectiveness 
that opens up a space between thinking and immediate action.310  
 
Life in a critical, rational mode, for Perry’s subject and for Rodriguez, seems to have taken on 
what Felski describes as a “muted” quality.311 
  It has been said that once you begin to critically reflect on one’s beliefs and the world 
itself, you can’t go back.312 You cannot unlearn or “unsee” that to which your eyes have been 
opened. This kind of education is permanently transformative, but not always for the best. 
Likewise, I have attempted to show in this chapter that critical thinking does not in itself, by 
virtue of cultivating students’ rational autonomy, lead to flourishing. It can have multiple 
negative outcomes, ranging from the temporary and benign to the truly harmful.313 The risks of 
critical thinking delineated above raise important ethical questions for those of us who make 
critical thinking central to our practice and understanding of ourselves as educators. If critical 
thinking can in fact diminish students’ capacity for and impede flourishing, is it a worthwhile 
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endeavor? Is the life liberal educators invite (or require) students to live worth living? In other 
words, should we still engage students in critically examining their beliefs?  
 I am not of the view that critical thinking in and of itself is detrimental. I believe 
cultivating students’ capacity to reflect on their beliefs in order to help them assess whether or 
not they are true and justified and whether or not they are indeed beliefs with which they identify 
is important and even necessary for their flourishing in a world that presents to them myriad 
possibilities – both good and bad – for how to live. I also am not of the view that students should 
never be uncomfortable or experience uncertainty or insecurity, for the experiences that unsettle 
us present opportunities for growth, for gaining wisdom and confidence, and for self-knowledge. 
The current ethos and practices of liberal education, however, neglect to take the potential 
negative consequences into account. The Socratic educator aims to unsettle students but does not 
take on the further responsibility of helping them resettle by taking them through a process of 
reconstructing their beliefs, and academic culture creates little room for expressing and 
addressing students’ emotional and psychological distress. Burbules calls upon educators to 
squarely face the potentially “tragic” consequences of this work:  
The educational process is imperfect and incomplete. We interact with students 
for a relatively short time in their lives; in that time, we are often more effective at 
tearing down their preconceptions than we are at enabling them to reconstruct 
something more complete. When the process is unfinished, as it usually is, how 
then do we argue that it is all for the best, having robbed students of something 
dear to them and given them so little in return?”314  
 
Burbules also rightly points to one of the institutional limitations on helping students complete 
this process — the short period of time that educators interact with students, much less build 
close, personal relationships with them through which we might even discover that we have 
                                                 
314 Nicholas C. Burbules, “The Tragic Sense of Education,” Teachers College Record 91, no. 4 (1990): 474. 
 121 
robbed our students of something dear to them. Perhaps it is for this reason that this issue has 
received so little attention.  
It might be argued that a commitment to critically examining one’s beliefs is itself a 
wholehearted engagement with the good, that rather than only unsettling and tearing down the 
commitments on which students’ lives are based, it is replacing them with a different 
commitment to some good.315 Certainly, such a commitment can orient and be the basis of a life, 
but what I have tried to show is that, in the critical ethos of liberal education, it is a life that is 
fundamentally in tension of what it means to flourish. The commitment to being rational and 
critical today is a commitment to being disengaged from one’s whole self and to looking for 
what is not good. Moreover, it is too narrow of an educational aim to serve as the dominant ideal 
of liberal education. The practice of critically examining one’s beliefs must be situated within a 
broader conception of flourishing that serves as our educational aim so that we do not neglect to 
consider and nurture the breadth of students’ existential needs and thereby serve their 
flourishing.  
Furthermore, it is important to remember that, for many students, the expectation to 
engage in the critical examination of their beliefs may come as a surprise after the more 
traditional teaching they have experienced in primary and secondary school. Unlike those who 
joined Plato’s academy to follow in Socrates’ footsteps, our students may not have chosen the 
critical way of life, if you will, that they are expected to adopt. It may be something with which 
they are confronted, initially an academic obligation that is foisted upon them but then a way of 
being they cannot easily give up or reject. Not only is their academic performance measured by 
it, but they can come to inhabit it, some with gusto and others, as we saw, with great heartache 
                                                 
315 I thank Chris Higgins for drawing my attention to this objection.  
 122 
and without seeing the possibility of restoration. This latter group of students may indeed feel 
that they were robbed. For this reason, Yacek raises the question of whether or not the suffering 
experienced by students due to the identity crises induced by transformative education should 
require the informed consent of students.316 In other words, should educators inform students that 
they are about to undergo a process in which they may experience emotional and psychological 
upheaval and give them the option of abstaining from participation? Yacek follows Laurie Paul 
in arguing that trying to inform students of what the experience might be like and of its potential 
benefits so that they can evaluate whether or not to proceed is not viable, for students cannot 
know ahead of time whether or not their transformed selves will value either their potential 
distress or the life they will lead afterward.317 This argument, which I find convincing, makes 
clearer the challenge posed by Burbules.  
If we hold to the value of examining one’s beliefs, how do we ensure that when we 
engage students in the critical practices of the examined life, we do so in a way that is not only 
sensitive to its risks but also truly enables students to lead a flourishing life? One way, as I have 
argued, is to situate critical thinking in a more holistic conception of flourishing that guides our 
educational practices. The liberal educator also has two other responsibilities. One is to help 
students restore their sense of stability. The other is to show them substantive possibilities for 
leading a flourishing life, potential paths forward for reinvesting themselves in the good that is in 
and that they perceive in the world. In the remaining chapters, I propose correctives to the 
current pedagogical practices of the examined life in order to fulfill these responsibilities to 
address students’ existential needs. Specifically, I argue for modifying the Socratic ideal of the 
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liberal educator and for broadening our modes of engagement with the world beyond the critical 

























Shepherding Students Through the Examined Life 
 
 
I tend to prefer the high school method of learning stuff. It’s thrown at you here where you’re left 
to cope too much on your own.  
 — Undergraduate in Perry’s study318  
 
I remember what was so grievously lost to define what was necessarily gained. 
  — Richard Rodriguez319 
 
Every classroom seems a frontier to me — full of the new and unknown — in which I try to live my 
life, available to those who are interested in learning whatever it is I might have to offer. As part of 
our encounter, and in the course of our grappling together with texts from the past, I open windows, 
from time to time, on pieces of my life, on decisions I’ve struggled with. 




In the past several years, I have attended institutes and conference sessions in which 
scholars and educators have discussed (either as the central focus or tangentially) their 
experiences with getting students to question their deeply held beliefs. At one such event, one 
scholar, a philosophy professor, related a story in which a student in her introductory ethics 
course came to see her at the end of the semester. The student told her with some worry and 
seeming expectation of the professor’s guidance, “Your course totally turned my world upside-
down.” She recounted her internal response, which, in her telling, reflected a mixture of 
incredulousness and slight mockery that the student would come to her with this problem. 
Throwing up her hands, she said her thought was, “Go see a therapist!” Several people laughed, 
and we moved on to a different conversation. In another instance at a roundtable discussion, I 
raised the question of how we as educators should help students who are experiencing confusion 
and anxiety in this process. One woman responded, “Well, I’m not and don’t want to be the 
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students’ therapist.” One man explained that he sometimes would act as a parent might if their 
child is about to go through something painful, saying to his students something to the effect of, 
“This might be difficult for some of you, but we’ll work through it together.” One of the other 
men at the table shook his head, showing his discomfort and disagreement on his face. I received 
a similar response and reaction at another conference when I suggested that educators bear some 
responsibility to help students deal with the distress that accompanies critically examining their 
beliefs.  
These incidences struck me as revealing a narrow conception of a professor’s role in 
students’ development and more specifically in addressing students’ distress, and ultimately as 
professionally unethical. While I do not believe that educators are called upon to act as students’ 
therapists, I will argue that liberal education that aims for students’ flourishing calls for a broader 
conception of a professor’s roles and responsibilities, which I describe as “pastoral.” The 
pastoral professor’s responsibilities extend beyond provoking students to think critically to 
supporting them in the midst of the vulnerability they experience in the process and offering 
substantive guidance with regard to what to believe. This conception serves as a corrective to 
what I have argued is a truncated pedagogical trajectory that culminates in unsettling students. 
My use of the term “pastoral” and the role it is meant to indicate will raise questions 
about the professional boundaries of faculty responsibilities qua teachers with regard to their 
training, expertise, and authority. Given that it usually describes a clerical role, the term 
“pastoral” might strike many as inappropriate, undesirable, or impermissible for the secularized 
context of most higher education institutions. A pastor is someone who, among other things, 
provides spiritual guidance to a congregant, and that is not (or no longer), many would argue, the 
job of a professor or the purview of the university. We have long since gone beyond the era 
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when higher education was an extension of a particular church. In addition, some would say the 
notion is overly paternalistic and authoritarian, raising concerns about professors taking on too 
heavy-handed a role in guiding students toward (or inculcating in students) their own worldviews 
and in controlling student behavior.321  
While acknowledging these concerns and connotations, I have chosen to use “pastoral” 
because it captures the educator’s roles and responsibilities for which I argue better than others 
that scholars have recently used to conceptualize the role of faculty in the development of 
holistic development of students, such as mentor and master practitioner (the latter term is 
implied in characterizing education as an apprenticeship).322 In higher education scholarship, 
researchers have increasingly been advocating mentoring relationships between faculty and 
undergraduates.323 For the most part, mentoring refers to providing students with support and 
guidance with regard to developing academic and professional competence and confidence. A 
mentor does become involved in concerns of an emotional and psychological nature but 
primarily as they relate to pursuing academic and professional goals. Parks’s use of “mentor” 
aligns more closely with the role I have in mind of providing emerging adults support and 
guidance as they wrestle with their beliefs in the process of critically examining them, but she 
                                                 
321 For example, in her work on the role of emotions in education, and more specifically within social justice 
education, Megan Boler borrows Michel Foucault’s term “pastoral power” to describe “modern methods of 
maintaining discipline and control,” including the realm of emotions. It is a “form of governing populations by 
teaching individuals to police themselves.” Within the context of formal education, pastoral power refers to how 
“Protestant and religious values” historically “framed ‘the good student’ through more or less explicit moral rules of 
obedience.” Feeling Power: Emotion and Education (New York: Routledge, 1999), 32. From Boler’s viewpoint, 
“emotions are a prime site for developing pastoral power” (p. 23). 
322 Stephanie Mackler, Learning for Meaning’s Sake: Towards the Hermeneutic University (New York: Sense 
Publishers, 2009); Sharon Daloz Parks, Big Questions, Worthy Dreams: Mentoring Emerging Adults in Their Search 
for Meaning, Purpose, and Faith, Revised (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2011); W. Brad Johnson, On Being a 
Mentor: A Guide for Higher Education Faculty (New York: RoutledgeFalmer, 2016); William M. Sullivan, Liberal 
Learning as a Quest for Purpose (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016); Douglas W. Yacek, “Transformative 
Education: A Philosophical Inquiry” (The Ohio State University, 2017), 
http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1500072204487494. 
323 Johnson, On Being a Mentor: A Guide for Higher Education Faculty. 
 127 
primarily frames it as a one-on-one relationship between mentor and protégé, whereas the term 
“pastoral,” as I will discuss, encompasses cultivating supportive relationships among students.324 
Conceiving of education as an apprenticeship, on the other hand, focuses on the educator’s role 
in teaching students the skills of a particular practice as well as cultivating its virtues and an 
appreciation of its internal goods.325 For Yacek, initiating students into practices is the best way 
to provide the continuity that can prevent an identity crisis because the practice provides a new 
community to which students can belong and orients them towards certain goods, though he does 
not specify either the kinds of practices into which students should be initiated in a school setting 
or the nature of belief formation in the initiation process.326 Stephanie Mackler and William 
Sullivan propose broader, more existential notions of apprenticeship as a model for liberal 
education — an “apprenticeship to meaning-making” and an “apprenticeship of identity and 
purpose,” respectively. Both share similar concerns about the destructive effects of a 
hermeneutics of suspicion and argue that liberal educators should teach students the skills of 
making sense of their lives and reconstructing their beliefs, an issue I will take up in the next 
chapter, but they do not specifically explore what it might mean for the educator to support 
students through their vulnerability or offer substantive guidance in the reconstruction of their 
beliefs.327  
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The term “pastoral” is rooted in the biblical metaphor of God as a shepherd lovingly 
guiding and providing for the needs of his flock.328 A pastor, while not assuming the absolute 
authority and position of God, is charged with caring for the spiritual flourishing and general 
well-being of members of the congregation. I use the term analogically, and my usage is similar 
to that found in educational discourse in the United Kingdom, where “pastoral” refers to an 
institution’s and educator’s role in “support[ing] the welfare, well-being development of children 
and young people.”329 Mike Calvert further explains, 
generally speaking, in the United Kingdom, pastoral care refers to the hierarchical 
structures and tasks assigned to specialists and other teaching staff within the 
school, the caring approach to those tasks including relationships and the overt 
curriculum in the form of taught elements such as Personal, Social and Health 
Education. The pastoral is often seen as separate and parallel to the academic.330  
 
It seems that the kinds of structures and tasks considered “pastoral care” are similar to those that 
fall under “student affairs” in American higher education, those that do not directly serve 
students’ intellectual development. My aim in this chapter is to argue for and flesh out a 
conception of the liberal educator in which the pastoral roles I delineate are integral to what it 
means for an educator to promote students’ flourishing in the context of liberal education, 
particularly in light of the risks of critical thinking.  
My conception of the pastoral professor is not meant to exclude the aspects of supporting 
and guiding undergraduates that are emphasized in the notions of mentorship and apprenticeship. 
The pastoral professor still advises and mentors individual students, still teaches particular 
intellectual and disciplinary skills, and still seeks to instill an appreciation of what their 
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discipline or the subject matter of the course has to offer. Returning to the ecclesial analogy, the 
work of pastoring is distinct from preaching, though both roles are executed by the same 
individual. Whereas preaching is like lecturing, the purpose of which is to expound certain ideas, 
increase the listeners’ understanding, and ideally inspire greater commitment to the aims of a 
tradition, pastoring is the work of being a compassionate presence and guide in times of 
confusion and difficulty so that the parishioners will flourish (in the ecclesial context, to grow in 
spiritual maturity and fulfillment). It is caring for the spiritual needs of this community not only 
by helping individual parishioners but also by building a community in which they can grow 
together. Moreover, although a pastor has expertise (typically theological), she does not guide a 
parishioner from a position of a knowledge expert who can provide definitive answers to life’s 
problems. Rather, she provides guidance as someone who can potentially offer insight based on 
her own experience, or those of others with whom she is familiar, on a similar spiritual journey, 
which her expertise can help illuminate and interpret. The pastoral professor plays a similar 
caring role in recognition of the fact that she is a teacher of young people who are in the midst of 
great uncertainty in their lives and in further recognition that they may experience greater 
vulnerability as a result of the educational practices in which they are asked to engage. 
4.1 Helping Students Cope with (the Examined) Life: A Professor’s Responsibility? 
Two objections might immediately be raised to the idea that professors should attend to 
students’ emotional and to psychological distress, both in general and specifically with regard to 
the disruptions I described in chapter 3. The first is expressed in the examples in my introductory 
paragraph with a modification: professors are neither charged with being nor qualified to be 
students’ therapists and therefore should neither be expected to emotionally support students nor 
undertake the role even if they want to. The second is that the liberal educator’s responsibility is 
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precisely to unsettle students and their responsibilities end there; any emotional discomfort 
students experience in the process is good for them and simply part of the inevitable “growing 
pains” on the way to mature adulthood. The first objection is based on a true statement, but this 
reaction to and rejection of the idea that professors ought to attend to students’ distress lacks 
nuance in considering the range of ways one can do so and in the underlying conceptions of the 
relationship between education and therapy. The second objection shows a lack of care for the 
student and a professional irresponsibility with regard to the consequences of one’s practice. I 
will discuss these two critiques in turn.  
I take the objection that professors are not therapists and should not be expected to 
provide students support for coping with their emotional and psychological distress to be an 
objection to the expectation to provide such support in general and to the expectation to provide 
such support with regard to the substance of the issues, namely existential issues that have to do 
with self-knowledge and even cosmic concerns. Both seem to be beyond the scope of a 
professor’s responsibilities and qualifications and instead the purview of a professional therapist 
(or a spiritual leader). I understand therapy in this objection to refer to a professional practice (a) 
the purpose of which is to help a client cope with certain emotional and psychological stressors, 
whether internal or external, and develop ways to potentially resolve the stress-inducing issue in 
order to mitigate or eliminate the clients’ suffering and ultimately enable them to flourish (b) by 
helping the client understand her emotional, thought, and behavioral patterns and their causes (c) 
through dialogue with the therapist over some extended period of time.331  
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By this definition, it is clear that providing emotional support to students overlaps with a 
therapist’s role but that professors should not fully take on the role of a therapist since helping 
students cope with emotional and psychological stress is not the purpose of education nor do 
faculty have the knowledge or training to address the range of emotional and psychological 
issues for which a student might seek professional therapy. Providing emotional support, 
however, should not be equated with professional therapy. Though it might seem obvious, 
psychotherapy is not the only form of emotional support that can be offered to someone in 
distress. A friend who simply listens to one’s concerns might provide just the right kind of 
support in certain circumstances. Sometimes, this kind of support is what people seek in therapy. 
Indeed, in his critique of modern psychiatry, William Schofield observes that seeking therapy, 
for many, is “the purchase of friendship.”332  
Likewise, emotional and psychological support can be provided within a professional 
situation or as part of one’s professional role without being therapy. For example, the act of 
compassionately listening to someone express their feelings about a difficult situation, such as 
when a student of mine tearfully spoke to me about the unexpected death of her mother’s 
boyfriend and her thoughts about the afterlife after she missed a paper deadline, is not therapy, 
though it might be therapeutic for the student in a general sense of relieving some distress. 
Similarly, encouraging a student who has come to office hours because he is struggling with self-
doubt about his future because of difficulty with course assignments is not therapy. Even if the 
student sought the listening ear and advice of a professor with regard to emotional distress over 
situations unrelated to academic work — perhaps because the student considered the professor to 
be kind, trustworthy, and wise — attending to the student’s distress, even on more than one 
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occasion, would not constitute therapy. Of course, at a certain point, the educator will have to 
discern if and when what the student needs or is seeking from her extends beyond her proper role 
as a teacher and is beyond her capacities (in terms of expertise, time, mental and emotional 
energy) and therefore should be referred to a professional therapist or other resource.  
A recent article in The Chronicle of Higher Education illuminates the fact that many 
racial and ethnic minority professors already do carry much of the weight of this “invisible 
labor” of “forming a social support system” for minority students who seek them out for advice 
on myriad issues. For Rachel Griffin, a black professor at Southern Illinois University, 
the stories, by now, are familiar: Often a friend has taken a course from Ms. 
Griffin, associate professor in the department of communication studies, and 
thinks she'll have good advice. The student sits down and tearfully describes a 
problem he or she is counting on Ms. Griffin to help solve. Maybe it’s how to 
make the transition to the campus or what to do about a much-needed financial-
aid check that has yet to arrive. 
 
“I’m clearly not a financial-aid adviser, but what do you do in that moment?” says 
Ms. Griffin. “You hand the student a Kleenex, and you get on the phone and see 
what you can do.333 
 
These examples are not necessarily the kind of support I have in mind to address the central 
concern of this study, but such support, in my view, reasonably and rightfully falls within all 
educator’s responsibilities, which include caring about and for — within one’s capacities — the 
academic success, the general well-being, and flourishing of one’s students, or in more colloquial 
terms, to love our students.  
 Caring for, let alone loving, students is rarely mentioned when discussing teaching in 
higher education and education in general. The belief that traditionally-aged undergraduates are 
adults who do not need the same kind of nurturing and care as younger students contributes to 
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this fact,334 but, as we have seen, research on emerging adults and today’s undergraduates has 
shown that they still need the support and guidance of adults and benefit from caring 
relationships with teachers. Writing on the ethics of teaching in higher education tends to refer to 
duty, educational aims, and relational boundaries that should not be crossed between teacher and 
student, but exhortations to deeply care about and love our students come as reminders of our 
common humanity with students, acts of retrieval of a forgotten tradition.335 bell hooks observes,  
When as professors we care deeply about our subject matter, when we profess to 
love what we teach and the process of teaching, that declaration of emotional 
connection tends to be viewed favorably by administrators and colleagues. When 
we talk about loving our students, these same voices usually talk about exercising 
caution. They warn us of the dangers of getting too close. Emotional connections 
tend to be suspect in a world where mind is valued above all else, where the idea 
that one should be can be objective is paramount.336 
 
I have heard similar warnings voiced by graduate students who have attended training sessions I  
have led for Teaching Assistants through my university’s teaching and learning center. When we 
have discussed different ways that teaching involves supporting students, some have expressed 
wariness about students “oversharing” about personal matters or becoming students’ therapists.  
The perceived and institutional division of labor in higher education between educating 
and caring for students’ emotional and psychological well-being reflects not only the long 
history in Western philosophy that has separated reason and intellect from emotion and has 
fundamentally shaped American academic culture, but also the pathologizing of internal distress, 
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and the subsequent acceptance in modern American culture of psychotherapists as the designated 
“creator and caretaker of the realm of the ‘interior.’”337 Emotions have been regarded as 
irrational, subjective, and private, characteristics that are seen to stand in opposition to what is 
considered the rational, objective, and public nature of the academic realm, a fact to which hooks 
alludes. This conceived relation between emotion and the public realm is also fundamentally 
shaped by gender norms, as emotion and its descriptors have been associated with women who 
were long excluded from the academic realm. Thus, there has been little room for engaging and 
expressing emotions in the context of intellectual inquiry (whether as the subject of scholarship 
or in classroom interactions), but since the 1970s, feminist theorists and other thinkers have 
argued for the legitimate and important role that emotions play in our intellectual lives and, 
therefore, for the necessity of engaging them in our educational practices.338  
The gendered conception of emotion, along with the idea that undergraduates are adults, 
no doubt contributes to the fact that there is no difficulty in accepting that nurturing is a central 
part of what one does in the feminized profession of K-12 teaching, whereas it is seen as 
marginal or outside the bounds of the work of the male-dominated profession of teaching in 
higher education. I do not mean to suggest that only female professors would embrace the caring 
role and male professors would reject it. As the examples with which I began this chapter show, 
a female professor would not necessarily see it as her role to offer support and counsel to her 
student and a male professor could be very much concerned to offer students emotional support. 
Moreover, it is male psychologists who initiated the student affairs movement in the early 
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twentieth century (of course, there were likely few female psychologists at the time) and who, 
along with contemporary female scholars, have been advocating student development support 
within higher education since the late twentieth century.339  
Providing emotional and practical support for students in particular instances when they 
come to us might seem acceptable enough. To do so seems only human. To make emotional 
support, though, and specifically with regard to something as deeply personal and individual as 
an existential crisis, an integral part of the educational process might seem to cross the line into 
therapy. If we take a broader view of therapy, however, in which the therapist’s aim is to enable 
the client to flourish by helping them understand their lives and the world in new ways, then 
education and therapy are much more alike than is generally assumed, and liberal education in 
particular, insofar as it engages students in the examination of beliefs that fundamentally shape 
their self-understanding and existential understanding of the world, traverses much of the same 
interior terrain. As a number of scholars have noted, from the beginnings of Western educational 
thought, education was understood to have therapeutic purposes, that is, to be healing or curative, 
precisely through dealing directly with questions of how to live well. Educational practices were 
meant to help students achieve greater self-knowledge and a more accurate understanding of 
virtue and reality, and the goal was to enable them to lead flourishing lives. Socrates understood 
himself to be undertaking precisely this endeavor with his interlocutors and says that the 
prisoners in the cave are “cured of their foolishness” through education.340 Of later Greek and 
Roman philosophers, specifically the Epicureans, Stoics, and Skeptics, Nussbaum writes that 
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their central motivation was to alleviate human suffering through “therapeutic arguments”341 that 
aimed at ridding a person of false beliefs that produced her suffering. Furthermore, as Boler 
writes, “The dynamics between teacher and student can parallel the therapist/client relation.”342 
For example, Higgins argues that psychoanalysis is similar to education pedagogically in that 
interpersonal relations — that between therapist and client, as with teacher and student — serve 
as “the prime facilitator of growth.”343 Avi Mintz also notes that “the root of ‘therapist’ is the 
Greek word therapôn, meaning an attendant or a servant who grants his services freely,” and 
suggests that Socrates, in acting as a “midwife of the soul” was more like a therapôn, that is, an 
attendant, than our typical notion of a teacher.344  
None of this is to say that education and therapy are the same, and there have been a 
number of important critiques of “the therapeutic turn” in education (and of modern Western 
culture more generally), warning of the dangers of educational institutions adopting or being 
overtaken by therapeutic aims and practices.345 The most pertinent criticisms are that education 
has become too focused on helping students to feel good about themselves or that it infantilizes 
them by trying to protect them from ideas that will challenge them and make them 
uncomfortable, all at the expense of the proper intellectual aims of education. Either time is 
taken time away from academic learning in order to develop students’ emotional capacities or 
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students are not exposed to different perspectives that will help them become critical thinkers. To 
be clear, in stressing the need for faculty to care about and for students’ emotional and 
psychological experiences, I am not interested, in this project, in making students feel good 
about themselves. I am interested, to put it in an oversimplified and perhaps a rather kitschy way, 
in helping students feel good about life, in helping them (among other aims) to see and 
experience it as worth living, even as we lead them into educational experiences that might shake 
their faith and hope. My concern is also not with regulating or even educating students’ 
emotions, that is, with how educators can help students control their emotional responses, 
develop certain kinds of emotional responses to situations or others, such as empathy or 
compassion, or recognize the variety of emotions they and other experience — what is often 
called emotional literacy, affective education, or social and emotional learning.346 Also, I have 
already stated that I do not think the discomforts of critical thinking should be avoided altogether 
and that there is great value in exposing students to different perspectives. We must recognize, 
however, that this process can engender intense emotional reactions and existential crises that 
can deeply affect students’ daily and future lives, and that liberal educators cannot simply ignore 
this fact. As Todd writes, “teaching cannot … run away from the possible consequences it 
generates.”347 Liberal educators have a responsibility to take these consequences into account in 
their practices and to address them in some way, though not in any way would be classified as 
professional therapy.  
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Again, it is important to know which issues we, as educators, can and cannot handle 
ourselves and to exercise prudence in teacher-student relationships, but it is also important to 
recognize that college teachers — whether faculty or graduate students — are the only non-
student adults at school that undergraduates have to see on a regular basis for a significant, albeit 
still somewhat brief, length of time. Outside of an institution with a highly structured advising 
system, professors and teaching assistants interact most regularly with undergraduates and can 
gauge students’ engagement in school (at the very least through course records) more than any 
other staff members, even if they are teaching large lecture classes. This puts faculty and 
teaching assistants in a unique position and gives them a unique responsibility to provide 
students with care and support. For example, with the rise in rates of anxiety and depression 
among today’s undergraduates, institutions are beginning to see faculty as critical to providing 
the support they need. As Jennifer Howard writes, “Faculty members, especially those who 
interact frequently with them, are well placed to pick up on warning signs.”348 Although faculty 
are not expected to undertake responsibility for providing counseling for students’ anxiety and 
depression, they have a critical role to play in ensuring students get the help they need, and this 
role depends on faculty paying attention to and being concerned with students’ emotional and 
psychological states. Recent higher education research has also begun to focus on the faculty-
student relationship as a critical element in a student’s growth, well-being, and success during 
and after college.349 The widely publicized 2014 Gallup-Purdue Index, for instance, reported that 
“if graduates had a professor who cared about them as a person, made them excited about 
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learning, and encouraged them to pursue their dreams, their odds of being engaged at work more 
than doubled, as did their odds of thriving in their well-being.”350  
Thus far, I have made the case that attending to students’ emotional and psychological 
distress does not amount to providing therapy and yet that the work of a liberal educator overlaps 
with that of a therapy in important ways, such that to ignore the deep existential concerns and the 
distress that critical thinking generates is in a way to miss the essence of liberal education. I have 
not yet made the positive case, however, that it is an ethical responsibility for liberal educators to 
address this distress, beyond asserting that doing so is part of a professor’s responsibility to care 
for the well-being of the student. This brings me to the second objection, that the aim of the 
liberal educator is precisely to unsettle students and make them uncomfortable and that the 
disruptions and discomfort of critical thinking are simply necessary for their growth. This 
conception of the educator’s role has been expressed in various contexts, not all explicitly 
associated with the Socratic ideal of liberal education. For example, it has been stated that 
college is precisely about getting students to engage with new ideas that make them 
uncomfortable in response to recent debates about “trigger warnings,” “safe spaces,” and free 
speech on campus, where there is a concern that colleges are allowing students to “hide from 
scary ideas.”351 Within the context of social justice education, Boler has argued for a “pedagogy 
of discomfort,” which allows educators and students to “explore emotional dimensions and 
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investments — angers, fears, and the histories in which these are rooted”352 as they “leave the 
familiar shores of learned beliefs and habits, and swim further out into the ‘foreign’ and risky 
depths of the sea of ethical and moral differences.”353 Both educators and students must also 
learn to live with the discomfort of “ambiguity.”354 Finally, Yacek observes that advocates of 
transformative education understand transformation to necessarily involve some sort of “crisis” 
experience:  
Jack Mezirow claims that transformations are preceded by “disorienting 
dilemmas”; … Sharon Todd points to the immense feelings of guilt, suffering and 
even “violence” that social justice education involves; and Andrea English claims 
that all learning follows upon an “interruption” of experience, which involves 
“self-alienation,” “struggle” and even “disillusionment.” In most dramatic form, 
Otto Bollnow … even goes so far as to claim that emergence of true novelty in the 
educational process only occurs upon “a hell-bound fall into desperation.”355  
 
The language of these theorists indicates a more intense experience than that of being  
“uncomfortable”; rather, they describe the kinds of deep existential disruptions discussed earlier.  
 These kinds of experiences are, of course, not uniquely the result of formal education. 
Most people at some point in their lives encounter circumstances, if not people, that challenge 
their basic views — life does not unfold as expected and we must reconsider and adjust our 
understanding of ourselves and the world if we are not to “fall into desperation.” Experiences of 
being unsettled, however, are not only inherent to the Socratic ideal of liberal education but an 
explicit aim of the Socratic educator. To intentionally lead students into an experience that one 
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knows can be deeply disruptive and can have negative consequences without giving thought to 
how to mitigate the risks of those consequences is professionally irresponsible.  
 To use a medical analogy, imagine a surgeon who has a patient who needs coronary 
artery bypass surgery. In order to bring the patient closer to health, the surgeon must actually 
wound the patient and change the natural functioning of the body first. She must make an 
incision in the patient’s chest, in some cases break his breastbone in order to reach the heart, cut 
out the unhealthy veins and arteries, graft healthy ones from elsewhere in the body to the heart, 
and thin the patient’s blood. In addition, during the surgery, the patient’s body will be connected 
to certain devices that ensure the continuity of certain vital functions. After the surgeon 
completes these procedures and the heart is properly pumping and receiving blood, her job is 
only partially complete. The patient still has serious wounds to which the surgeon must tend, and 
the internal conditions of the body must be restored to normal (to the extent to which it is 
possible) if the patient is to return to healthy functioning.356 Moreover, the surgeon must provide 
the patient with guidance for proper healing or adjustment if the patient cannot return to her 
previous way of life. Finally, as research has shown, a good bedside manner, which includes 
empathy and compassion, also helps the patient handle the process with greater ease and recover 
more quickly.357 A good surgeon recognizes the unique difficulties the patient will endure in the 
process and does what she can to alleviate the patient’s particular fears and pain.  
 Questioning and getting students themselves to critically examine their fundamental 
beliefs are akin to creating a wound in and around the heart, except the wounds are to students’ 
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psyches. Just as the heart is of vital importance of our bodies, our fundamental beliefs are so 
central to our existential functioning and flourishing that having one’s attachment to them 
severed can result in losing a part of oneself and derail one’s flourishing. Several scholars have 
in fact described not only the potential outcome of critical thinking but of education itself as such 
a process of loss. Five years after publishing her book advocating a pedagogy of discomfort, 
Boler reflects on her work in social justice education in another essay and describes herself as 
asking students “in some sense to annihilate the self as they have known it.”358
 
Within the 
context of peace education and dialogue on diverse ethical viewpoints, Seamus Mulryan writes 
that to experience a “breakdown in self-understanding” is to “confront the death of one’s self.”359 
 James Stillwaggon sees the loss of self as inherent to an Enlightenment-based conception 
of education in which “school curricula offer an exchange of childish beliefs and attitudes for the 
knowledge and behaviors appropriate to adulthood: an ideal of progress so invested in the future 
that it produces the past as merely the object that must have been overcome or completed in 
order for the subject to succeed.” He goes on to surmise, “the student whose past remains 
unchanged by her or his learning, ineffably unavailable or impervious to school discourses, may 
experience education as a discursive gain at the expense of a much more substantial loss of 
identity and agency.”360 Rodriguez’s experience corroborates Stillwaggon’s intuition. Rodriguez 
was unable to find a way to integrate the ways of his Mexican American working-class family 
life and those of the American public school. Becoming an accomplished student and scholar, for 
him, meant the tragic loss of connection with his family and his ethnic identity, and he writes in 
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his memoir, in the same terms that Stillwaggon uses, “I remember what was so grievously lost to 
define what was necessarily gained.”361 Todd goes so far as to characterize formal education in 
general as placing a “demand” on students to “learn to become” someone different and therefore 
“an inherently violent activity where the social environment exacts a traumatic price from the 
psyche.”362  
 While I am not inclined to indict liberal education or education in general as an act of 
violence, the place where a student’s psyche has been opened up in the process of critical 
thinking is a site of pain, injury, and loss, even if temporarily felt, that the responsible liberal 
educator should not simply dismiss or outsource for care. Being uncomfortable and experiencing 
disorientation and disillusionment might simply be temporary growing pains, but they only might 
be. They certainly signal that something has changed, but change does not always proceed in a 
positive direction. Perry characterizes students’ transition to becoming independent thinker in a 
pluralistic context as one punctuated by “major points of choice between fragmentation and 
integration, alienation and involvement.”363 Students must choose to either separate themselves 
from a reality in which there are multiple perspectives, leading to some form of alienation, or 
somehow accommodate and integrate this fact into their overall outlook and their commitments, 
which enables them to stay involved in the world. From the student’s perspective, each choice is 
one “between courage and despair — unless I find some way to shut my eyes.”364 While the 
ultimate responsibility for this choice rests on the student, Perry pushes back against the 
inclination to see this choice in individualistic terms: “Whether he responds productively rather 
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than destructively may be up to him in the end, but society may surely nourish the prospect of a 
productive outcome through an understanding of the learning and the courage the development 
entails.”365 Perry and his colleagues found that most students found the courage to stay involved, 
while some chose “alternatives to growth”: some stayed in a state of noncommittal limbo, “as 
one waiting for agency to rise within himself … or waiting for something to turn up that will 
interest him enough to solve all problems”366; “retreated” to an earlier outlook, “giving up, for 
the moment at least, … the responsibilities of reason (and of considered Commitment) and 
falling back on impulse”367; “dissociated” from the complexity of reality, leaving “all 
responsibility to fate”368; or “encapsulated” their identities within their competence in some 
activity, “sealed off from the implications of deeper values.”369 Perry, therefore, describes the 
educator’s responsibility as providing for “the sustenance of care”— care that sustains the 
student’s engagement with the world. 
 The Socratic ideal of the liberal educator offers no resources for the sustenance of care. It 
offers no resources for addressing either the pain or the loss that might lead students to recoil 
from engaging with the challenges with which they are confronted. It also offers no resources for 
providing support for the instability and distress that are inherent to the examined life and does 
not take students through a process of reconstructing the beliefs that are vital to their flourishing. 
Reflecting on the aporetic apex of Socrates’ dialogues, Burbules and Stitzlein ask, “Is a person 
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better off with the half truths they have than with nothing at all?”370 The responsible liberal 
educator does not simply leave this question to chance. The responsible liberal educator 
recognizes her practice as one that can inflict wounds and that pain requires attention, injury 
healing, loss an opportunity to grieve. She takes steps to shepherd them through this process 
towards restoration of the conditions of flourishing that have been disrupted — epistemic 
stability, sense of belonging, sense of orientation and purpose, and a sense of faith in the world 
— in order to enable students to lead a flourishing life.  
4.2 The Pastoral Professor: Updating the Ideal of the Socratic Educator 
 In shepherding students through the examined life, the pastoral professor undertakes the 
responsibilities of providing support and guidance to try to ensure that students will (continue to) 
lead flourishing lives characterized by wholehearted engagement with the good. Specifically, the 
pastoral professor (1) works to create a transitional intellectual and existential community that 
supports students in their vulnerability and distress and (2) offers students substantive guidance 
for reconstructing their beliefs and (re)engaging with the world based on her own views and 
experience. These pastoral roles — particularly the first and possibly the second — are generally 
taken up by student services units, as well as certain campus organizations that serve students 
(such as religious and spiritual centers), while individual faculty do some of the work of caring 
for students “invisibly” outside of the classroom. Integrating them into the educational practices 
of a professor requires a shift in our conception of the liberal educator and in what should take 
place within the academic realm in higher education. Recognizing and creating space for 
students’ emotional experiences and personal existential concerns pushes against the rationalistic 
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and detached norms of intellectual inquiry and the long established division of labor between 
faculty and student affairs, while recommending to students particular ways of viewing and 
living in the world might threaten students’ autonomy. With regard to the former concern, I seek 
to show in the remainder of this chapter and in the next that attending to students’ emotional 
experiences are not separate from or opposed to the intellectual aims of education but intertwined 
with them. With regard to the latter, I seek to offer ways of presenting one’s view that is neither 
indoctrinatory nor authoritarian. 
(1) The Classroom Community as a Transitional Intellectual and Existential Home 
 
Much has been written about the importance of creating a sense of “community” in the 
classroom. The classroom community is promoted as a mechanism for both educational and 
societal reform.371 A sense of belonging to a caring and supportive classroom community is 
reported to increase students’ engagement in learning and contribute to their overall academic 
achievement in college, and this kind of community is said to encourage students to be open to 
new perspectives and to want to understand those who are different from themselves. There is 
also rightfully considerable debate about just how to go about creating this sense of community 
and the effectiveness of different approaches in achieving the educational and societal aims of 
their advocates. Trust is essential to community, and creating a genuine sense of trust among 
students and between students and the teacher is a complex and delicate task, especially when 
discussing controversial topics and given that the teacher has power over students.372 It should be 
acknowledged that the number of students in a given course highly affects the possibility of 
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creating a sense of community among students and that what I am advocating is most feasible in 
seminar-size classes, perhaps of up to thirty students. That said, some of the strategies below can 
still be used in large lecture classes and reinforced in smaller discussion sections.  
The above cited purposes that motivate some educators to strive to create community in 
the classroom are important, but for my purposes I would like to conceive of the classroom 
community as a stabilizing environment for students as they go through the process of critically 
examining their beliefs. A sense of security and stability are in fact prerequisites to open and 
genuine engagement with new ways of thinking and new perspectives, as Perry’s alternatives to 
growth suggest. Sometimes, the student is “just not ready yet.”373 Warner, quoted in chapter 2, 
aspires to be a Socratic teacher, but he writes of tempering the desire to “make students 
uncomfortable” with an understanding of the necessity for students to feel secure while taking 
intellectual risks:  
Those of us who agree that one of the primary goals of education should be to 
make students “uncomfortable,” should remember that in order to make students 
uncomfortable, they must first feel secure.  
 
While there have no doubt been excesses when it comes to students declaring that 
they need a “safe space,” I am consistently dumbfounded when faculty speak or 
act in ways that seem so cavalier when it comes to making students feel 
appropriately secure so that they may learn. 
 
A student who experiences college feeling unsafe — culturally, academically, 
economically, socially — does not have the luxury of being challenged in the 
classroom because all of their energy is directed towards trying to survive.… 
 
When I tell [my students] that I will primarily offer pathways of inquiry inside of 
the discipline, rather than hard and fast answers, many students feel 
uncomfortable. But I’ve also learned — often the hard way — that to demand that 
students take risks requires me to incentivize risk, rather than punishing failure, 
that security must be a given.  
 
Put another way, anxious and afraid are not synonyms for “uncomfortable.”374 
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 Critics of the therapeutic turn in education would view this solicitousness to students’ 
fears, anxiety, and desire for security as infantilizing them. Kathryn Ecclestone and Daniel 
Hayes, for example, assail “the therapeutic university,” in which “the assumption of 
vulnerability” is pervasive, and completely dismiss the idea that “challenging experiences and 
changing your mind about your most precious beliefs and prejudices … are something that must 
be carefully and ‘sensitively’ handled.” While offering no student perspectives on the matter, 
they write, “we believe young people do not want to be students seen as needing therapeutic 
interventions, even when disguised as supporting their fragile ‘will to learn.’”375 They further 
contend that acknowledging to students that they may experience emotional difficulty in the 
learning process can both have a Pygmalion effect and debilitate both teachers and students: 
“Presenting learning as emotionally difficult and suggesting that emotions create barriers to 
achievement undermines teachers’ authority as subject matter experts who can teach, assess, and 
challenge their students. The converse is also true: the more that students are embroiled in 
therapeutic education, the less they want to be taught, assessed and challenged.”376 Finally, the 
concern with students’ emotions, whether “intellectual love” or the expression of their feelings 
about a matter in general, corrupts intellectual inquiry: “An academic life which requires self-
denial and disinterested inquiry is being undermined by the promotion of vulnerable ‘identities’ 
and an obsession with feelings.”377 Feelings, Ecclestone and Hayes worry, lead to bias and are 
often taken as a substitute for thought. They prefer a much more ascetic and tough-minded view 
of learning: “We might actually hate the process of enquiry, of going the ‘bloody hard way’ as 
Wittgenstein called it, but still be committed to our subject.”378 What Ecclestone and Hayes point 
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out, I acknowledge, are all risks that are run in giving more attention to students’ emotional 
experiences but not guaranteed outcomes, in the same way that I and others have argued that 
critical thinking has inherent risks. To deny the risk on one side is to run a greater risk on the 
other. Preventing the realization of the potential negative outcomes on either end of the spectrum 
requires prudence.  
 While students may not wish to be seen through a quasi-clinical lens that marks them as 
in need of therapeutic intervention, the student development scholarship that does rely on student 
voices to argue for being attentive to the emotional distress that accompanies students’ 
existential concerns make the case that they, as any human being in some distress, are helped by 
the care of another, even if they do not absolutely require it to cope. Again, this is not to say that 
all students experience such anxieties or will even want or accept such care from a professor or 
other adult. Should an educator recognize that her students are in distress, whether or not it is due 
to her teaching — but especially if it is due to her teaching — then surely she should make an 
effort to be responsive to the student, as a matter of both human decency and professional 
responsibility.  
 Also, I cannot launch into a full discussion about intellectual love here, but I will simply 
note that, although I agree that intellectual inquiry requires a certain ascetic discipline and that 
we must be careful not to be overly influenced by our personal interests or agendas, if we are 
genuinely seeking understanding and truth through intellectual inquiry, we do so because we are 
seeking a good that is the object of our love or eros, our desire for something we lack.379 
Moreover, a love for intellectual inquiry would seem to be a prerequisite for getting 
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undergraduates to genuinely engage in the kind of intellectual inquiry conducted in higher 
education. This kind of learning is new, often daunting, and quite challenging to undergraduates, 
and, as such, the goods of this engagement are unknown to them. Given that most students 
experience traditional teaching styles prior to (and sometimes during) college that aim to 
transmit information, especially in an era of standardized testing, students may experience school 
learning and expect it to be, as Dewey wrote more than 100 years ago, “remote and dead.”380 The 
issue of intellectual love aside, my position is that engaging with students’ emotions is necessary 
for their further engagement in critical intellectual inquiry, as Warner argues, and for restoring 
some of the conditions of flourishing. In the next chapter, I will also explore how engaging with 
students’ emotions and existential concerns can help them gain deeper understanding of the 
subject matter, which will help them reconstruct their beliefs and support their wholehearted 
engagement with the good. 
  The classroom community I have in mind offers students stability, security, and care for 
the purpose of supporting them with the intellectual transition they are making, but this transition 
is inevitably existential in nature and has emotional consequences. This community is defined by 
its transitional nature and serves as students’ intellectual and existential home as they, in Boler’s 
words, leave the familiar — and familial — shores of learned beliefs and habits. As their prior 
bonds loosen, they can regain a sense of belonging and safety with their fellow classmates and 
their teacher, who, like a pastor, is a fellow, albeit more experienced, sojourner. Yacek has 
challenged the idea of a “responsive classroom community”381 as the supportive medium that 
would prevent students from suffering, in his terms, an identity crisis because the time period of 
a course makes the classroom community too transient to become the kind of robust and 
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enduring community that can provide stability and continuity. He instead proposes that students 
be initiated into practices through which students gain a new identity within the community of 
practice as well as new ethical commitments embodied in the practice.382 Because practices exist 
as traditions that transcend students’ relatively brief school lives, they provide for the continuity 
of ethical frameworks and relationships that students need to regain their footing. Although a 
practice may provide a longer-term solution, it does not serve the particular purpose I see the 
classroom community serving.  
 As a transitional community, what its members share and what provides support and a 
sense of belonging is their experience of vulnerability and loss in the midst of uncertainty and 
change, as well as their individual and collective efforts to make sense of their lives. Anchored in 
this community, they regain a sense of security as they test the waters and begin to make their 
way towards another shore, however close or far off it may be. Parks helpfully reframes 
students’ experiences with critical thinking as a search for a new home: “It is particularly useful 
here to remember the value of thinking less in terms of development journeys and more in terms 
of transformations in one’s sense of home.”383 Neither the home of their childhood beliefs, a 
religious institution with set creeds, a professional practice, nor a political or social cause to 
which they are devoted, the classroom community becomes a temporary home from which they 
can explore possibilities for another home. Here, I draw from Perry’s study and the educational 
implications he draws from it. Identifying “the most pressing problem emerging from the study” 
as the question of “what environmental sustenance most supports students in the choice to use 
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their competence to orient themselves through Commitment,” rather than move towards 
alienation, he concludes, “For the majority, … the most important support seemed to derive from 
a special realization of community. This was the realization that in the very risks, separateness, 
and individuality of working out their Commitments, they were in the same boat not only with 
each other but with their instructors as well.”384 It should not be difficult to understand, 
particularly for academics, how, in an environment where most people have been socialized to 
seek approval for knowing the right answer, knowing that one is “in the same boat” with others 
who also are uncertain and confused makes one feel less alone, not to mention less afraid to 
make mistakes and more willing to admit ignorance and insecurity. 
 The presence and participation of the instructor is important and is what distinguishes this 
community from the proverbial dormitory “bull session,” which some would argue is more 
appropriate for serving the purposes of the classroom community. Discussions that revolve 
around students’ feelings of vulnerability and loss and around their existential concerns should 
take place, critics might argue, outside of the classroom. Moreover, it might be thought that the 
presence of the instructor may in fact inhibit students’ inclination to share openly. It is important 
to remember that the emotions and concerns for which I am arguing educators should offer 
support are those that arise within the context of a particular course. While they are certainly not 
bounded by the subject matter of the course and extend to nonacademic realms of students’ lives, 
the course materials, foci of inquiry, and the educator’s insights into the subject matter serve as 
resources. They can provide new knowledge, conceptual frameworks, and language for giving 
clarity, depth, and breadth to students’ understanding of and a different vantage point on their 
experiences. Contrary to the trend Gert Biesta calls the “disappearance of the teacher,” which he 
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attributes to the influence of certain constructivist and student-centered conceptions of education, 
I argue for the essential role of the teacher even in this aspect of the educational process.385 It is 
not that students cannot offer each other anything without the teacher, but the liberal educator 
brings resources to students’ process of grappling with their emotions and concerns — while 
grappling with the course subject matter — that they may not otherwise possess. On the 
importance of bringing something beyond students’ experiences to discussion, Joseph Schwab 
writes, “By omission of the substantive function [of education], only the student’s experiences 
remain as a subject matter and as a ground for discussion. By omission of the exemplary, what 
little is available for subject matter is treated only by the limited terms and methods already 
familiar to the participants. The combined omission of both has as its consequence increase of a 
drug-addictive taste for talk itself. Discussion is corrupted into bull session.”386 In the same vein, 
Todd challenges the midwife model of the Socratic educator, in which teaching is conceived as 
helping the student give birth to truths they contain within, or “bringing out of the I that which it 
already contains” — and argues that teaching should instead be viewed as “bringing more than I 
[the student] contain.”387  
 Also, as someone more experienced in the intellectual realm, the educator can affirm 
students in their existential-intellectual efforts. The apprenticeship model is fitting here, which 
Perry also invokes. Educators, he writes, have “the duty of confirming the student in his 
community with them — a membership he achieves (at the very least as an apprentice or 
colleague-to-be) through his own meaning-making, his daring to take risks, and his courage in 
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committing himself.”388 This community, therefore, is a safe space, but not a space safe from 
new and challenging ideas but is safe for engaging with them. Furthermore, beyond their 
scholarly expertise, the educator also brings more life experience that can place students’ 
experiences in a long-term perspective, helping them see that what might seem like a permanent 
condition is not, that there is “hope that meaning can be reconstituted beyond the Abyss — there 
will be a new home.”389 While an educator’s presence can inhibit students’ openness in this 
community, this does not necessarily have to be the case, as the examples I offer below will 
show. Cultivating the kind of trust that is necessary for creating the classroom community I have 
described, both in the teacher-student relationship as well as in the student-student relationship, 
is a delicate task, but it is not an insurmountable challenge and can be done without either 
undermining the educator’s institutional authority or generating inauthentic compliance.  
 In addition to offering a community in which to belong and in which they can feel safe 
while taking risks, the classroom community offers an opportunity for students’ losses to be 
recognized and mourned. Recognizing and allowing students to mourn their losses is not simply 
a matter of compassion. Perry and Stillwaggon argue that having one’s loss recognized by 
another in some way and mourning the loss of one’s previous attachments are necessary for 
moving forward and staying engaged in the educational enterprise that has caused the loss. 
 Perry relates in a later essay a story that presses the importance of recognizing students’ 
losses and of educators’ “sharing in the costs of growth.” A freshman woman, whose high school 
social science teacher conducted a demonstration of an optical illusion, reports that from this 
demonstration she came to see “how much we bring with us to our perception of things, how 
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much we construct our worlds … how everybody makes their own meanings, how different 
things can look in a different light, so to speak.” When asked how she felt at that moment, she 
responded, “Oh it was awful. I mean, my world was shattered. I guess it’s sort of naïve to use a 
word like this here, but it was like I lost my innocence. I mean nothing could ever be for sure — 
like it seems — I mean, again.” Nonetheless, she held to her newly gained perspective and 
nonchalantly reported that she saw a similar “gimmick” at Harvard. Asked why she “stayed 
with” this view, she responded, “Oh, that was because of the teacher! You see, I trusted him, and 
I knew he knew. I mean, we didn’t talk about it really, but he just looked at me and I knew he 
knew — what I’d learned — and what I’d lost! I guess because he knew what I’d lost, I could 
stay with what I’d seen.”390 Perry goes on to elaborate on the effect of having one’s pain and loss 
recognized:  
If a loss has been known, if a pain of mine has been known and shared by 
somebody, if somebody has been aware of one of my pains, then I can go on. I 
can let that pain die in some way and go on to reinvest the hope. (Not that I ever 
really get entirely over it, you understand. What happens to the wounds of the 
past? Theodore Reik was asked that question, you remember. He said, “Well, they 
ache in bad weather.”) But still, if these things have been known and shared, then 
somehow it is possible for me to do a strange thing called grieving, which I do not 
pretend to understand. It seems all right to let it hurt. 
 But if it is not allowed to grieve or hurt, I have to deny the truth to have 
my chin up. If my loss has never “lived” socially, then I must keep it alive myself, 
protect it like a responsibility, even.391 
 
Having one’s pain and loss recognized and legitimized by another somehow allows one to 
actually grieve and let go. Perhaps it is the confirmation, especially by someone with authority 
and more experience, that it is not some personal pathology but a more common human 
experience that gives one permission to grieve.  
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 Drawing on his early experience as a sixth-grade teacher in the rural South, Stillwaggon 
writes that “unmourned losses”392 can actually become a source of resistance in students to 
engaging in the educational process in which they are expected to participate: “Where these 
feelings of loss go unrecognized, a potential resistance manifests itself in the form of an 
identification with their lost connections rather than with the positive promises of educational 
transformation.”393 More often than not, the losses experienced due to education go unrecognized 
and unmourned, particularly in the case of marginalized students for whom the schooling process 
and curriculum may feel “too distant from the attachments that made them who they were.”394 
Their resistance springs from the desire to feel at home in their social worlds and to retain a 
sense of belonging, or, in the terms framing this project, to maintain some of the conditions of 
their flourishing:  
 Successful working-class students may experience “the threat of losing oneself” 
to a system of interconnected discourses that fail to represent an aspect of their 
life experiences outside of school, and may forego the widely recognized benefits 
of higher education for the more familiar identity categories of the home. 
Alternatively, successful working-class (or otherwise culturally different) students 
who remain engaged with the target culture in which they have been educated 
may find themselves at a loss: always feeling the split between their outward, 
professional identity and their inner feelings of belonging.395 
 
Stillwaggon’s focus is marginalized students, but again, this tension can be felt by any student 
with for whom the educational discourse — in this project, that of the critical ethos of liberal 
education — is foreign and is a matter of degree.  
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 In an educational environment that does not generally recognize these losses, Stillwaggon 
argues, students are left without a means for expressing their grief. He suggests that, beyond the 
personal recognition of students’ losses, as we saw in Perry’s story, educators should provide 
resources, namely texts, that offer a language for articulating that loss. In other words, educators 
must use texts in which students their lives or at least aspects of their lives are represented. 
Stillwaggon tells the stories of Ronald and Amy who had been “broadcasting some aspect of 
their identity that they each knew to … be problematic within the educational discourse where 
they spoke”: neither Ronald’s father or siblings completed sixth grade and Amy’s mother was an 
imprisoned heroin addict.396 The entire class was resistant to the standard curriculum and 
Stillwaggon’s efforts to inspire them. He witnessed significant breakthroughs with Ronald and 
Amy in terms of their level of engagement after he stocked the room with various other young 
adult books and gave more open-ended assignments that allowed students to express whatever 
thoughts they had about what they were learning. For Ronald, it was recognizing his father in a 
character in a story, and for Amy, it was a found-poem activity397 through which each of their 
hitherto unmourned losses were given expression. For Stillwaggon, enabling students to see or 
express their losses in linguistic form is important because language offers some distance that 
allows them to understand those losses, their relationship to those losses, and their relationship to 
the educational discourse differently.  
 By providing a place to belong, be confirmed, and mourn one’s losses, the classroom 
community serves as a medium through which students can stay engaged with the social world 
and to experience the world in general as having something good to offer. It does so by helping 
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them sustain a sense of trust and faith in it, even as they detach from and question it in ways that 
disrupt their other social ties as well as the epistemic approaches, purposes, and faith with which 
they entered the classroom. Jane Tompkins writes that “the classroom is a microcosm of the 
world,”398 an enactment of certain ideals, and this kind of classroom community shows students 
a world that is hospitable to their desires for security and belonging and the need to explore 
before placing their stake on some new territory (or perhaps on the old one with a more nuanced 
understanding and considered conviction). Arcilla similarly envisions liberal education as a way 
to cultivate a community that can serve this purpose for young people, though its primary 
purpose is to create solidarity in a divided world. A particularly relevant educational problem he 
tackles, building on the work of Stanley Cavell, is how an educator can respond to a young 
person who is on the verge of cynically rejecting a divided adult world that is full of 
“pretentiousness, hypocrisy, and phoniness protected by complacent callousness.”399 His 
cynicism radiates to all of life, and he has a particular resentment for education, which he 
“accuses … of trying to cover up the arbitrariness of all things, and so the absurdity of any 
particular state of affairs.”400 Uncompromising in his principles, he would isolate himself for the 
sake of his integrity. What the educator can offer to this student in response is “the same sense of 
honesty, neither of them pretending to know hypocritically or fraudulently what they do not.”401 
The educator lets the student know that they are “together at a loss of how to live.”402 Rather 
than rejecting the adult world all together, the student can find membership in and have his 
“faith”403 restored by a community of “aporetic questioning,”404 in which participants honor each 
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other’s sincerity and do not hide their “vulnerability to unanswerable questions,”405 but instead 
seek the good together in wonder of the mystery of human existence. Arcilla insightfully 
articulates how liberal education can serve the flourishing of young people by defining it as a 
community of questioning, but, like the ideal of the Socratic educator, I believe it only goes half 
way. While we may never stop questioning entirely, we live according to our answers to these 
questions, even if those answers evolve, and thus creating a space for collective questioning is 
only part of the pastoral professor’s task, as I will discuss in the next section.  
 Before elucidating what this task entails, however, we must consider how this transitional 
community I envision is to be realized. I offer a few guidelines and examples, drawing from the 
work of other scholars and my own experience. The viability of this community fundamentally 
rests on trust — trust between the educator and the students and trust among students — because 
being open about one’s vulnerabilities and losses requires trusting those to whom these are 
disclosed. Trust can never be forced, demanded, or assumed, but must be cultivated, particularly 
in a classroom setting, in which educators are not likely to have had a prior relationship with all 
of her students and in which not all students are likely to know each other. I suggest cultivating 
the trust necessary for creating community requires that educators (1) initiate and model 
openness about their own vulnerabilities; (2) explicitly invite students to engage with their 
academic work and with each other on a personal level; and (3) affirm students and create 
opportunities for students to affirm each other in their efforts to make sense of what they 
encounter. Through this process of initial openness, invitation, and affirmation, trust is built. 
 In her exploration of the dynamics of trust in teacher-student relationships, Barbara 
Applebaum argues that because the power differential between teachers and students already 
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places students in a more vulnerable position, teachers must initiate trust, and they do so by 
showing that that they trust the students with their own vulnerability: “In order to trust one’s 
students the teacher must in some way and to a certain degree make him/herself vulnerable to 
them primarily by showing them that he/she is a human being just as they are, having faults, 
weaknesses, desires, and ambitions.”406 With regard to the particular vulnerabilities students may 
experience due to critical thinking, Perry writes that educators must demonstrate an “openness—
a visibility in their own thinking, groping, doubts, and styles of Commitment,” which is also 
suggested in Arcilla’s vision.407 In doing so, the educator not only shows that she trusts her 
students, she also serves as a model of thoughtful uncertainty, which both make it permissible for 
students to be uncertain and demonstrate ways to handle it with candor, intellectual integrity, and 
courage. While the educator remains an authority figure from an institutional and pedagogical 
standpoint and teaches from the authority of greater knowledge of a field, she puts herself on an 
equal plane as a fellow learner or takes a “participant stance,” a term she borrows from Richard 
Holton.408 As Applebaum writes,  
By being vulnerable, teachers may be able to mitigate the power differential in the 
classroom. This point about vulnerability and trust is not to imply that a teacher 
must make him/herself so fallible as to lose the respect of students. Yet it is ironic 
that often when a teacher is not afraid to show feelings that can be hurt, to make 
mistakes, and to show a willingness to learn from as well as teach students, the 
students seem to respect and care for the teacher all the more.409 
 
Applebaum reminds us that there is risk in showing one’s vulnerability to students and that 
knowing exactly what and how to show vulnerability requires prudence, but that the risk is often 
very worthwhile.  
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 Showing trust in students also shows respect and care. It shows students that the teacher 
believes they are “persons of integrity, capable of reliable action and possessing a proper concern 
and respect for others,”410 and these attributions convey aspects of care, “for when we trust 
someone we have a certain positive perception of them and give them the benefit of the doubt.” 
By showing trust in students, Applebaum argues, teachers can create “dispositions to trust” in 
students.411 Although she does not explicitly draw this connection, one can imagine that upon 
sensing that they are respected and cared-for, students can then feel safe to be vulnerable with 
their teachers.  
 Having set a tone of openness and vulnerability by initiating trust, educators should 
explicitly invite students to engage with their academic work and with each other on a personal 
level such that they are permitted to express what they feel about what they are learning and to 
relate what they are learning to their existential concerns, or in short, to make the intellectual 
personal. I do not mean that this invitation must be issued in every assignment and activity, but 
that educators should create such opportunities in addition to more traditional types of 
assignments. Doing so enables educators to learn about the particular concerns with which 
students are grappling and opens the door to a genuine relationship in which these concerns can 
be broached. Explicitly inviting personal engagement in their academics means allowing students 
to write from a first-person perspective (that is, to use “I”) and making connections between the 
what they are learning and their personal experiences. Given that most students have been 
socialized not to do so within the academic context, I have found that explicitly inviting this kind 
of engagement is necessary.  
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 Understanding this act as an invitation is critical, for it implies, first of all, the freedom of 
the participant to choose whether or not to participate. Educators should not force students to 
reveal their innermost thoughts. The notion of an invitation also implies a particular pedagogical 
approach where care is taken to make an appeal to a specific audience, offer a worthwhile 
experience, and show hospitality to those who join. The educator must “pitch” these kinds of 
assignments and class activities at the right intellectual and maturity level for students, make 
clear what their purpose is, and state and show through affirmative responses that what students 
share in earnest and the risks they are taking in their thinking are welcome and valued. Without 
these elements, students are unlikely to want to engage in an activity in which they place 
themselves at risk.  
The invitation to think about their academic work in personal terms can be made in a 
number of ways. The educator can acknowledge the different kinds of emotional responses 
students (or anyone) might have to a topic, assignment, or type of discussion, as the professor 
who suggested taking on the role of a parent does. The educator can directly ask about their more 
immediate responses to something, during a class discussion or on a written assignment, such as 
brief response papers or “journals” in which students are asked to respond either to specific 
questions or are given freedom to choose the direction of their response. One religion professor 
prompts his students as follows:  
The journal should be a record of those things in the readings that you find 
stimulating, eye opening, beneficial, disconcerting, scary, etc. This is meant to be 
an organic exercise—in other words, the journal is there for you to record not 
only what you have learned and think you ‘know,’ but also how you ‘feel’ about 
the material. As you work on your entries, try to think holistically, and across the 
mental boundaries that condition your thoughts, ideas, and feelings. Ask yourself 
why you think and feel the way you do about the topic(s) that you are considering. 
When you have recorded your answers to those questions, again ask yourself why 
you think and feel the way you do about the answer you have just recorded, and 
write that down too. 
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This process of “meta-thinking,” he explains, will be “extremely difficult, but also extremely 
beneficial, as it will allow you to empathize (though not necessarily agree) with those who think 
differently about religion than you yourself do.”412 Not all journal assignment have to be as 
prescriptive, though it seems to me that this particular assignment strikes the right balance 
between creating opportunities for students to share the emotions and uncertainty that a reading 
might arouse while also encouraging them to think critically. These kinds of assignments are 
some of the most useful ways of not only gaining an initial awareness of students’ experiences 
with critical thinking but also of getting to know students individually and helping them find a 
starting point for deeper engagement with the subject matter.  
Finally, students’ participation in the community must be validated by the educator and 
other students. How an educator responds to students’ risk-taking and their having opportunities 
to respond to each other are crucial to creating and keeping them engaged in the classroom 
community. There are few things more demoralizing than expressing one’s genuine thoughts and 
feelings only to have them met with a less than genuine response or to be ignored altogether 
while perfunctorily assessed against a grading rubric.413 Students’ responses must be understood 
as part of dialogue in which the educator is a participant, rather than the fulfillment of an 
assignment. The educator’s care is expressed through recognition and affirmation that shows 
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students they have been heard, their struggles are legitimate, and that they are in fact capable of 
questioning, reasoning about, and interpreting the world with the educator and their fellow 
classmates.  
For most students, the recognition and affirmation of the educator carries a weight that is 
different from that of peers because of her greater knowledge and expertise. Still, recognition and 
affirmation from peers is also critical for helping students see that they are not alone and for 
cultivating personal and supportive relationships. The limitation of individual response papers is 
that usually only the educator reads them. The basic model of interaction among students in the 
classroom community is that of discussion in which students are given the opportunity to engage 
in dialogue with each other through a variety of classroom activities. Much has been written on 
the nature and possibilities of genuine dialogue and the importance of empathic listening in 
education, but I will not draw on this literature here, though it offers valuable insight. I would 
like to instead offer a concrete example of an activity devised by religion professor Susan 
Handelman (introduced in chapter 2) that I believe presents a compelling way in which educators 
can create a community that addresses students’ existential (or spiritual) needs and also develops 
their intellectual capacities through the disciplined attention required by writing. While I cannot 
do it justice in my brief summary, my aim in presenting this example is to encourage educators 
to think beyond our conventional notions of academic work and how we run a class for the 
purpose of enabling our students to flourish. 
Handelman writes that at the end of each semester, many of her students would express 
“a frustrated need for help in sorting it all out, knowing where to take a stand, a feeling of being 
left hanging” after they had been exposed to “a profusion of ideas, questions, and debates.”414 In 
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response, she sought to develop a way to have them “learn from each other” and to “encourage 
and confirm them in their spiritual quests, to affirm their searching until they each found what 
she or he needed, each in her or his own way.” Instead of journals and in addition conventional 
academic assignments, Handelman asks students to write letters to certain people in their lives, 
including fellow classmates and the teacher, in response to readings, which they then read aloud 
and discuss in class, usually in small groups and to which other students can respond at any point 
in the semester. She notes that “the rhetorical directness and informal form of the letter frees 
them to write in a more personal, engaged way” and that “knowing they will … read it aloud and 
give it to their colleagues, makes them put in a special effort.”415 (In general, I have found that 
creating opportunities for informal interactions, especially in person and in class, goes a long 
way toward helping students feel comfortable with each other). These letters are collected, and at 
the midpoint and at the end, students are asked to read them all and to comment on a few quotes 
they found especially meaningful. Handelman also writes letters to the class, both to model the 
kind of engagement for which she is hoping — “a combination of serious thought with a warm, 
personal, playful voice” — and to “become part of the democratic mélange of voices.”416 She 
explains the effectiveness of this assignment as follows: 
Whatever their tone and style, reading and writing letters over the course of a 
semester creates a special kind of cohesiveness and intimacy in a class. And our 
students are so desperately hungry for that deeper connection with each other and 
with their teachers…. the letter writing makes every one [sic] a participant, gives 
everyone a voice, even those who are shy or afraid to speak, or insecure…. I use 
the letters as a means for students to get to know each other better.417  
                                                 
experiences of this assignment see Susan Handelman, “‘Dear Class,’” Essays in Quality Learning: Teachers’ 
Reflections on Classroom Practice, 1998, 17–32. 
415 Handelman, “‘Stopping the Heart’: The Spiritual Search of Students and the Challenge to a Professor in an 
Undergraduate Literature Class,” 206. 
416 Ibid., 208. 
417 Handelman, “‘Dear Class,’” 4. 
 166 
Her students’ unsolicited comments about the letters at the end of the semester are a testament to 
what she perceives about her students — that they seek deeper connection and find 
encouragement from it while in the throes of a search for answers to “big questions” about life. 
Handelman quotes “one of the more cynical and perplexed” of her students:  
What made this class so effective was the honesty and thought everyone put into 
the letters and discussions. That personal insight gave this class a depth that most 
courses lack and I thank you all for sharing. I hope you all find the answers you 
are looking for. And if you do please e-mail me because I’m so tired of asking 
paradoxically unanswerable questions that at this point I am open to anything. 
Future cult leaders take notice.418 
 
Lest anyone be concerned that Handelman has sacrificed intellectual rigor in her class, she states 
parenthetically, “By the way, I still do require final projects and term papers in more traditional 
modes. The letters often provide the seeds of those essays, but these other projects almost never 
have the same verve, eloquence, or creative insight; the prose returns to the perfunctory and 
dull.”419 
 Handelman’s assignment and the other strategies I have mentioned invite students into 
the examined life in a way that acknowledges that their whole person is involved in the learning 
process and that our teaching touches upon their concerns for their flourishing. Although I have 
chosen examples from two religion professors, one can imagine similar types of assignments and 
discussions taking place in humanities and social sciences courses, in which students confront 
multiple perspectives, and possibly even sciences courses to the extent that they address broader 
philosophical (metaphysical, epistemological, ethical) questions.  
 I have conceived of the classroom community as transitional and therefore a temporary 
one in which students can ask questions and explore in safety with fellow travelers. The comical 
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final statement from Handelman’s student in the quote above, however, should not distract us 
from the very real plea for answers. My student Lucas who criticized the drastic “flip” between 
the traditional teaching in high school and the critical approach in college for leaving students in 
“a disillusioned mental state” made a similar plea. “What is the ‘right’ path to take?” he asks. 
“How can we combat the disillusion[ment] or are those feelings just an inevitability of modern 
society?” How are we who tout the virtues of questioning to answer these questions?  
(2) The Professor as Guide Toward Potential Paths of Flourishing  
If our ultimate aim as educators is to enable students to flourish, then it is not sufficient to 
create a community where they can be supported and affirmed as they grapple with questions. 
Flourishing, as I have defined it, is undergirded by beliefs that give stability to one’s life, orient 
one towards what is and what one perceives to be good, and motivate one’s engagement with the 
world. The pastoral professor works toward restoring or sustaining the conditions of students’ 
flourishing, partly by creating a classroom community, which offers a sense of belonging and 
can sustain students’ faith in the world and hope of finding another existential home. She must 
also offer resources to help them regain their epistemic stability and ethical orientation, namely 
resources that help them reconstruct their beliefs and point them towards possibilities for 
engaging with the good. The pastoral professor does so by presenting specific, substantive 
possibilities for what to believe and how to live, potential paths forward that she herself would 
endorse as good and constitutive of a flourishing life. In this task, the educator’s own 
commitments and experience, I argue, are an important resource for guiding students in their 
efforts to determine their beliefs and how to lead a worthwhile life.  
The ethico-epistemological ideal of the rational autonomous, or the self-responsible, 
individual and the related ideal of objectivity in research have led to an academic culture in 
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which many educators are wary of, if not entirely opposed to, trying to guide students in these 
ways and of expressing their own beliefs. The former ideal in particular is the source of continual 
tension and debate in education theory and practice, and some would argue it actually creates a 
counterproductive contradiction at the heart of the educational enterprise itself. The ideal of the 
self-responsible individual, we will recall, emerged out of Enlightenment philosophies that 
rejected the influence of authority over or any external interference with an individual’s beliefs, 
as well as the influence of emotions and personal interest. The individual is her own authority 
with the right and responsibility to choose her own beliefs and trajectory in life, and exercising 
this right and responsibility is necessary for fulfilling her humanity. Within the realm of 
education (as with parenting, this ideal leaves us in a quandary. Educators, at least traditionally, 
are responsible for teaching something to students, which they presumably believe is worth 
learning because true and/or useful and which students are supposed to learn from them. This 
transaction can occur only if students accept educators’ authority on the matter and in the 
educational process. Indeed, Arendt argued that the loss of authority in modern society was the 
root of the “crisis in education” in the United States, indicated by the inferior academic 
performance of American students as compared with their European peers, which, according to 
Arendt, was wrought by progressive theories of education that abdicate adult authority to the 
child.420 Zagzebski further observes that even the authority of experts, which higher education in 
particular recognizes, is “carefully circumscribed” by the belief in the individual’s authority over 
herself: “Most philosophers assume that they may not command belief, and nobody has an 
epistemic duty to believe them.”421 
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In the name of protecting and developing students’ autonomy, it is argued that teachers 
should remain neutral and leave their own views out of discussion in order to make room for 
students “to think through issues themselves, to make clear distinctions, to offers stronger 
reasons, to present more cogent appraisals of others’ reasoning, and the like.”422 Given the 
inherent institutional authority that educators possess, along with their personal biases, scholars 
also worry that educators might indoctrinate students into their own beliefs; or even if the 
educator has no such intention, students might still be unduly influenced by the authority and 
power that educators exercise over them. Scholars also make the civic and political argument 
that, in a pluralistic, democratic society such as the United States, an educator’s expression and 
advocacy of her views would present to students a biased view on social issues and could prevent 
them from voicing and hearing perspectives that differ from those of the teacher. In addition, the 
idea that the individual is her own authority over judgments about what is true and right is also 
the basis for an egalitarian view of conceptions of the good that places epistemological and 
political constraints on educators’ efforts to guide students. Without universal standards dictated 
by any recognized authority, what justifies claims that one way of life is better than another, and 
what gives anyone the right to impose or try to persuade another to adopt their beliefs? We saw a 
similar line of reasoning earlier with the paternalism objection to the idea that our educational 
practices should be guided by a conception of flourishing, which educators hold to be good for 
their students.423  
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Just as I believe that those who reject the idea that educators should support students in 
their emotional distress go too far to avoid certain risks and thereby neglect the actual needs of 
students and their responsibilities as educators, I argue that those who think educators should 
refrain from offering substantive guidance to students about what to believe in order to protect 
students’ autonomy run the risk of depriving them of developmental resources that educators are 
in a unique position to provide. In other words, I acknowledge that there are certain risks posed 
to students when an educator presents her own views, but these risks should not prevent us from 
considering how educators can present her views in ways that can actually support students, even 
in their becoming independent thinkers, and I will be making a case that they can. 
Before doing so, let me address the specific concerns listed above. An educator might try 
to indoctrinate students into her own beliefs, but she is not likely to be successful with regard to 
any beliefs that are not already embedded in the ethos of the institution.424 Keeping in mind that I 
am primarily interested in the experience of undergraduates undertaking a liberal arts education 
in secular, pluralistic higher education institutions, we must remember that undergraduates who 
enter our classrooms are being exposed to multiple ethical perspectives within their academic 
and nonacademic lives (though the range of diversity will differ across institutions). Many, like 
Handelman’s students, will engage with multiple and conflicting perspectives in one course, but 
even if they are not, they are likely to do so across the courses they take. One professor who 
aggressively or just passionately advocates his views will not have total influence on students, 
and if all professors were to be transparent in advocating their views, then students will definitely 
be exposed to a diversity of perspectives. The same argument applies to a certain extent to the 
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issue of bias, though the concern is that students will only hear one side of a particular issue 
within a course. It is now commonly understood that we cannot wholly escape bias in education, 
that there is no true neutrality, for, again, all of our educational practices — from the course 
material an educator selects to her pedagogy and to the irreducibly personal perspective from 
which an educator teaches a subject — flow from a particular normative framework. Thus, in 
trying to avoid bias, we inevitably exchange one bias for another. The question is rather how we 
can prevent our bias and authority from overly inhibiting students’ exposure to other 
perspectives and from hindering their intellectual development, and instead use them to promote 
their capacities for forming their own beliefs.  
I already addressed the paternalism objection in chapter 3, but it is worth considering this 
objection with regard to the idea of guiding students in the reconstruction of their beliefs by 
offering one’s own views as possibilities. To start, the view that education is essentially 
paternalistic is not a claim that an educator has the right to impose her views on a student, which 
implies an unwelcome and coercive act. Imposing one’s view on students would mean presenting 
one’s own view on a matter as the only right view and trying to forcefully persuade students to 
hold this view, reinforcing this effort by penalizing them in some way for expressing a different 
view. (Actually coercing someone to hold a belief is considered impossible.425) I wholly oppose 
this approach, no matter how sincerely an educator believes that her view is right and good for 
students’ flourishing.  
The act of guiding, however, might still seem too directive and to have the effect of 
imposition, given the power differential between teacher and student. I would like to bracket the 
issue of power for now and consider the notion of guiding. In one sense, guiding can be very 
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directive. For example, a tour guide directs one’s journey through a particular itinerary to a 
particular destination. Guiding, however, can be more suggestive, like a travel guide that offers 
recommendations. It is in this sense that I use the word “guide.”  
Oakeshott provides a vivid metaphor that gets at this idea. In his poetic essay “A Place of 
Learning,” he describes liberal learning as an “invitation to encounter particular adventures in 
human self-understanding.” Through various school subjects and the particular ideas and 
narratives that are presented to them by educators, students encounter not information to be 
acquired but “expressions of human self-understanding,”426 expressions of the ways that humans 
have made sense of their lives and the world throughout the ages. They are a record of a human 
culture, which “comprises unfinished intellectual and emotional journeyings, expeditions now 
abandoned but known to us in the tattered maps left behind by the explorers.”427 As adventures 
and unfinished journeys, the final destination is unknown, and the maps have been tattered by the 
many hands that have picked them up as guides for their own journeys — guides in which the 
paths have lost some definition and that perhaps only partially reflect the current landscape, but 
provide some direction and potential pathways nonetheless.  
Oakeshott does not mention the liberal educator and her particular role in this essay, but 
we can draw two implications from this metaphor for how an educator can guide students. First, 
given that an educator’s views are already implicit in the course materials she selects, she can 
select materials for students specifically for the purpose of helping them explore paths forward 
out of their particular epistemological and existential confusion that she herself has found 
helpful, similar to how Stillwaggon offered his students texts that reflected their lives. Second, 
assuming that a liberal educator is a fellow human being on her own adventure of self-
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understanding, her own views and experience can also serve as one of those tattered maps. Both 
of these ways of sharing the educator’s own views fulfill the pastoral responsibility of restoring 
the disrupted conditions of flourishing by helping to restore students’ epistemic stability and by 
pointing them towards possibilities for wholeheartedly engaging with the world. At the same 
time, these ways of guiding students can help them become independent, critical thinkers.  
Beginning with the first implication, in addition to having students engage with course 
materials that help them think critically about different beliefs and issues, educators should also 
have students engage with materials that present the narratives (in texts and film, for example) 
and reflections of people who have found ways resolve or come to terms with the conflicts and 
questions raised by the issue at hand — ways to live out their purposes, to affirm what is good, 
and to maintain faith and hope in the wake of their crises and losses. Parks writes that students 
need “access to key images”: those of “suffering and wonder”; those that empower students by 
showing how we as individuals are connected to and can affect “the larger whole”; those that 
portray transformation so as to nurture hope; and those that present “positive images of self,” 
images of “adults who are living positive and joyful lives.”428 Boler makes a similar addendum 
to her pedagogy of discomfort after “witnessing students’ intense emotional reactions and 
resistances to rethinking cherished assumptions and worldviews.”429 As a result of one explosive 
encounter with a student and the ensuing conversation, she comes to conclude that educators 
must “be able to meet [students’] discomfort with compassion — and with resources to help 
them replace the lost sense of self.”430 For this latter restorative step, Boler looks to the 
curriculum and briefly suggests three “productive ‘replacements’” offered within the course: a 
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discussion that seeks to help students to incorporate an understanding of the costs of privilege (of 
various kinds) for the privileged; first-person narratives of those who become activists upon 
realizing their complicity; and histories that offer detailed portraits of those involved in social 
movements.431 Such narratives give students a glimpse into “what might be gained through this 
suffering of loss” and provide ways of moving “beyond discomfort” to “building critical hope,” a 
hope that is not naïve but is contextualized within the unjust, historical realities of the world yet 
still sees the possibility for positive change.432  
 The selection of course materials that educators consider restorative is implicitly an 
expression of their views, but students would also benefit from hearing what educators 
themselves believe and how they have come to their conclusions, the second implication I drew 
from Oakeshott’s metaphor. The motivation here is not to have students reach the same 
conclusions. As with the narratives of others, the educator’s views offer potential ways that 
students can resolve some of their uncertainties, at least partially and at least for a time, and to 
model ways of thinking and thoughtfulness about specific issues. The latter reason is particularly 
important. One of the conditions of flourishing that I argued is disrupted by critical thinking is 
epistemic stability. The instability students experience is not only due to uncertainty about which 
views to believe but also, and more fundamentally, uncertainty about how to determine what to 
believe, as expressed by one of Perry’s interviewees. In his interview, the student states 
“plaintively” that he finds it very difficult to be given “a big question to answer” and then to try 
to “figure it out.” He rightly, I think, identifies the problem: “I haven’t had enough practice in 
being able to think that way.”433 Educators can easily forget that they are part of a distinct 
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academic culture, as Graff writes, with particular ways of reasoning and arguing that are foreign 
to many students. If we want students to become confident in their own reasoning capacities, 
then providing guidance with regard to how to reason is necessary. For this reason, Graff argues 
that educators should be explicit about the norms of argumentation in higher education.  
More important than the intellectual “moves” that make for a good academic argument, 
however, students benefit from hearing about the overall process by which an educator came to 
her position. For most people, this process involves a combination of logic, personal experience, 
and, as Alasdair MacIntyre argues, the perspective of a broader worldview with its own 
epistemological assumptions. Criticizing the dominance of Enlightenment-based epistemologies 
in the contemporary academy, MacIntyre argues that the intellectual norms of what I have called 
the critical ethos constitute just one of three “rival traditions of moral inquiry,” which are 
fundamentally at odds with each other and are the source of our current ethical and political 
conflicts. Given that students live in a world in which such conflicts abound, MacIntyre argues 
that “it is the central responsibility of higher education” to teach students explicitly about these 
conflicts and the epistemologies underlying different positions so that they can gain a clear grasp 
of competing views and develop the capacity to reason about them. In order to do so, the 
educator should explicitly “advance enquiry from within [her] particular point of view” and also 
serve as a mediator among the rival traditions of inquiry.434 Whether one agrees with MacIntyre 
or not that there are rival epistemologies that are all worth discussing, it is the case that people 
come to their conclusions in different ways, and, I agree with MacIntyre that it is beneficial for 
students’ own thinking and for their capacity to engage in public life to understand the ways 
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people reason and to hear respectful arguments for why the educator considers certain ways more 
reasonable than others. 
Other scholars have advocated a similar role for educators, focusing more on the 
developmental importance of modeling what it means to be a thoughtful person of conviction 
and a citizen in a democratic society. In Parks’s words, educators can offer students an example 
of a life of “meaningful commitment on the other side of the achievement of critical thought.”435 
Thomas Kelly argues that teachers should explicitly state their views, particularly on 
controversial issues for three reasons: educators (1) model “those who possess and live reasoned 
convictions” and serve as a “personal witness” to the importance of this ideal; (2) provide 
opportunities where students can practice their own “democratic authority” 436 as citizens by 
learning to “confront authority in a genuine yet supportive manner”; and (3) serve as “collegial 
mentors” who relate to students in an “authentic, nonposturing way,” almost as a peer, such that 
they “begin to see themselves as more adult.”437 Likewise, Penny Gold writes that “the teacher 
should [be] … a model of a person who takes a position, which of course, necessitates voicing 
that position.” She further argues, “Why not make an effort to be neutral in the classroom, or to 
put forward a variety of positions with equal force? It is because neutrality on issues of deep 
moral and political import is not something I want to encourage in my students. Why, then, 
attempt (or pretend) to be neutral myself?”438 We see in these arguments how offering guidance 
in the form of presenting one’s views as a live possibility provides students substantive and 
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437 Ibid., 133. 
438 Gold, “‘The Teacher Is Either a Witness or a Stranger,’” 261. 
 177 
procedural resources for reconstructing their beliefs, thereby helping to restore their stability, and 
for envisioning a potential life of commitment that is the fruit of critical thinking. 
Of course, how the educator makes her views known is crucial to students’ development. 
Returning to the issue of the teacher’s power and authority, the risks that these inescapable 
features of education present can be minimized, if not eliminated, through the kind of open, 
trusting, and caring participant-stance relationship that was described earlier and by the 
educator’s explicitly permitting students to question and disagree with her views, just as they 
might question and disagree with the views of an author. The ethos of the classroom community 
sets the stage for this kind of engagement with the educator’s views. Because they are affirmed 
in the intellectual risks they take and in their developing thoughts, students can trust that the 
educator respects their individuality, cares about the development of their own views, and will 
not try to impose her own views on them.  
In fact, informal studies and anecdotal evidence suggest that withholding one’s views in 
order to be neutral could actually erode students’ trust. Kelly writes,  
Generally, as their capacity for autonomous reasoning matures, youth may view 
the neutral teacher with distrust and resentment for several reasons. One is the 
manipulative, gamey quality which can arise when the student is asked to become 
vulnerable and take risks by expressing personal views on controversial issues 
while the nominal leader who controls action deliberately avoids doing so. As 
revealed in informal discussions with a number of preservice and seasoned 
teachers, this lack of reciprocity however well intended, can be viewed in a 
number of related and unfavorable ways: as a cowardly sign of teachers’ evading 
legitimate challenge of their own views; as a frustrating denial of a potentially 
informative perspective; as evidence of fraudulent commitment to rational 
inquiry; as an indication that the subject really isn’t that important; as an 
endorsement of straddling issues; or as an admission that certain view must be 
irrational or inferior they cannot be reasonably articulated or defended.439 
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Perry and Gold offer evidence of these reactions by students. As mentioned in chapter 2, Perry 
and his colleagues observed that some students seek to excel in critical thinking as a way of 
learning the “tricks of the trade” merely for success in the course. Perry explains that this attitude 
is engendered in part by asking students to argue for a side in a debate without also showing 
them that something important is genuinely at stake: “The ‘pros and cons,’ the glib presentation 
of ‘several points of view,’ the summary which judiciously selects a position to be in favor of, 
‘all things considered’ — these become the stock armamentarium of the gamesman who has 
‘caught on’ to ‘what they want’ and is giving it to them in exchange for grades and a 
diploma.”440 On the other hand, a student may simply feel lost and come to see the educator who 
does not offer answers as uncaring and untrustworthy. The student who admitted his lack of 
practice with critical thinking complains, “[The student’s] trying to grope it out for himself, but 
he’s got to have more help than he’s getting. He’s just not getting enough help. And, and, these 
fellows who hold back information are just not, the right kind to, they’re not developing 
students’ minds at all.”441 Perry reflects with sympathy on this student’s perspective: “In even 
the best courses, once it has been given for several years, ‘they’ do come to know the answer, if 
not ‘the answer.’ In presenting the same problems, without revealing the range of acceptable 
‘answers,’ may it not be said, ‘They’re hiding things’?”442  
 Gold asked students to anonymously respond to an abstract of her essay in which she 
argues against teacher neutrality with regard to controversial issues, and only ten percent (four 
out of forty) “thought it best that the teacher take a neutral position in the classroom”: 
Several students commented that the teacher could be figured out anyway and that 
a stance of neutrality is a pretension or a fraud. One said, ‘To me, it shows that the 
teacher doesn’t care about what is being taught.’ They liked teachers to make their 
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position explicit for a number of reasons: to give students something clear to react 
to; to help make the teacher part of the class; participating like the students; to 
give the students the benefit of their insights; to model of process of coming to a 
position.443 
 
While it may be the case that some students just want their teachers to give them “the  
answer,” these students indicate that they are seeking clarity in their own thinking and 
connection with their teacher whose knowledge and experience they respect. Moreover, the 
evidence from Perry and Gold show that withholding one’s views may lead students to feel 
alienated from both the educator and the educational process.  
 In carrying out the restorative work of the pastoral role, the liberal educator offers 
guidance by sharing her own views but she does not preach her beliefs; rather, to borrow another 
term with religious associations but used by social justice educators and others including Kelly 
and Gold quoted above, she acts as a “witness” to students of a way of making sense of life and 
engaging with the world. A witness can endorse or recommend a view without trying to impose 
her view on another. For Gold, to be a witness means, “to express, from time to time, simply and 
straightforwardly, what are core truths for me — to witness to the viability, for me, of a 
particular path, of particular choices.”444 In so doing, “a teacher can help a student cut a path in 
life.”445 Gold gives form to her conception of the teacher as witness using an apt analogy 
between the teacher and the groups of monks and nuns in the Middle Ages who were sent to a 
“frontier area … [to] live their lives, available to people who became interested in this strange 
and committed lifestyle.” Likening the classroom to a “frontier — full of the new and unknown,” 
she writes, “I open windows … on pieces of my life, on decisions I’ve struggled with.”446 The 
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examined life into which the liberal educator invites students is a frontier area that is full of the 
new and unknown, full of risks and struggle — for all who commit to it, but especially for young 
people who do not quite know what they are entering. The work of the liberal educator is not 
only to invite students into this life but also to care for and guide students through the risk and 
the struggle if the examined life is to be part of a flourishing life.  
 The conception of the pastoral professor underscores the importance of the relational 
context in which the examined life must be embedded if it is not to undermine students’ 
flourishing. In the next chapter, I turn to the instructional aspect of the pastoral professor’s work, 
the modes of inquiry by which the educator invites students to engage in the examined life and 
which can help students to reconstruct their beliefs and discover possibilities for being engaged 
























Broadening the Examined Life 
 
 
For everything there is a season, and a time for every matter under heaven … a time to break down, 
a time to build up. 
      — Author unknown447 
 
In the past what I used to do is, well, I’d read something and then I would get completely lost within 
whatever it was, I mean I would accept it completely without asking any questions, and … I still 
have that tendency, and I think it’s good, because it makes you look for what’s good in something, 
and I think that’s something that’s sometimes-ah neglected. 
      — Undergraduate in Perry’s study448 
 
I have upwards of sixteen years of formal education, and only once in any classroom was I 
encouraged to talk honestly and openly about the sense of mystery and depth that I frequently 
experience in my own life…. Why can’t we ever talk in higher education about what gives lives real 
meaning? Why can’t we talk about this everywhere on campus and throughout the four years that 
we spend here? And I don’t just mean in all-night bull sessions in the residence halls or in the 
downtown bars and cafes!  
     — Student of Robert Nash449 
 
If I may add to the distinguished poet [Rainer Maria Rilke], I would suggest that we not only “live 
the questions” but consider which questions we should live.  




 The central question of this chapter is, what modes of engagement can help students 
engage wholeheartedly with the good? In Chapter 3, I argued that the critical mode of 
engagement is an alienated way of being in the world, which is fundamentally in tension with 
wholehearted engagement with the good. Critical thinking not only can disrupt particular 
conditions of flourishing that lead to specific forms of alienation, but the detached, disengaged, 
and skeptical mode of intellectual inquiry that has come to define critical thinking can become a 
more generalized stance and outlook that alienates us from ourselves and the world. It requires 
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that we distance ourselves from the emotions, desires, and commitments that are the fabric of our 
lived experience and creates a barrier of distrust between us and others who could potentially 
exert some influence on us. This mode of engagement also has implications for the extent to 
which liberal education can help students with the tasks of reconstructing their beliefs and 
identifying potential ways to engage with the good—two tasks that I have argued are necessary 
for their flourishing. Students’ engagement with the ideas they encounter in their courses is 
meant to help them evaluate their own beliefs and adopt new perspectives that help them form 
their own conception of the good, but the critical mode of engagement, I will argue, hinders this 
process, and we therefore need to reconsider which modes of engagement are more conducive to 
achieving these aims. 
 Kimball’s history of liberal education reminds us that critiques of the critical mode of 
engagement are as old as criticality itself, so to speak, with Plato having to defend Socrates’ 
dialectic against the attacks of his rival philosophers. From the orators’ skepticism of the value of 
speculative reasoning for discovering truth and cultivating virtue, to the Renaissance humanists’ 
opposition to the “endless cycle of criticism and disputation” of the scholastics in favor of moral 
formation in accordance with exemplary classical texts,451 and the contemporary doubt of the 
doubting game and suspicion of the hermeneutics of suspicion as the best ways to test ideas and 
interpret reality, scholars and educators have sought to counteract what they see as the 
destructive and miseducative effects of a thoroughgoing skepticism and criticality on our ethical 
lives and on the possibilities for students’ ethical formation in education. To a large extent, then, 
I am treading on some well-worn paths in this chapter. The ongoing debate about the value of a 
critical approach to intellectual inquiry comprises several related debates (to which I have 
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alluded or with which I have already engaged) that course between the poles of entrenched 
dichotomies in philosophical and educational thought about the proper means of ethical 
development, epistemology, and ultimately what it means to flourish: indoctrination into versus 
liberation from traditional beliefs and values; submission to authority versus autonomy to choose 
one’s own way of life; an unreflective trust in and acceptance of others’ ideas versus vigilant 
criticality and construction of one’s own meanings; reliance on emotion and subjective 
attachments versus rationalistic, objective thinking.  
 With a few exceptions452, scholars who challenge the dominance of the critical mode of 
engagement in liberal education do not advocate students’ submission to the teaching of 
authority figures or wholly reject the idea that students should examine their beliefs and the ideas 
they encounter. The critiques of these scholars generally fall into two categories. First, some 
argue that the critical mode is not, as Taylor puts it, our “normal” way of experiencing our lives 
and the world, by which they also mean it is not the way we should experience our lives and the 
world. They generally share Taylor’s view that to disengage ourselves from our emotions, 
desires, and commitments fundamentally misunderstands the nature of our intellectual and 
ethical lives and our relationship to the world around us, and that, in striving for a disengaged 
rationality, particularly for the purpose of gaining control over our lives, we limit our 
possibilities for fulfillment and set our moral compass askew.453 Second, others challenge the 
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critical mode out of the more specific educational or developmental concern that it renders 
liberal education insufficient for or incapable of helping students reconstruct and affirm the 
beliefs and ideals that give meaning and purpose to their lives.454 In short, these two critiques 
make the case that the critical mode of engagement is and leads to an impoverished way of 
understanding and being in the world. The problem is not merely one of intellectual import, such 
that our thinking process is faulty, but it is one of ethical, existential, and experiential import, 
such that the very substance of our lives — how we live and what life is like for us — is at stake.  
 Both critiques resonate with my own views and the concerns motivating my desire to 
offer an alternative, and I will further elaborate on these critiques and build upon the work that 
has already been done. Keeping with the overall perspective of this project, however, I will 
consider our modes of engagement through the lenses of flourishing as wholehearted 
engagement with the good and of the developmental needs of emerging adults. These 
perspectives, I believe, yield a more comprehensive and targeted pedagogical approach than 
previous proposals for helping students fruitfully engage in existential inquiry, or inquiry into 
existential matters, such as how and why one should live. In the terms of this project, the aim of 
this chapter is to develop an approach to the examined life that can be described as inquiry for 
flourishing. I seek to reconceptualize the examined life in terms of its modes of engagement such 
that intellectual inquiry in liberal education is constructive and productive for students’ pursuit of 
a flourishing life. In other words, inquiry for flourishing enables students to use the ideas they 
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encounter for constructing beliefs and for producing, or generating, possibilities for 
wholehearted engagement with the good. I will first elaborate on my definition of engagement 
and my understanding of its relationship to learning, distinguishing it from the use of this term in 
higher education discourse. Finally, I will argue for a holistic and affirmative approach to inquiry 
that actively engages the subjective aspects of students’ experiences in order to enable their 
wholehearted engagement with the good. 
5.1 Engagement and Disengagement in Learning 
In recent years, “student engagement” seems to have become almost as ubiquitous in 
higher education literature as “critical thinking” is in education discourse in general. As with the 
development of critical thinking skills, measures of student engagement are considered indicative 
of student success, teaching effectiveness, and the overall quality of a college education. Despite 
the enormous amount of attention it has received in recent years, it remains variously and 
nebulously defined.455 The website of the widely used National Survey of Student Engagement 
(NSSE) website offers a definition in terms of very general categories rather than what 
engagement actually looks like: “Student engagement represents two critical features of 
collegiate quality. The first is the amount of time and effort students put into their studies and 
other educationally purposeful activities. The second is how the institution deploys its resources 
and organizes the curriculum and other learning opportunities to get students to participate in 
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activities that decades of research studies show are linked to student learning.”456 In general, the 
more time and effort students invest in learning and other educational activities, the more 
engaged they are thought to be. 
Scholars have given the term more breadth and conceptual definition by identifying 
dimensions of engagement, such as behavioral, emotional, intellectual or cognitive, social, and 
cultural,457 or by contrasting it with what seems to be a disengaged state — alienation, 
withdrawal, apathy.458 Furthermore, as the NSSE definition suggests, student engagement at an 
institutional level, meaning students’ involvement in decision-making, is sometimes 
distinguished from engagement at a “pedagogical” level, meaning their attention to and interest 
in various aspects of their academic lives.459 Given its ubiquity, multiple dimensions, and diverse 
meanings, and given the centrality of the word “engagement” to this project, it is worth taking a 
moment to clarify how I am using the term and to offer an initial formulation of the relationship 
of engagement and disengagement to learning in the context of the examined life. 
 First, it should be clear that I am interested in students’ pedagogical engagement, but my 
interest in our modes of engagement in intellectual inquiry diverge right away from the concern 
with pedagogical engagement in student engagement literature. While student engagement 
research focuses on the degree to which students are genuinely interested and involved in the 
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learning process, as indicated by behavioral compliance, enjoyment, and ownership of their 
learning, my focus is on ways of interacting with, of relating and responding to, the objects of 
inquiry, or what it is that students are examining. In other words, the former is concerned with 
students’ engagement with learning, whereas I am concerned in students’ (and educators’) 
engagement with their beliefs, ideas, and information encountered in the course materials, the 
more specific subject matter that a line of inquiry explores, and, through these, the world.460 For 
the sake of simplicity, I will often refer to these collectively as “objects of inquiry.” I believe the 
two aspects of engagement are intimately related, as the ways that students engage with objects 
of inquiry can be more or less enjoyable or meaningful to them and can therefore affect their 
engagement in the learning process. This fact drives much of the advocacy of progressive 
teaching methods. 
 The distinction between my usage and the typical usage in higher education literature is 
clearer in Vicki Trowler’s literature review in her section “Engagement with what?” She 
identifies four “targets of engagement” on which researchers focus to assess student engagement: 
(1) “specific student learning aspects/processes,” such as action learning groups, distance 
education, and feedback, to assess “the effects of an intervention on student engagement”; (2) 
“learning design,” meaning students’ involvement in assessing “teaching and learning 
interventions”; (3) “tools for online/classroom-based learning,” to assess how particular 
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technologies improve student engagement; (4) “extracurricular activities,” to assess how such 
activities contribute to students’ “learning and personal development”; and (5) “institutional 
governance,” to understand how and to what benefit students are involved in higher-level 
decision-making.461 None of these are about students’ engagement with the substance of the 
course itself.  
 Having distinguished “mode of engagement” from “student engagement,” let me restate 
what I mean by a mode of engagement. By engagement, I mean an intentional interaction with 
something or someone, and its mode is the way the subject interacts with the object — the aim(s) 
driving the interaction, her attitude toward it, how she relates to and responds to it, what she does 
with or to it. Taking the critical mode of engagement as an example, the subject takes a detached 
stance and a skeptical attitude toward the object for the purpose of rationally examining and 
evaluating its validity or legitimacy and for the purpose of making autonomous choices about 
what to believe and how to live.  
 Thus far, I have cast the critical mode of engagement as a deficient and detrimental mode 
of relating to ourselves and world, in line with the critics referenced above, specifically because 
it requires disengagement from aspects of ourselves that are at the core of who we are and how 
we normally inhabit the world. It might be said, however, that disengaging from how we 
normally think and live — from the emotional responses, desires, and commitments we already 
have and the ways we already make sense of the world — is precisely what we need to do if we 
are to critically reflect on and reconsider our beliefs. Even if we cannot be entirely objective, 
engaging with the world in terms of our normal ways of inhabiting it can preclude our viewing 
our beliefs from another perspective. If we do not teach students to disengage from the 
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perspectives they bring with them, they may display a closed-mindedness that would prevent the 
kind of genuine learning that liberal educators hope students will experience in encountering new 
ideas and would limit their capacity for seeing potentially better ways to live. 
 Although I will be arguing that the disengagement from our emotions, desires, and 
commitments required by the ideal of disengaged reason is counterproductive to the process of 
identifying and evaluating objects of inquiry and potential goods, the dichotomy between 
engagement and disengagement is in some respects false and occludes important nuances in our 
experience in the critical mode and other modes of engaging with the world. We have seen the 
dichotomy collapse in the terminology of the critical mode of engagement and the objection I 
addressed that the critical mode that embodies the critical ethos is itself a commitment motivated 
by certain desires and harboring certain emotions — a commitment to skepticism, a desire for 
autonomy, and the feeling of being in control, for instance. Amanda Fulford similarly challenges 
the view of disengagement within student engagement literature that views it as a “passive 
nonchalance” and argues instead students who disengage from school may in fact be actively 
recognizing and voicing their dissent to the school community’s expectations, which, conversely, 
is their assent and commitment to a different set of norms.462 As we will see in a later section, we 
are always already engaging the subjective aspects of who we are, either subconsciously or 
consciously. Thus, the ideal of disengaged reason is an impossible myth, but that does not mean 
it is a myth with no force or effect about which we need not be concerned. Disengaged reason 
suppresses certain emotions, desires, and commitments, and we must consider which we actively 
engage, teach, and valorize in our educational practices, and whether or not our inclusion or 
exclusion of certain aspects of students’ experiences supports their flourishing.  
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 In the critical mode, the act of questioning one’s beliefs is linked to skepticism and the 
ideal of disengaged reason. For this reason, some scholars concerned about the destructive 
effects of skeptical questioning and the instability created by detaching from one’s commitments 
have proposed that we need to somehow balance our educational practices between the acts of 
questioning and accepting, or questioning and affirming. Elmer John Thiessen, like Rorty, for 
instance, argues that children must first be socialized into traditions before being taught to 
question them.463 In the context of higher education, Kimball suggests a “restoring of the 
balance” between the Socratic (philosophical) tradition and the oratorical tradition, which sought 
to instill a commitment to shared values through dogmatic instruction and prescriptive study of 
traditional texts.464 Elbow opposes the “believing game” to the doubting game, where we 
“refrain from doubting” and first “believe all the assertions,”465 or “try as hard as you can to 
believe” something in order to find out if it is a better way to understand the world.466 Rather 
than opposing questioning to accepting and affirming, I want to decouple the act of questioning 
and evaluating from skepticism and the disengagement for which the critical mode strives and 
consider how questioning, acceptance, and affirmation work together in inquiry for flourishing.  
 I seek this third option because, although one of my main critiques of the Socratic ideal 
of liberal education has been that it raises questions that unsettle students without offering 
potential answers, I maintain that liberal education should be an education that is fundamentally 
framed and driven by questions, specifically existential questions, asked by both educators and 
students. Liberal education should provide students the opportunity to practice asking and 
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exploring such questions because, while educators can offer possible answers, they cannot help 
students answer their questions with any finality that sets them on a path of flourishing. Any 
answers students’ inquiry yields, if it yields any, will be challenged by later life circumstances or 
simply evolve with more experience, and our students will have to seek answers to the questions 
again. There is a tendency in American education and culture, however, to celebrate questioning 
itself because it implies that one has an independent mind, but questioning can be done well or 
poorly or in better and worse ways. Our questions and our questioning have existential and 
ethical dimensions and consequences, for they express and lead us into certain kinds of 
relationships with others, the world, and even ourselves. They can take us down generative, 
degenerative, and regenerative paths. Recognizing the consequential nature of our questioning, 
Matthew Lee Anderson calls upon us to question our questioning:  
The mere fact that we are questioning does not mean we should be or that we 
should be questioning in that way. How should we then question? When should 
we ask a question? How shall we frame our question? What shall we question for? 
To whom shall we pose our questions and when shall we ask them? We cannot 
simply go forward on the assumption we have those questions truly answered.467 
 
These questions are especially pertinent for the liberal educator who adopts a Socratic pedagogy, 
as we saw in Chapter 3. For the purposes of this chapter, I want to consider the implications of 
our modes of questioning in liberal education — their purposes, attitudes, cognitive approach, 
and the questions themselves — for students’ flourishing.   
 While I will argue that the ideal of disengaged reason is counterproductive, there is a 
necessary element of distance from oneself and interruption of our everyday existence that enters 
into any reflective process and is therefore necessary if students are to evaluate their beliefs and 
the possibilities they encounter. In his vision of liberal learning, Oakeshott insightfully draws our 
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attention to the kind of distance that students (and we all) need in order to undertake the 
“engagement of critical self-understanding” that liberal learning is.468 Oakeshott is concerned 
with more than engaging students in the critical examination of their beliefs. Beliefs are only one 
aspect of our self-understanding and who we are, which encompasses the whole range of ways 
we perceive, relate to, and respond to the world: “What constitutes a human being … [are] his 
thoughts, his beliefs, doubts, understanding, his awareness of his own ignorance, his wants, 
preferences, choices, sentiments, emotions, purposes and his expression of them in utterances or 
actions which have meanings.”469  
 What worries Oakeshott, and why we and our students need liberal learning, is that our 
self-understanding and ways of relating to the world are too easily dominated by an instrumental 
attitude, and, particularly in the case of young people, the fads of the day and pre-packaged 
opinions. In the instrumental mode, we are concerned with satisfying our wants and engage with 
the world as “exploiters of the resources of the earth.”470 Oakeshott is not accusing us all of 
selfishness or greediness but is rather pointing out, as Giddens and Heidegger do, that we are 
generally immersed in practical living, in doing what needs to be done, trying to get what we 
want, and figuring out how to do so. In the instrumental mode, we might examine the means to 
given ends, but not the ends themselves, and students view learning itself as just another means 
to achieving what they already want — a high grade, a degree, certain kind of job, certain forms 
of enjoyment, a certain lifestyle. The question mediating their studies is, as Higgins puts it, 
“What’s this good for?”471 Given the cost of college today, it is understandable that students (and 
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their parents) want to know whether or not a college education will provide a return on their 
investment, but students’ wants are often the ones into which they were socialized, whether 
within their families, local communities, or peer groups, as is their sense of what something is 
good for. 
Moreover, in Oakeshott’s view, the broader world offers little help for thoughtfully 
shaping one’s life, for it is filled with a “ceaseless flow of seductive trivialities which invoke 
neither reflection nor choice but instant participation.” Though he was writing over forty years 
ago, his words could not be any more an accurate portrayal of the world in which young people 
are growing up today, especially in our aggressive consumer culture and with the advent of 
social media and internet memes: 
 A child quickly becomes aware that he cannot too soon plunge into this flow or 
immerse himself in too quickly; to pause is to be swept with the chilling fear of 
never having lived at all [what, today, has been dubbed “FOMO,” or “the fear of 
missing out”]. There is little chance that his perceptions, his emotions, his 
admirations and his ready indignations might become learned responses or be 
even innocent fancies of his own; they come to him prefabricated, generalized and 
uniform.472  
 
 In the midst of a life driven by the satisfaction of wants and instant participation, 
Oakeshott invites students into a “reflective engagement,” in which they slow their instrumental 
and reactive responses to the world (which in some cases are one and the same).473 Liberal 
learning is an “unexpected invitation to disentangle oneself from the here and now of current 
happenings and engagements, to detach oneself from the urgencies of the local and the 
contemporary.”474 Some of the courses described in Chapter 2 that were developed to address 
students’ existential angst were created in part to provide just this kind of opportunity, a time 
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spent in in “silence, self-reflection and introspection” in the midst of their busyness and various 
pursuits (“they have internships up the ass, they shadowed this person, they won on the debate 
team”).475 To create this time, the professor of the course on “Existential Despair,” for instance, 
has students meet once a week for seven-hours at a time, during which they spend four to five 
hours silently reading a book given to them upon arrival and then discuss it, and he does not 
assign homework or give exams. My point here is not to attack social media or to endorse the 
way this particular course is run but to show that the invitation of liberal learning is just as, if not 
more, relevant to students today.  
 Liberal learning issues an invitation “to look, listen, and to reflect” on the adventures in 
self-understanding — adventures in perceiving, thinking, feeling, responding, believing, and 
choosing — recorded by those from different times and places.476 This invitation can only be 
heard, however, if the engagement of liberal learning is undertaken in a “special place of 
learning,” where “what is special about such a place or circumstance is its seclusion, its 
detachment from … the here and now of current living.”477 Although Oakeshott designates the 
school and university as such places, the more important idea is that liberal learning is a kind of 
engagement that is different from students’ everyday experience. It is one in which students learn 
to hold in abeyance the impulse to view and evaluate what they encounter in terms of their 
immediate wants and preformed reactions, allowing a fresh current to flow through the space 
created between the encounter and their response. It is an engagement in which the student might 
be “moved by intimations of what he has never yet dreamed” and “finds himself invited to 
pursue satisfactions he has never yet imagined or wished for.”478  
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 This distance between encounter and response is not the stringent disengagement from 
our emotions, desires, and prior commitments that the rationality and objectivity of the critical 
mode demands. It instead, as Oakeshott’s words imply, creates the possibility that they will be 
redirected. I will explore this idea further in what follows, but, for now, I will suggest that the 
subjective aspects of students’ experience remain engaged: students may be moved towards 
another dream that offers them the prospect of a different satisfaction for which to wish. 
Furthermore, while reflection requires this distance, I will also argue that our immediate 
responses can point us toward what it means to lead a flourishing life and therefore should not be 
dismissed or excluded from intellectual inquiry.  
5.2 The Limitations of the Critical Mode of Engagement 
 Although liberal educators cannot guide students in a process that leads to final answers, 
students’ engagement in intellectual inquiry should move them towards flourishing, which I have 
argued depends on holding certain kinds of beliefs. Intellectual inquiry should help them 
discover and develop a clearer, richer, more nuanced, and more defensible understanding of, or 
set of beliefs, about who they are, what the world is like, and how they want to or should live. 
Such beliefs are, of course, more or less what the process of critical examining one’s beliefs and 
other ideas is meant to yield. Having analyzed and tested their beliefs against other ideas, 
students are supposed to be able to reconstruct their identities and their lives according to beliefs 
that are, to use Nussbaum’s words, “truly worthy of guiding” their lives.479  
 I have assumed the suitability of the metaphor of “constructing” beliefs up to this point, 
but I believe it is particularly apt for considering what it means for liberal education to help 
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students determine their beliefs. The idea of constructing beliefs implies that there are materials 
or resources with which to construct them.480 At the very least, these resources include the course 
materials, but I have also argued that the educator’s own views are a permissible and valuable 
resource. As a number of scholars have argued, however, the critical mode of engagement is 
deconstructive or destructive and negates the very resources upon which students might draw for 
both reconstructing their beliefs and affirming the ideals, or the good, in which they can invest 
their lives.  
 In order to better understand this claim and to offer a framework for an alternative, it will 
be helpful to restate the defining features of the critical mode of engagement and elaborate on 
their implications for how students engage with objects of inquiry. The critical mode of 
engagement can be schematized in terms of its overall aim, attitude toward objects of inquiry, 
driving questions, stance and cognitive approach (Table 1). It is important to remember that the 
critical mode of inquiry is not only the questions that drive it. It is an embodiment of the critical 
ethos, which shapes the way these questions are asked and answered.  
 I have already argued for a conception of flourishing as wholehearted engagement with 
the good that should guide the educational practices of liberal education, and it remains the 
overarching framework for thinking about our modes of engagement in liberal education. Recall 
that wholehearted engagement with the good has both an objective and subjective aspect. The 
phrase describes both the engagement with an objective good and the experience of engaging 
with that good. The pertinence for our current discussion of these aspects of flourishing is that 
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the substance of what students encounter through their intellectual inquiry and their experience 
of the encounter are both important in considering what inquiry for flourishing means. 
Overall aim To evaluate and autonomously choose one’s beliefs about 
how to live 
Attitude Skeptical or suspicious 
Driving questions 1. Is X [some belief/view] true, justified and/or valid? 
2. Is it legitimate?,” where illegitimacy connotes an 
unjust claim to truth and power 
3. Who benefits from or is disempowered by X [some 
belief/view/situation]? 
4. How does this text or interpretation of a text promote 
or undermine the status quo (where the status quo is 
seen to be oppressive)?  
In what ways does this X [some idea/situation] fail to live 
up to our democratic ideal of equality? 
Stance Detached 
Cognitive Approach Disengaged reason  
Table 1: Defining Features of the Critical Mode of Engagement 
 Scholars concerned about helping students reconstruct their beliefs often focus on the 
skeptical or suspicious attitude as the primary shortcoming of critical thinking. They rightly point 
out that this attitude can have an insidious effect on how students approach the ideas with which 
they engage. Skepticism is rooted in distrust, and trust, I argued, is fundamental to our basic 
sense of existential security. Knowing when not to trust someone or something is important, but 
as a pervasive attitude, it is already alienated from the person or object with which one is 
engaging. Skepticism also undermines the potential for the ideas that students encounter (and for 
those expressing them) to become resources for constructing their beliefs. It is a defensive mode 
in which one looks for the faults of an idea, and therefore can prevent students from seeing and 
incorporating something of value from the ideas into their lives. As Roth writes, “Our students 
may become too good at showing how things don’t make sense. That very skill may diminish 
their capacity to find or create meaning and direction in the books they read and the world in 
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which they live.”481 He goes on to suggest that “in training our students in the techniques of 
critical thinking, we may be giving them reasons to remain guarded — which can translate into 
reasons not to learn [from what they encounter],”482 or reasons not to believe someone.  
 Furthermore, as Roth suggests here, the negating work of skeptical criticality does not 
lend to creating or constructing something positive from the ideas one encounters. The 
fundamental questions of the critical mode help illustrate this point. These questions can be 
valuable for helping students reconsider what they have taken for granted and equip them with 
new analytical and interpretive skills for understanding ideas and social phenomenon, and, in the 
case of the latter four questions, potentially motivate students to make the world more just. Yet 
as analytical and interpretive tools, these questions are themselves lenses that focus students’ 
attention towards specific aspects of the examined object and direct their thought in very specific 
ways. In his analysis of the nature of questions and questioning, Hans-Georg Gadamer writes 
that a question has a “sense of direction” and that it “places what is in question in a particular 
perspective.”483 If we think of questions as lenses, we can only view an object from a particular 
location and see a particular aspect of it. Other parts are hidden from our view because they are 
not in our line of sight. Likewise, a question directs our attention towards specific aspects of the 
object of inquiry.  
 While liberal educators think of questions as opening students to new perspectives, 
questions also can limit their perspective on an object, for every question “implies the explicit 
establishing of presuppositions, in terms of which we can see what still remains open.”484 In 
order to think in the direction of a question, the presuppositions themselves cannot be open to 
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question. The basic presuppositions of the questions of critical mode (when asked in the critical 
mode) are that (1) we should not simply trust that an idea or a fact we encounter is true, justified, 
or valid and should judge these for ourselves; (2) that truth and power should be evaluated in 
terms of legitimacy; (3) an idea or situation, including my own, is to understood in terms of 
unequal privilege and power; (4) the status quo is a negative state or oppressive, and texts or 
events should be interpreted in terms of whether they promote or undermine it; (5) that the object 
should be viewed in terms of its failure to fulfill some ideal of equality. To say in response to the 
first question, for instance, that we are not in a position to make a judgment about the validity of 
some idea and that we should ask an authority figure halts the inquiry that the question would 
otherwise catalyze and goes against the critical ethos.  
 My interest here is not to specifically dispute any of these presuppositions, to say that we 
should have no presuppositions that limit our perspective, which is impossible, or to argue that 
these questions should not be asked at all. My concern is rather how these questions, when asked 
in the critical mode, can lead students to view and examine what they encounter and can deplete 
the potential for liberal education to move them toward wholehearted engagement with the good. 
With regard to question 1, asking if a claim is true, justified, or valid is important, but the effort 
to answer this question may seem futile and can lead to disillusionment, total relativism, or 
nihilism when asked with a skeptical attitude and in an intellectual culture where the very 
validity of the notion of truth is questioned, there are no clear or universal standards for 
determining truth, or asking questions itself is celebrated. Perry describes the progression of 
thought that can bring a student to this point after having learned to think critically:  
  Here the student has his tools; he has learned how to compare “models” of 
thought, how to relate data and frames of reference and points of observation. But 
now differences of opinion in his field appear even more irreconcilable than ever. 
No one can ever be sure. ‘It’s all up to the individual in the end.” 
 200 
  Well, indeed it is. But the tone of this statement too often implies, “So 
why bother. If it’s all a matter of opinion in the end, why not in the beginning? 
Why bother with all the intellectual effort?”… It says that the unexamined 
opinion is as good as examined opinion. It is the moral defeat of the “educated” 
man.485 
 
 With regard to questions 2-5, which are central to inquiry in the realm of critical theory 
and the hermeneutics of suspicion, there is the danger of presupposing the very conclusion the 
educator wants students to draw — a particular interpretation of the way society is unjust and 
oppresses certain people — and of only offering new ways to articulate it. Felski writes, “The 
hermeneutics of suspicion knows its vigilance to be justified. Something, somewhere — a text, 
an author, a reader, a genre, a discourse, a discipline — is always already guilty of some 
crime.”486 There are real injustices, and there are real acts of oppression in the world, but Felski 
is characterizing a totalizing viewpoint that “push[es] thought down predetermined paths”487 that 
ultimately lead to cynicism. When the questions of social critique are the only ones being asked, 
they are debilitating. Daniel DeNicola observes that “when [unmasking] threatens to leave us 
with no normative concepts, no authority — just power and the phenomena it may generate — it 
becomes a philosophical dead end.”488 Any ideal or power structure that might be harnessed for 
good can be undercut by asking, for instance, “Who benefits?” The direction of such questions 
does not lead students’ thoughts toward, as Mackler writes, “a positive search for something 
new.”489 
 Social critiques and critical pedagogy have in fact been criticized by scholars within these 
fields for merely ending with critique and, therefore, for being unproductive or  
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counterproductive in their efforts to rectify injustice. Richard Van Heertum explains,  
Critique has been at the foreground of projects for radical social change from their 
earliest incarnations … This seems appropriate, as it would be hard to imagine 
convincing people that a better alternative exists if we do not first highlight the 
limitations of the present circumstance. Education has generally played a key role in 
these projects, opening the mind to the world around us and ways to creatively 
reconceptualize it. And yet today it appears that critique has come to dominate radical 
pedagogies without the accoutrement of an alternative vision.  
 Critical race theory, critical media literacy, and critical pedagogy all tend 
to share too firm a commitment to the first half of their sobriquets, forgetting that 
critique alone has never led any social movement.490 
 
Like Boler and Van Heertum, other critical pedagogy scholars have sought to correct this 
tendency and have begun to write about the need to help students think constructively about how 
to address the failures they see, how to articulate an affirmative and normative ideal that 
motivates their efforts, and how to educate students for hope.491  
 This critique suggests that the fundamental questions of the critical mode neglect other 
legitimate and worthwhile questions. For example, Kant asserted that all human questions can be 
encapsulated in the following three questions: “What can I know? What should I do? What may I 
hope?” Ironically, though Kant has had a monumental influence on modern academic inquiry, 
we have largely lost sight of the latter two questions. Other than robust forms of civic education 
or social justice education, normative ethical inquiry in academic philosophy has largely given 
way metaethics, which seeks to understand the nature of morality and moral statements rather 
than establish moral principles, and the question of hope has received little attention in secular 
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scholarship until relatively recently.492 Kant’s questions may not be exhaustive, but they do 
present two questions that lie at the very heart of our existence and our flourishing. To ignore 
them is to ignore essential realms of understanding regarding ourselves and the world.  
 Finally, the detached stance and ideal of disengaged reason attempts to remove necessary 
internal and experiential resources from the process of evaluation, the formation of beliefs, and 
for choosing the good with which one will engage. It is widely assumed that emotions exert an 
unreliable and irrational influence on thought, that personal desires and motives lead to bias, and 
that prior commitments hinder openness. Each of these claims has their own vast literatures, and 
I do not have the space to make an extensive case against each. I will instead draw on what I 
consider compelling and pertinent arguments for the necessary role of emotion, desire, and prior 
commitments for the evaluative process and more specifically for wholehearted engagement with 
the good.493  
 Recent work in philosophy, psychology, and neuropsychology has challenged the 
assumption that emotion undermines rationality and has argued that emotions are necessary for 
making, and that they contain in themselves, judgments of value.494 Nussbaum’s account of 
emotion is especially relevant for my purposes. Nussbaum argues that emotions are “forms of 
evaluative thought”495 and that they have four characteristics: First, emotions are directed at an 
object (a physical object, a person, a certain phenomenon, and activity); emotions “are about 
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something.” Second, the object of an emotion is “an intentional object,” which refers to the 
subjective relationship between the person feeling the emotion and the object. The particular 
emotion directed at an object “embodies a way of seeing” it and arises from how that person 
interprets the object.496 Third, emotions “embody … beliefs about the object,” beliefs about the 
existence or occurrence of the object as well as the implications of that existence or 
occurrence.497 Fourth, emotions see the object as “invested with value or importance,” where that 
value is related to “the person’s own flourishing.”498 Emotions are eudaimonistic in that “the 
object of the emotion is seen as important for some role it plays” in the persons’ flourishing.499 
The first-person perspective on the relationship between the object and the person’s flourishing 
is essential to understanding the eudaimonistic nature of emotions. Nussbaum explains, 
[Emotions] insist on the real importance of their object, but they also embody the 
person’s commitment to the object as a part of her scheme of ends. This is why, in 
the negative cases, they are felt as tearing the self apart: because they have to do 
with me and my own, my plan and goals, what important in my own conception 
(or more inchoate sense) of what it is for me to live well.500 
  
The emotions two people feel about the same object will differ according to how it fits into their 
respective conceptions of their flourishing. 
 Let me offer an example to illustrate Nussbaum’s account. A woman learns that she is 
about to be laid off from her job and feels fear. She feels fear about her situation of joblessness. 
She feels fear because she sees being laid off as threatening to her in some way. She also feels 
fear because she believes that being laid off will have negative consequences — she will no 
longer be working in a job she enjoys, she will not have an income for some time, she might 
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have diminished prospects for getting a new job. Finally, her fear stems from the fact that the 
loss of this job and the negative consequences contradict her conception of her own flourishing. 
Another person facing the same prospect of being laid off could feel excited because she sees the 
loss of the job as creating new possibilities for her to pursue other projects that she believes are 
viable and important for her flourishing. 
 Viewing objects in terms of one’s own flourishing should not be equated with a selfish 
self-centeredness. It grows out of a basic human motive. We are inescapably striving to live 
flourishing or worthwhile lives, however we conceive of flourishing, and it is the ultimate good 
we seek to achieve, as Aristotle posited.501 We cannot help but respond to and seek what we 
believe will contribute to our flourishing. Genuinely other-regarding emotions, such as love or 
compassion, can be considered and felt to be important and necessary for our own flourishing 
(and in fact often are thought to be so) without collapsing into selfishness.502 Nussbaum also 
identifies the emotion of wonder, and the related emotions of awe and reverence, as largely non-
eudaimonistic, in that it “responds to the pull of the object, and one might say that in wonder, the 
subject is maximally aware of the object, and only minimally aware, if at all, of its relationship to 
her own plans.”503 Wonder, however, can “move distant objects within the circle of a person’s 
scheme of ends,” such that the object of wonder becomes something the person seeks to include 
in their pursuit of a flourishing life.504 For example, because of the wonder I have experienced 
before the mountains at Grand Teton National Park, I now consider another trip to this park and 
places like it, as well as supporting efforts to preserve them, important for my flourishing.  
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 Our emotional responses to what happens to us or to something we encounter are 
indicators of what we already believe is good (or bad), can point us to other possible goods (and 
away from what might not be good), and provide evidence for particular beliefs about an object. 
We instinctively want to move towards those objects that generate positive emotions in us, such 
as delight, gratitude, confidence, and hope, and positive emotions indicate what we believe is or 
will be good for our flourishing.505 Conversely, we instinctively want to move away from those 
objects that generate negative emotions in us, such as sadness, anger, fear, and despair, and 
negative emotions indicate what we believe is or will be bad for our flourishing (though, over 
time, we may learn not to flee from negative emotions). Negative emotions can also heighten our 
sense of what we believe is good that the object does not display. Experiencing certain emotions 
while engaging with a particular object informs us that, when we engage with this object, we feel 
those emotions, and this fact is integrated into our beliefs about the object.506 To exclude our 
emotions, then, from the process of evaluating potential goods with which we will engage in 
pursuit of a worthwhile life is like trying decide where to go on vacation without consulting our 
own preferences. Preferences — about not only whether you like beaches or mountains but also 
“rational” decisions about how much money should be spent — provide the starting point and 
direction. When deliberating about our flourishing, emotions must similarly be taken into 
account.  
 I do not mean that we must be guided by the first emotional response we have, for, if the 
beliefs on which our emotions depend are false, then our emotions will serve as faulty guides. 
Yet immediate emotional responses, upon reflection, become resources for deliberative thought. 
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The experience of being “caught up” and “totally lost within” something that positively 
captivates one’s attention, as the student quoted in the epigraph describes, is devalued by the 
ideal of disengaged reason, but the student intuitively (or experientially) grasps its importance 
for evaluating what he is reading: “it makes you look for what’s good in something.” Emotions 
like wonder are experienced in the same manner, and it is in such emotions that we often see and 
experience with striking clarity manifestations of the highest goods. For this reason, Josef Pieper, 
for instance, argues for the necessity of contemplation in intellectual life, which he characterizes 
as an unreflective and “purely receptive” way of knowing an object, in which we simply behold 
what is beautiful and wondrous in it.507  
 Even misguided emotions, however, are valuable resources that should not be excluded 
from the evaluative process. We can gain reflective distance from them and examine the beliefs 
they contain to try to assess whether or not our perceptions of and beliefs about the object are 
correct and, therefore, whether or not our emotional responses to the object are appropriate. Of 
course, how to we make this assessment is both complex and highly debated, but, at the very 
least, I would argue, based on the preceding discussion, that our judgment is not the result of a 
process that excludes emotion and assert that reflecting on our particular beliefs about the good 
from different perspectives in conversation with others and in light of our lived experience is 
necessary. Thus, the journal assignment that asks students to iteratively write about how they feel 
about what they have read and then to explain why would prove to be an extremely valuable 
instrument for identifying and examining their beliefs and initial intuitions. 
 Turning to desire, the case for engaging desire in intellectual inquiry and belief formation 
is similar to that for engaging emotion. I understand engaging desire to be a particular case of 
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engaging emotion, specifically that of eros, which was referenced earlier in the discussion of the 
ethos of the examined life in Ancient Greece. The concept of eros has been richly portrayed in 
Greek mythology and in the Platonic dialogues, but I will not be exploring it fully here. 
Abstracting from some of the particulars of these portrayals, we can define eros as a love for 
something (good) that one lacks, which produces a desire to possess it. As a type of love, eros 
has an intensity that would be lacking in a desire produced by mere liking or preference, 
indicating that something of importance to the person experiencing this desire is at stake. Liston 
and Garrison describe eros as “passionate desire.”508 In the context of the Socratic dialogues, 
love for the good, true, and beautiful produced a desire for and motivated the search for them. 
The desire of eros, therefore, like emotion, is indicative of what one perceives to be of value for 
one’s flourishing, and this desire is passionate because one believes it to be particularly 
important and good for one’s flourishing. We do not and cannot have a passionate desire towards 
objects that have no importance for us, and we only desire what we believe to be good. 
Furthermore, we only desire it again, if we have possessed and then lost possession of it, because 
we experienced positive emotions when we possessed it. Eros is an inherently positive emotion, 
but like any emotion, it can be misguided. Our eros can be attached to objects that are in fact 
detrimental to our flourishing.  
 Desire produced by eros, then, plays the same role as emotion in directing our attention 
towards that which we perceive and believe to be good for our flourishing, and desires can be 
changed through reflection upon underlying beliefs that make the object less desirable as well as 
by discovery of another object that seems to have the potential to satisfy that desire better. This 
latter possibility is the effect Oakeshott believes liberal learning could have on a student’s life. 
                                                 
508 Liston and Garrison, “Introduction: Love Revived and Examined,” 9. 
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He writes in more expansive terms, where the student would come to desire something beyond 
her imagination, but fundamentally, the student is seeking something to bring satisfaction and 
fulfillment to her life, something that will make her life be and feel worthwhile. 
 Eros also plays a more fundamental role in intellectual inquiry. It is necessary for 
catalyzing and sustaining inquiry that is undertaken with genuine interest. There would be no 
reason to begin searching if we did not love (and feel the lack of) what we hoped to discover. 
Anderson writes, “Why would we search out the world if we did not think that what we find 
would be better for us? The love of goodness precedes our knowledge and stands beneath and 
within all of our exploring.”509 That is not to say that people do not sometimes search something 
out with a negative agenda, but what they are seeking in the end (revenge, for instance) still 
contains something good in it (a certain satisfaction and possibly vindication) that they desire 
that compels them to start the search. It is helpful to remember that the Latin roots of “emotion” 
(e + movere) together mean to “move out”510; emotion is a motive force. Challenging the demand 
for objectivity in science, Polanyi calls attention to the “intellectual passion” that motivates even 
the most “objective” and rigorous scientific research. This passion affirms that that there is 
something “precious” to be done and discovered, guides the scientists’ assessment of what is of 
higher and of lesser interest,” and “sustain[s] their persistent pursuit through years of labour.”511 
For Polanyi, intellectual passion ultimately grows out of an appreciation of the order in the 
world, but a passion for discovering a cure for a disease or a better way to construct bridges 
certainly drives the work of many other scientists, and similar aesthetic and vocational passions 
inspire scholars in all domains.  
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 For students who do not already possess it, stoking this passionate desire for intellectual 
inquiry itself through a “lovable” and therefore desirable experience of intellectual inquiry is 
crucial to their engaging in it as an authentic endeavor and necessary for it to serve their 
flourishing. This idea is familiar enough. It goes without saying that for many students, at nearly 
all levels, school learning is not an engagement for which they have much passion, a fact that has 
concerned many an educator and scholar who attribute students’ boredom to teaching that for 
one reason or another does not connect to their loves (or their interests). Schwab’s lament will 
probably resonate with both educators and students:  
Because the emotional and active are considered as apart from the intellectual and 
of no concern to the teacher, practically all feeling and propensities toward action 
on the part of the student are attached to the extracurricular. The curriculum 
becomes a bore, an unpleasant duty, a necessary evil, and, consequently, the 
recipient only of energies left over from the more compelling activities of campus 
life.”512 
 
Though it may not be the case that the emotional and active are of no concern to the teacher 
(perhaps it is a matter of ineffectiveness), ethnographies of undergraduate life on American 
campuses do little to dispel Schwab’s assessment.513 The engagement of students’ loves and 
desires is crucial not only because authentic engagement in intellectual inquiry will help them 
construct beliefs about what is good but also because the engagement itself will be an 
engagement with the good they may come to pursue wholeheartedly. The process becomes 
something that satisfies their desires and one to which they might ideally become committed.  
 Thus far, I have been discussing the subjective elements of our positive emotions and 
desires as guides to our perception of the good, and it may seem that the notion that the good 
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with which we engage must be objectively good has been lost. I am arguing for the value of 
these subjective elements for the process of evaluating and forming beliefs about potential goods 
because the ideal of disengaged reason discounts their contribution to this process, but, to be 
clear, I am not making the case that what we believe or feel to be valuable for our flourishing is 
objectively valuable because we believe or feel it is so or that what is valuable is merely what we 
choose to give value. Aside from my previous argument that a good must have worth apart from 
our own desires and interests and also be validated by others, I take it that we also care that the 
objects in which we invest ourselves are actually good for our flourishing, even if it is not 
universally agreed to be so. Nussbaum writes, “We typically think [something is valuable] 
because of some real value the item possesses … And in building a conception of eudaimonia 
for themselves, people often seem to build in just those terms about which such true evaluative 
claims can be made. I am not trying just to get any old conception, I am trying to get the one that 
values things aright.”514 In Taylor’s terms, building a conception of flourishing is a matter of 
“strong evaluation” in which we have a sense that failing to evaluate correctly means that we will 
fail to live a worthwhile life.  
 The final subjective element I want to consider are our commitments, which are thought 
to prevent impartiality and open-mindedness in intellectual inquiry. To understand how our 
commitments are in fact a resource for evaluating the objects of inquiry, I turn to Gadamer’s 
argument about the role of prejudice in hermeneutics. Although he is concerned with textual 
interpretation, his account of what happens when we encounter a text and the important role of 
prejudice in our efforts to understand it applies more generally to any type of inquiry in which 
we encounter ideas. Also, we can understand prejudice to refer simply to the commitments we 
                                                 
514 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intellgence of Emotions, 47, emphasis in original. 
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hold prior to an encounter rather than a bigoted and unfounded viewpoint, as it has come to 
connote today. A prejudice is a pre-judgment of any kind.  
 Drawing on Heidegger’s ontology, Gadamer describes our initial encounter with a text as 
a meeting between the text and our prior understanding of it, however vague or superficial. We 
cannot help but approach objects with a “fore-understanding” that forms our expectations about 
the object (what a text is about, for instance).515 It is this very encounter between our prior 
understanding and the object that can catalyze an open-minded inquiry that seeks to understand 
the object. Gadamer writes that we recognize a text as presenting something different from the 
understanding we bring to it when we are “pulled up short” by it: “Either it does not yield any 
meaning at all or its meaning is not compatible with what we had expected. This is what brings 
us up short and alerts us to a possible difference.”516 The recognition of this difference can lead 
us to seek understanding of the object, assuming we first have the desire to understand it. As 
stated earlier, without desire, no genuine inquiry will ensue. Contrary to the idea that we must 
disengage from ourselves, Gadamer advocates “the foregrounding and appropriation of one’s 
own fore-meanings and prejudices” so that one can be fully aware of the particular perspective 
one brings. An explicit awareness of our prejudices enables us to feel the full force of the 
difference between oneself and the object, allowing the object “to present itself in all its 
otherness and thus assert its own truth against one’s own fore-meanings.”517  
 In inquiry, one’s prejudices are not necessarily hindrances to openness and 
understanding; it is only an insistence, a stubborn certainty that one’s prior judgments are 
correct, that hinders understanding. Foregrounding our prejudices enables us to see more clearly 
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how another’s idea is distinct from our own and the perspective with which we are viewing and 
evaluating it. When our prejudices are “operating unnoticed,” we simply assume the way see we 
the world is the way it is.518 Given that we cannot escape our prejudices, “all that is asked is that 
we remain open to the meaning of the other person or text,”519 where openness is implied in 
seeking to understand an object, as understanding requires “the fundamental suspension of our 
own prejudices.” Suspension of a prejudice is a suspension of the finality of the judgment as we 
seek to understand the meaning of another. The conscious awareness and suspension of our 
prejudices both allows “another’s meaning [to] be isolated and valued on its own,” that is, to be 
attentive to what the other is or might be trying to express, and to examine those prejudices of 
our own that would color our view of it. At the same time, questioning our own prejudice does 
mean that it is “simply set aside and the text or the other person accepted as valid in its place.”520 
In suspending our judgments and being open to another’s ideas, we stand “prepared for it to tell 
[us] something” that is potentially valuable.521 What we see from Gadamer’s account of the role 
of prejudice in understanding is that that our prejudices can actually be affordances in intellectual 
inquiry. Not only can they catalyze the inquiry, but when they become explicit, they can be 
questioned and changed in the process of reflection.  
 I have argued that the critical mode of engagement — by virtue of its skepticism and 
suspicion, its fundamental questions, and its attempt to answer these questions using a 
disengaged rationality — is insufficient for enabling students to lead flourishing lives. It draws 
their attention to what might be wrong in the world and constrains their ability to discover 
through their inquiry possible goods in which they might invest their lives. Furthermore, as a 
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mode of engaging with the world, it is in itself limited for experiencing wholehearted 
engagement with the good. What, then, does inquiry for flourishing require? 
5.3 Inquiry for Flourishing 
 The deficiency of the critical mode could be summed up as a problem of narrowness or 
reductionism. It is too narrow (a) in its focus on developing autonomy while neglecting other 
aspects of flourishing that must be cultivated; (b) in its focus on critical questions that rest on a 
skeptical or suspicious attitude to the exclusion of other possible modes of reflection and ways of 
responding to what one encounters, and (c) in its attempt to rely only on our rational (logical, 
analytical, and conceptual) faculties to the exclusion of nonrational (to be distinguished from 
irrational) ways of apprehending the world. These features have come to define the contours of 
intellectual life in liberal education, but what the critical mode excludes is not only constitutive 
of our full humanity but necessary for understanding ourselves and the world.  
 Just as the Socratic ideal of the liberal educator is too narrow to fully support students’ 
flourishing, the critical mode of engagement is too narrow to fully support a flourishing life. We 
need to broaden the modes of engagement in the examined life beyond the critical if it is to 
enable students to lead — and if it is to be — a flourishing life. In other words, although 
flourishing is the aim or the end of liberal education, it should not be construed as the “end-
product” of liberal education, such that students are expected to lead flourishing lives after 
having examined their lives, but rather the engagement with the examined life should itself 
embody flourishing or wholehearted engagement with the good. Our mode of engagement must 
be holistic, both in allowing for the whole self to be engaged in intellectual inquiry and in the 
questions that frame inquiry, and it must be fundamentally affirmative in its approach, 
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encouraging students to consider how they might integrate what they encounter into the beliefs 
that guide their lives.  
 Allowing students’ whole selves to be engaged in intellectual inquiry is essentially what 
the pastoral professor is called to do, but the purpose of holistic engagement in the context of this 
discussion is to serve as a way for students to access their beliefs and intuitions about what is 
worthwhile and to motivate their desire to understand what the objects of inquiry might have to 
tell them. The journal assignment referenced above and Handelman’s letter-writing activity are 
just two examples of how students’ emotions, desires, and prior commitments can be 
foregrounded as they engage with course materials so that they can reflect upon and examine 
their views. Permitting students to write about these aspects of their experiences legitimates them 
as proper subjects of inquiry and discussion in the academic realm. Holistic engagement, 
however, should not be limited to assignments; it should be part of the ethos of a class, where the 
educator can acknowledge the subjective aspects of students’ lives and invite them to share what 
is pertinent to the course in class discussions, whether in opening up discussions or in 
conversation with individual students.  
 I would like to consider more closely what it means to engage students’ desires because 
some might worry that this idea sounds like a call for “relevance,” which can easily lead to the 
instrumentalization of both the substance and process of learning that liberal education advocates 
are fighting and limit what we teach to what is related to students’ immediate circumstances. The 
language of viewing course materials as “resources” for constructing one’s beliefs and a 
conception of flourishing might already seem to promote an instrumental view of liberal 
education. If we train students to view what they learn only in terms of what will help them 
achieve their conception of the good, then they may not see the objects of inquiry as having any 
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value apart from our own desire to flourish. I have already suggested my position on these 
concerns throughout this chapter, but I will address them more directly here to the pave the way 
more clearly for what remains. 
 The call to teach what is relevant to students can be heard as a call to teach what interests 
students, and what interests students can be understood in undergraduate education to mean that 
educators should show students the practical (that is, employment) value of what they are 
learning and/or use course materials in ways that relate to certain immediate aspects of students’ 
lives, such as their cultural background, current events and pop culture, or their other individual 
interests. As general recommendations, I am not opposed to any of these — as with any 
pedagogical approach, they can be executed in better and worse ways — and my own 
pedagogical proposal would not exclude these approaches to relevance. I would argue, however, 
that they are neither the only nor the most fruitful ways of engaging students’ desires and 
interests in the context of liberal education, where one of the central aims is to help students 
critically reflect on the beliefs and interests that motivate them so they can determine if they are 
“truly worthy” for guiding their lives. The effort to be relevant may accurately hit the target of 
students’ interests but may only reinforce what they already deem a worthy pursuit. Addressing 
this potential failing of student-centered conceptions of teaching that prioritize students’ 
motivations and interests, Higgins suggests, drawing on Oakeshott, that rather than capitulating 
to the student who asks, “What’s this good for?,” the educator “works to interrupt the student’s 
initial motivations”522 because “the point is precisely to expand his or her sense of what might 
count as good”523 — so that satisfactions that have never been imagined can come into view.  
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 The successful Oakeshottian educator interrupts the student’s initial motivation in order 
to connect to a deeper motivation in the student, that emanating from her desire to learn and 
pursue something good for her flourishing. Liberal education can be made relevant without 
abdicating its expansive potential by engaging students’ fundamental desire to lead a worthwhile 
life. This desire can motivate them to explore new possibilities for their lives through an 
engagement with the course material framed by existential questions. The argument I am making 
here is slightly different from the argument that liberal education should address existential 
questions because that is its original or fitting purpose or the paternalistic argument that students 
need this kind of education, though I agree with both of these views. I am instead suggesting that 
students’ in fact already desire to explore these questions. 
 This suggestion seems to contradict the 2016 survey of American freshman conducted by 
the Higher Education Research Institute (HERI), which reported that only 46.8% of incoming 
first-time freshman (out of 137,456 students who entered 184 U.S. colleges and universities of 
different types) indicated that “developing a meaningful philosophy of life” was an “essential” or 
“very important” objective for them in attending college (82.7% indicated the same level of 
importance for “being well off financially”).524 While I am not in a position to vigorously refute 
their findings, a separate HERI study from 2004 on the spiritual development of undergraduates 
reported that 76% (out of 112,232 students attending a national sample of 236 colleges and 
universities) indicate that they are “searching for meaning/purpose in life,”525 69% consider it 
“‘essential’ or ‘very important’ that their college enhance their self-understanding,” and 67% 
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consider it “‘essential’ or ‘very important’ that their college ‘develop their personal values.’”526 
It is possible, though not likely, that students’ attitudes have dramatically shifted in the span of 
fifteen years, but the earlier HERI findings are corroborated by anecdotal evidence offered by 
scholars who argue in more recent publications that colleges should help emerging adults in their 
search for meaning and purpose in life.527 The sentiment expressed by Nash’s student in the 
epigraph, which I repeat below, is especially arresting. He sounds almost desperate in his 
frustration that his schooling has been indifferent to his desire to experience “real” meaning: 
I have upwards of sixteen years of formal education, and only once in any 
classroom was I encouraged to talk honestly and openly about the sense of 
mystery and depth that I frequently experience in my own life…. Why can’t we 
ever talk in higher education about what gives lives real meaning? Why can’t we 
talk about this everywhere on campus and throughout the four years that we spend 
here? And I don’t just mean in all-night bull sessions in the residence halls or in 
the downtown bars and cafes!  
 
This student’s exasperation should be encouraging to liberal educators who are frustrated 
because they think students only care about getting a job. Perhaps we just have to find ways to 
tap into this desire.  
 The desire to explore and discuss existential questions is not unique to emerging adults 
and should not be seen as “navel-gazing.” The developmental stage of emerging adults, the 
seeming boundlessness and sheer diversity of their options, and the practical pressure to have a 
job when they graduate make existential questions particularly pressing, but this desire arises 
from the basic human motive to lead a flourishing life. Again, we cannot help but value what we 
encounter in the world in terms of how they might fit into our conception of flourishing. Those 
objects we deem worthwhile will naturally find a place within that conception and those we do 
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not will naturally fall outside of it until we come to see them as worthwhile. The student who is 
disengaged from school learning cannot be faulted if she is disengaged because she does not find 
that it fits into her conception of flourishing and, therefore, does not find it to be a worthwhile 
engagement.  
 Based on the data above and my own experience with undergraduates, exploring 
existential questions is likely to be considered a worthwhile endeavor for most if not all 
undergraduates. Course materials and subject matter knowledge are not secondary in this 
process. It is the engagement with particular objects of inquiry that should enable students to 
reconstruct their beliefs and encounter substantive possibilities for worthwhile commitments. 
Furthermore, any object of inquiry could be considered from the angle of its potential relevance 
to one’s flourishing. An inquiry into what it means to flourish or into other related existential 
questions does not have to be limited to the “Great Books,” works of contemporary relevance, or 
even the humanities, as Nel Noddings has argued.528 It can also include topics of vocational 
interest and import. It is a matter of how we approach the engagement with course material and 
subject matter and of the questions that frame it.   
 The attitude Gadamer describes in being open to a person or text suggests the kind of 
affirmative approach that sets the stage for the examined life to be an inquiry that serves 
students’ flourishing. It opens students up to possibilities for engaging with the good and makes 
the process of inquiry an engagement with the good itself. In being prepared for an object to tell 
us something and in seeking to understand what it has to say to us, we do not affirm what it says 
as truth, but we affirm that it has the potential to offer something valuable for our understanding 
of ourselves and the world. Oakeshott casts this affirmative attitude in terms of a belief that 
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underlies genuine liberal learning that expands the self: “a special place devoted to [liberal] 
learning is constituted only in terms of what it is believed there is to learn.” Moreover, this belief 
is what makes liberal learning possible. Without a belief on the part of the student that there is 
something of worth to be learned for her own self-understanding, learning only amounts to 
“merely becoming aware of” the various paths people have taken rather than an acceptance of an 
invitation to consider these paths as possible paths for her. 529 Awareness does not in itself 
contain the motivation to be open, to understand, and to seriously consider whether any of these 
paths are worthwhile engagements for one’s flourishing.  
 Ricoeur similarly describes an approach to hermeneutics that stands in contrast with the 
hermeneutics of suspicion, one that rests on a kind of “faith.”530 Unlike the hermeneutics of 
suspicion, which “reduces” linguistic expression to hidden causes or agendas, a hermeneutics of 
faith approaches the object (text) with the “expectation of being spoken to [that] motivates 
concern for the object”: “For would I be interested in the object, could I stress concern for the 
object … if I did not expect … this something to ‘address’ itself to me?”531 This faith is a belief 
that something important is at stake, and, for Ricoeur, it motivates his inquiry: “It is this 
expectation, this confidence, this belief, that confers on the study of symbols its particular 
seriousness. To be truthful, I must say it is what animates all my research.”532 The language that 
Oakeshott and Ricoeur use is helpful for understanding how intellectual inquiry can be an 
engagement that supports flourishing. It is an engagement infused with a faith and hope that the 
engagement could lead to something worthwhile and a belief that it is a worthwhile engagement.  
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 Intellectual inquiry in an affirmative mode also embodies a degree of trust in the world 
via trust in the ideas of others. This trust stops short of fully accepting what another says as truth. 
We trust, however, that the other is making an earnest effort to understand herself and the world. 
Based on this trust, we can try to enter into the other’s ideas in the way Gadamer suggests: “We 
try to transpose ourselves into the perspective within which [the person] has formed his views. 
But this simply means that we try to understand how what he is saying could be right.”533 
Elbow’s “believing game” takes just this approach, but he describes it more experientially. When 
trying to determine whether or not an assertion is true, we try to believe an assertion, which 
means we try to imagine what it is like to see “more and more things in terms of it or ‘through’ 
it.” When comparing different assertions, we try to believe both until we are able to “see or feel 
that [one] is truer” and have “a trustworthy sense that one is better than the other.”534 Elbow does 
not offer rules or criteria for determining what is “truer,”535 but I suggest that the benefit of 
relating to another’s claim with an initial trust that enables us to enter into it is that, in addition to 
using logic and evidence, we can test it using a criterion Nietzsche considered tragically 
neglected by universities: “whether one can live in accordance with it.”536 Restated in the terms 
of this project, does the idea enable me or us to flourish, to live a life of wholehearted 
engagement with the good?  
 Although the affirmative approach stands opposed to skepticism and suspicion, it is not 
opposed to questioning or criticality, if we define criticality more broadly as the disposition and 
capacity to engage in “analysis and evaluation of an issue in order to form a judgment.”537 In 
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other words, we can question and be critical in an affirmative mode.538 We can and should 
examine objects to assess whether or not it holds true, justified, or valid claims, especially when 
our flourishing is at stake. We can and should examine situations of injustice and oppression for 
the ways they undermine our individual and collective flourishing, but we can do so to help us 
see more clearly the ideals that guide us and that we want to work to realize.  
 Brenda Watson proposes that we cultivate in students (in primary and secondary school) 
an attitude of “critical affirmation,” which encapsulates but also goes beyond being critical in an 
affirmative mode, as I have just described it, and which moves us towards the questions that I 
propose should frame inquiry for flourishing. Watson identifies “at least five intentions” that 
constitute critical affirmation:  
1. The desire to find insight 
2. The expectation that probably insights are there to be found 
3. The determination to try to uncover them 
4. The rigorous use of critical faculties in so doing, but not for the sake of destruction, as 
though skepticism were the be-all and end-all, but for the purpose of creating a larger 
grasp of understanding and commitment both for oneself and for others 
5. The desire to make other people’s insights one own.539 
 
By “insight,” Watson means “knowledge felt to be self-authenticating,”540 where “to have an 
insight” means to “experience in a totally self-evident way an understanding of reality.”541 I will 
sidestep the question of whether or not insights can be considered reliable knowledge and will 
substitute “views” for “insight,” by which I mean beliefs and ways of making sense of one’s life 
and the world. Any differences between these two words are immaterial for my purposes. I 
would like to build on the fourth and fifth intentions but will further modify the language to 
make clearer how we can encourage students to use the views of others to construct their beliefs 
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and how we can move them toward wholehearted engagement with the good by posing certain 
kinds of affirmative questions. 
 It is implicit in Watson’s notion of critical affirmation that making others’ understanding 
one’s own does not mean an unquestioning acceptance of another’s view as one’s own belief. To 
avoid this connotation, however, I suggest that we instead use the language of application, of 
applying another’s view to one’s own situation or life. To apply another’s view to one’s own life 
means to consider how that view affects one’s own — whether it confirms, illuminates, expands, 
or convincingly refutes it — and thereby affects one’s existential reality. To do so requires that 
we first take a Gadamerian approach to the object, viewing it as having something potentially 
valid to say to us and seeking to understand it on its own terms. Although Gadamer sees 
application as inherent to genuine understanding of another’s ideas, it is pedagogically useful to 
think of understanding and application as separate steps. Higgins proposes a “map of reading and 
discussion” in the humanities that is especially helpful here, a flowchart of guiding questions for 
three different stances — interpretation, application, and criticism. I will present it in simplified 
form only in terms of questions. First, students are asked to approach a text with the interpretive 
questions of “What does it say?” and “What does it mean?” Once they have taken the time to try 
to understand what the text says and means, then they can seek to apply it to their lives, with 
questions such as “What does the text say to me, to my world and my problems? How would I 
translate my concerns into its terms or its concerns into my terms? What can we learn about the 
text and our situation by imagining its concrete implications and applications?”’; and critically 
evaluate the ideas, with questions such as, “Is it true?” or “Is the author’s project valuable?” 
Although the process begins with interpretation, it does not merely end with application or 
 223 
criticism, but is a circular process where the answers to the questions in each stance can lead us 
to rethink our answers to the other questions. 
 In the critical mode, students ideally engage with interpretive questions first and then 
engage with critical questions, but they are generally not asked to reflect on application 
questions. The process of application, however, is precisely that process where another’s views, 
in some respect if not wholly, become part of who we are and how we live. To borrow a phrase 
from Ricoeur, it is a process of “existential assimilation.”542 The attitude and questions of the 
critical mode, we saw, are limited for serving this purpose. I acknowledge that students can form 
certain beliefs through developing arguments that revolve around the questions of the critical 
mode. The conclusions they draw may be genuine beliefs that they form. The questions of the 
critical mode, however, are of a distinctly different kind and serve a different purpose from those 
of application. Furthermore, they do not express the range of existential questions with which we 
are confronted or that we might ask ourselves as we reflect on how to live. We reflect on moral 
questions not only about what is right or wrong but also about whether or not we are living with 
moral integrity, that is, living up to our ideals of what is right and good within our private and 
public lives. We struggle with the question of whether or not we are living authentically, whether 
our projects and aspirations are truly an outgrowth of our own desires. We explore aspirational 
questions, trying to figure out what kind of life we want to live and who we want to become. We 
seek answers to metaphysical questions, searching for a sense of order, some transcendent 
meaning that makes sense of and gives us hope amidst seemingly random and chaotic events that 
cause personal and global suffering.  
                                                 
542 Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation, 31. 
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 Robert Nash and Michele Murray identify a host of deeply personal and introspective 
questions that occupy undergraduates about various aspects of their lives. I include a handful 
from each of these aspects here:  
(1) Hopes and Dreams — How do I find my passion? … Is it possible to have a 
fulfilling relationship and a fulfilling job at the same time? What if I make the 
wrong choice on either side? 
(2) Educational Challenges — Am I studying what is right for me? Why do I 
have to be so preoccupied with gearing up for graduate school and a career 
when I’d just like to enjoy exploring the arts and humanities? How well am I 
handling the freedom of college and being way from home for the first time? 
(3) Religion and Spirituality — What is the right religion for me? … Can any 
good come from doubting? Do I need a religious faith to be a moral person? Is 
there a way to make a meaning that is enduring without religion or 
spirituality?  
(4) Work Life — Will I always have to choose between doing what I love or 
making lots of money? … Is it possible to find a career that is congruent with 
my personal values?  
(5) Home, Friends, Lovers, and Family — Why is it so hard to live alone but also 
so hard to sustain a relationship? Now that I’ve moved away, how do I make 
friends? Who will be my true friends, will I ever fit in, and how will I know 
who[m] I can trust? 
(6) Identity — Will I ever truly be happy with myself? Why do I feel so guilty 
when others claim I am privileged? Aren’t we all human beings underneath 
our skin color, sexual orientation, [and] neighborhoods?543 
 
Nash and Murray identify numerous other questions, which are generally helpful for 
understanding students’ existential concerns, but they do not make clear how these questions can 
be used in tandem with course material. Nash offers the example of a course he created on the 
philosophy of the meaning of life, but not all courses should be expressly organized around this 
topic nor would all faculty be permitted to do so. If the course is not to turn into a bull session, 
we must think about how questions can both intersect with students’ existential concerns while 
also drawing their attention to the objects of inquiry. 
                                                 
543 Nash and Murray, Helping College Students Find Purpose: The Campus Guide to Meaning-Making, 5–7. 
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 Other scholars have offered compelling visions of a liberal education that seek to address 
existential questions through engaging with particular objects of inquiry. In Mackler’s vision, the 
interpretation of textual meaning and the creation of stories can help us collectively develop 
answers to the cosmic question of why things happen in the world. In Arcilla’s vision of 
“existential learning,” we can confront the metaphysical question of why we exist at all by 
learning to celebrate existence through an engagement with mediumist works of art, works that 
“stress their mediums” and “draw attention to our strange, existential nature.”544 In Sullivan’s 
vision, liberal education should be organized around the quest for vocational purpose, where 
interdisciplinary courses on the meaning of vocation, on civic responsibility, and on ethical 
values, along with various experiential education opportunities, provide students with resources 
for deliberate reflection on the purpose they will pursue when they graduate. Each of these 
addresses an important question, but only one among those that bear on our flourishing.  
 Building on the work of these scholars, I propose a more comprehensive set of categories 
of questions on which students can be invited to reflect as they engage with course materials 
(Table 2). To the interpretive and critical questions, I have added four categories of application  
questions, which match the types of self-reflection questions I identified earlier and which I have 
labeled moral/civic (I take questions about civic responsibility to be a subset of moral questions), 
recognitional (recognizing one’s authentic self)545, aspirational, and metaphysical. I have written 
these questions as they would be asked in an introspective mode apart from an engagement with 
course material (top row) as well as how they might be asked in the context of a course (bottom 
                                                 
544 René Vincente Arcilla, Mediumism: A Philosophical Reconstruction of Modernism of Existential Learning 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2010), 101. 
545 I have adapted this term somewhat infelicitously from Felski, who identifies four ways that people commonly 
engage with texts and that are valuable, which the critical mode of reading ignores. One of these is “recognition,” in 
which we see ourselves in and feel affinity with a character in a text. The Uses of Literature (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2008), 23. 
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possibilities for who 







to affirm meaning 
and order in life 
Educational aim: 
Cultivate/sustain 





• Desires  
What am I like? 
What kind of 
person am I? 
What do I 
believe? What do 
I care about? 
Is what I believe 
true, justified, 
valid, legitimate?  
 
What should I do 
(what is the right 
thing to do)? Is the 




what (I believe) is 
right/just? 
 
Is what I believe, 
desire, understand 
of my experiences 
“me,” true to myself 
and/or my projects? 
How would I/we 
like to be? How 
would I/we like to 
live? What kind of 
work would I like to 
be involved in? 




What do I find 
good, beautiful/ 
wondrous? 
In/through what do 
I experience 
meaning and hope 
in the world? 
“The world”  








What kind of 
object is [X]? 
What are the 
qualities of [X]? 
What does [X] 
say? What does 
[X] mean?  
Is [X] true, 
justified, valid, 
legitimate?  
What does [X] 
reveal to me about 
what I should do? 
Is [X] consistent 




To what extent does 
[X] affirm or differ 
from what I believe, 
desire, and 
experience? In what 
ways does [X] 
clarify or illuminate 
my self-
understanding? 
How does [X] affect 
how I/we 
understand who 
I/we want to 
become, what I/we 
would like to be/do 
in the future?  
 
What do I find 
good/beautiful/ 
wondrous about 
[X]? In what ways 
does [X] bring 
meaning and hope 
to my life? 
Table 2
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row) to distinguish “bull-session” questions from those that lead students to engage with course 
material (of course, it is possible that students might discuss course material in bull sessions). 
The overall purpose of these latter questions is to encourage students to, first, see objects of 
inquiry as potential resources for answering their existential questions, and, second, to apply 
what they are learning to particular dimensions of their lives. The moral, aspirational, and 
metaphysical questions are specifically geared towards helping students think about the good 
they perceive in the world and with which they might purposefully engage. I articulate the 
questions in general terms, but they can be tailored for specific disciplines and courses, examples 
of which I provide.  
 There is no one pedagogical structure for utilizing these questions, and I propose these 
questions both as pedagogical tools as well as guides for how course materials can be framed. 
Using these questions in assignments is a fairly simple matter, but it takes intentionality and 
effort to make genuine reflection on application questions part of the ethos of a class and may 
require some tough choices about how educators and students spend their time, for it may mean 
that less course material is “covered.” Creating opportunities for students to reflect on existential 
questions requires that educators broaden their thinking about their subject matter and  
educational aims, beyond gains in knowledge and intellectual skills to what will best serve 
students’ flourishing, as I have argued throughout this dissertation.  
I have used application questions to guide my own teaching, asking students to reflect on 
these questions in brief weekly response papers and making explicit connections between the 
topic of discussion to different existential dimensions. At the end of the semester, I give them the 
following prompt:  
For this final response paper, I invite you to offer your reflections on what you are 
taking away from any and/or all aspects of this course (such as course materials, 
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lectures, discussion, your peers, assignments, etc.). Please respond to the 
following questions: 
 
1. What is the most important or valuable thing you feel you have learned through 
this course? 
 
2. In what ways, if any, has this course has affected 
• how you understand your own education/schooling (such as your 
experience/life as a student, your educational goals, how your education 
has shaped and is shaping you) 
• how you think about your future work as a professional (whatever your 
potential career/vocation, have you come to think about your goals, role, 
and interests in new ways?) 
• how you understand yourself as a citizen (about your civic 
responsibilities/duties, your particular role in society) 
 
3. Taking the approach of this course to be an example of liberal learning, what value, if 
any, do you see in this kind of education? [the concept of liberal learning was the overall 
framework for the course] 
 
Much of what students have written has been moving and insightful, showing precisely how their 
identities, their aspirations, and how they were making sense of the world had changed through 
the course. One young woman shared in class that her sense of purpose as a teacher deepened, as 
she came to see teaching as something more than a job she would enjoy to a way to contribute to 
the lives of disadvantaged students. A young man studying finance, who admitted that his goal 
was to become wealthy, wrote about how he came to see that everyone has a unique story and 
that, “as a middle-class citizen it is not a legal duty but certainly a moral duty of sorts to ‘stick 
up’ for the at times underprivileged, working class. These kinds of reflections necessarily 
involve students’ emotions and personal experiences, though students may not explicitly or 
extensively write about them, and the questions direct their attention to what is worthy of 
integrating into their lives — what they sense to be good and worth being a pursuing as ideals. 
Doret De Ruyter and Jim Conroy argue that the development of aspirations and an “ideal 
identity” are essential to identity formation and give an individual’s life a “sense of purpose and 
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meaning and give her a direction,”546 suggesting that identifying ideals for oneself would be 
especially important during emerging adulthood. Discovering that there are ideas and ideals by 
which one can live is also necessary for feeling at home in and staying engaged with the world. 
My student Jack was reacting to a portrayal of the educational world as thoroughly corrupted 
with little hope for improvement, and he understandably recoiled. His reaction reflects Erikson’s 
portrayal of adolescence as a time when young people “most fervently [look] for men and ideas 
to have faith in” even while they “fear a foolish, all too trusting commitment,” which leads them 
to “express [their] need for faith in loud and cynical mistrust.”547  
 Higgins has developed a more complex assignment involving both application and 
critical thinking. Students read an educational autobiography, and their written assignment is 
divided into two parts: first, they write their own brief educational autobiography, narrating how 
their education (formal or informal) has shaped who they are today; then they identify one aspect 
of the author’s experience that both resonates with their own and differs in some way, exploring 
how the similarities and differences illuminate their own understanding of their experience as 
well as the more general experience of schooling.548  
 Application can also be incorporated into science courses. Students can be given the 
opportunity to do more than memorize and apply formulas to solve problems or analyze social 
phenomena from particular theoretical perspectives. They can reflect on the marvels of the 
physical world and consider how their understanding of a particular issue has ethical 
implications for their individual and collective lives or within a relevant profession.549 Two 
                                                 
546 Doret de Ruyter and Jim Conroy, “The Formation of Identity: The Importance of Ideals,” Oxford Review of 
Education 28, no. 4 (2002): 516. 
547 Erikson, Identity: Youth and Crisis, 128–29. 
548 Higgins assigned this autographical essay for a course for which I was the Teaching Assistant from Fall 2016 to 
Fall 2017. 
549 For examples of how science and economics courses can be framed in these terms, see The Liberal Art of 
Science: Agenda for Action (Washington, DC: America Association for the Advancement of Science, 1990); Mark 
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colleagues of mine in chemistry assign journals in which they ask students to consider their 
chemistry knowledge in terms of ethical and existential questions. For example, with regard to 
sugar metabolism, students are given a case study and must answer the following questions: 
“How can we modify patient sugar consumption? Can we assist patients with poor emotional 
regulation to maintain healthy lifestyles? How do you connect with someone who is struggling 
emotionally?”550 Another journal assignment explicitly asks students to reflect on why learning 
organic chemistry matters, in general and to them personally.551 I include the entire prompt here: 
Food for thought: 
Gabe and Jose have asked themselves one question every step of the way along 




We encourage you to ask, "Why?" at every step of the way along your future 
educational and professional careers. Why did Nature choose phosphates? Why 
does our body need to be at pH 7? Why do we take exams in organic chemistry? 
Why should anybody care about organic chemistry?  
 
Similarly, we challenge you to ask yourself, “why am I in college?” Whether you 
believe education is an obstacle course on the way to your career or you believe 
educating individuals improves our society, we challenge you to consider the 
purpose of higher education and to come up with your own answer. 
 
Prompt: 
The purpose of teaching organic chemistry is contested, in some ways, with some 
instructors emphasizing the learning of synthetic reagents and some instructors 
emphasizing the logic of proposing reasonable electron flow mechanisms. 
Further, the relevance of organic chemistry to students with different intended 
career paths is also contended, i.e. what and how much should an engineer need to 
know about organic chemistry? What about a surgeon? What about a college 
professor? Ask yourself, how and why should organic chemistry be taught, if at 
all? Gabe and Jose are not satisfied with the response, "this is how organic 
chemistry was taught in the past, and this is how it should be taught in the future" 
and you should not accept this reason either. Please take a moment to reflect on 
                                                 
Girod, “A Conceptual Overview of the Role of Beauty and Aesthetics in Science and Science Education,” Studies in 
Science Education 43, no. 1 (2007): 38–61; Michael Daley and Richard B Peterson, “Rescuing Economics from the 
Discipline : The Green Learning Community” 14, no. 3 (2014): 70–83. 
550 Gabe Rudebush and Jose Zavalas, “Journal 4,” 2018.  
551 Gabe Rudebush and Jose Zavalas, “Journal 8,” 2018. 
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the purpose of learning organic chemistry and come up with your own responses 
for the following questions. 
 
1. In general, should someone with your career plan learn about organic chemistry? 
What, if anything, should you know about organic chemistry? 
 
2. Specifically, is there one thing you have personally learned from Organic 
Chemistry 1 or 2 that you will apply to your future educational or professional 
career? If you cannot think of something relevant that you personally learned, 
please share one thing we should include in future classes of Organic Chemistry 1 
or 2, or propose a compelling argument for why organic chemistry should be 
removed as a requirement for students with your career plan. 
 
 Although existential application questions can be brought to bear on any object of 
inquiry, educators must still carefully consider the particular course material with which students 
engage, for the questions and the object of inquiry work together to substantively shape student’s 
understanding of and engagement with the world. If the aim is to move students toward 
wholehearted engagement with the good, we must think about how we can use both aspects of 
our teaching to invite students to actively think about the good they either discover or want to 
create in the world.  
It might be said that requiring students to reflect on existential application questions in 
assignments is too contrived and will lead to inauthentic responses. Scholars such as Gadamer, 
Arcilla, and David Aldridge have argued that genuine questions must come from the individual 
herself.552 There is a real risk of inviting forced responses, but we must remember the priority of 
the relational context in which students are invited to reflect on these or any other questions. The 
ethos that the pastoral professor strives to create is one of genuine care, openness, and trust, and 
in such an ethos, students are likely to respond genuinely, to which Handelman’s and my own 
experience attests.  
                                                 
552 Gadamer, Truth and Method; René Vincente Arcilla, “The Questions of Liberal Education,” Liberal Education, 
no. Spring (2007): 14–19; Aldridge, “The Logical Priority of the Question: R. G. Collingwood, Philosophical 
Hermeneutics and Enquiry-Based Learning.” 
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Furthermore, educators who feel that higher education has drifted from its ethical aims 
often remind us that to educate means to “lead out of” (from the Latin educere) and, as Mark 
Edmundson adds, “and then presumably toward something.”553 The paternalistic objection to this 
view has already been addressed, and the overarching theme of this dissertation is that the aim of 
the liberal educator is to lead students toward wholehearted engagement with the good. The 
existential application questions we pose to students serve this purpose in two ways. First, they 
direct students’ attention to potential goods. Second, they cultivate a mode of engaging with the 
world that lends itself to wholehearted engagement with the good. In a self-reflective mode, 
these questions are animated by the desire to live a worthwhile life. In posing these questions 
within the context of liberal education, the educator leads students to engage with the world itself 
(via course materials) as a place that holds something of value for their flourishing. As students 
encounter ideas that give voice to their inchoate thoughts, contemporary challenges that call for 
their participation, objects that arouse their curiosity and wonder, and figures that awaken their 
highest hopes and ideals, the world becomes a place that is responsive to their need to feel at 
home and be involved in it in purposeful ways. Students can and do have these experiences 
without educators explicitly asking them to reflect on and write about them, but deliberate 
reflection and writing on these experiences enables students to integrate them into the narrative 
of their lives and make them available to others for collective deliberation and reflection.  
Our modes of engagement in the academic realm are modes of seeing, experiencing, and 
living in the world. The examined life can be a disciplined engagement in which students pause 
and gain some distance from our habitual thoughts, reactions, and pursuits, but it must be an 
                                                 
553 Mark Edmundson, Why Teach?: In Defense of a Real Edudcation (New York: Bloomsbury, 2013), 165. 
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engagement that is itself worthwhile for sustaining and generating possibilities for wholehearted 



























The Value of Liberal Education Revisited 
 
What avail is it to win prescribed amounts of information about geography and history, to win ability 
to read and write, if in the process the individual loses his own soul; loses his appreciation of things 
worthwhile, of the values to which these things are relative; if he loses desire to apply what he has 
learned and, above all, loses the ability to extract meaning from his future experiences as they occur? 
   — John Dewey554 
 
  
 My interest in the risks of liberal education was born out of my encounters with the 
narratives of Richard Rodriguez and of the title character in W. E. B. Du Bois’s “Of the Coming 
of John.” I admit that much of what was described by Rodriguez and Du Bois resonated with my 
own experience with liberal education. My interest became an urgent concern a few years later, 
however, when I witnessed the disillusionment of my students, which was a result, at least in 
part, of their experience in the course. Having completely embraced the idea that a liberating 
liberal education is necessary for a worthwhile life and is the most worthwhile college education, 
this experience was disconcerting. 
 I have been asked whether the motivating problem of this project is widespread enough to 
merit the kind of attention I have given it. Surely, there are bigger problems that liberal education 
and undergraduate education in general face — rampant instrumentalism, consumerism, and 
careerism in undergraduate education, as well as decreasing funding for public higher education 
and decreasing enrollments in liberal arts programs.555 And, after all, Perry and his colleagues 
found that most students managed to cope with the emotional stress that accompanied their 
                                                 
554 John Dewey, Experience and Education (New York: Touchstone, 1997), 48–49. 
555 Christopher Newfield, Unmaking the Public University: The Forty-Year Assault on the Middle-Class 
(Cambirdge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008); Colleen Flaherty, “Major Exodus,” Inside Higher Ed, January 
26, 2015; Jon Marcus, “With Enrollment Sliding, Liberal Arts Colleges Struggle to Make a Case for Themselves,” 
The Hechinger Report, May 28, 2018; Mark Schnieder and Matthew Sigelman, “Saving the Liberal Arts: Makiing 
the Bachelor’s Degree a Better Path to Labor Market Success” (Washington, DC, February 2018).  
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confrontation with multiple, conflicting perspectives and the demand to think critically. In fact, 
David Setran and Chris Kiesling, addressing a concern that Christians often have about the 
effects of college on young people’s faith, write that “college is not as ‘disruptive’ as some might 
think.”556 They cite reports that show that college students today indicate that their religious faith 
was strengthened in college.  
 While this news may be heartening to Christian parents and leaders, one of the potential 
reasons Setran and Kiesling offer for the lack of correlation between college attendance and a 
decline in faith will dishearten liberal educators: “[these results] may … demonstrate students’ 
lack of intentional intellectual engagement.”557 They support their hypothesis with the same 
HERI study that reports that a minority of incoming freshmen seek to develop a “meaningful 
philosophy of life,” as compared to the vast majority who say that their purpose in attending 
college is to “be well off financially.” Setran and Kiesling further explain, 
Defined as “practical credentialists” rather than “intellectual explorers,” [students] 
are less apt to be lured away by godless philosophies than they are to breeze 
through the college experience with little intentional reflection on faith. The 
search for a marketable degree generally means finding courses that will provide 
the best “applicable” training with a minimal investment of thought and 
reflection.558 
 
Qualitative studies of undergraduate life conducted in recent decades consistently describe what 
Mary Grigsby calls a “generalized college student culture,” in which serious engagement with 
ideas or academics is not a high priority for a considerable number of students. For many 
students, classes are not where they say they learn the most.559 Anthropology professor Rebekah 
                                                 
556 David P. Setran and Chris A. Kiesling, Spiritual Formation in Emerging Adulthood: A Practical Theology for 
College and Young Adult Ministry (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2013), 21. 
557 Ibid. 
558 Ibid., 21–22.  
559 Moffatt, Coming of Age in New Jersey: College and American Culture; Nathan, My Freshman Year: What a 
Professor Learned by Becoming a Student; Grigsby, College Life Through the Eyes of Students; Arum and Roksa, 
Academically Adrift: Limited Learning on College Campuses. 
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Nathan found after spending a year as a freshman that “college culture” revolves around “the life 
of friends and fun”560 experienced in dorms and extracurricular activities, and she concludes: 
The biggest attraction of college for these students is clearly “college culture,” 
which … seemed to have very little to do with either intellectual life or formal 
instruction…. The tiny place occupied by anything academic in college life was a 
consistent message. This was disconcerting to me as a professor because I have 
always shared the professor’s worldview that what we do is regularly mind-
altering and life-changing.561 
 
Asked if she would “take the degree and run” if the university were willing to grant it right then, 
one student responds with frank enthusiasm, “No, college is too fun. Granted, classes get in the 
way a bit, but it’s all worth the experience!”562 
 Of course, student bodies at different types of institutions vary in their level of academic 
engagement, as do groups of students within the same institution, and the recent ethnographic 
studies of college life do not focus on students in liberal arts programs. Yet the suggestion that 
college is not particularly disruptive for most students because most have little interest in 
genuine intellectual inquiry does not relieve liberal educators of the responsibilities I have 
argued are part of their ethical and professional responsibility. Fulfilling these responsibilities is 
not merely a matter of restoration after injury; it is the very means for ensuring that a liberal 
education that engages students in critical reflection is an education that enables them to flourish. 
Furthermore, students’ lack of interest in intellectual engagement, I suggest, is itself related to 
the critical ethos of contemporary liberal education, and, therefore, liberal education is 
contributing to its own lack of appeal. The vision of liberal education I have offered is also a 
proposal for ensuring that liberal education is a worthwhile education for all students.  
                                                 
560 Nathan, My Freshman Year: What a Professor Learned by Becoming a Student, 101. 
561 Ibid., 103. 
562 Ibid., 102. 
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 As I have stated, in my own experience, it is the few students who most earnestly grapple 
with the questions and ideas they encounter, or with which they are confronted, who seem most 
vulnerable to the risks I have identified. Critical examination of their beliefs and the world 
around them is no mere doubting game; something important for their flourishing is at stake. The 
tragic irony is that these students, like Jack and Lucas, may be wholeheartedly engaged with the 
learning process because the questions and ideas speak to their desires and loves in some way, 
but this engagement may be detrimental to their flourishing. It may not lead them into an 
existence that is subjectively experienced as worthwhile and/or objectively lived through 
worthwhile engagements, both in the midst of the process or afterward. It could be the case, and 
perhaps it is likely the case, that students who are already disoriented and feeling alienated are 
drawn to an enterprise that acknowledges and “breaks open” the questionable aspects of life, for 
they recognize themselves in and feel recognized by it.563 With such students, we must be more 
thoughtful about the potential consequences of our practices and how we can enable them to 
discover worthwhile engagements that will give them direction and a way to feel at home in the 
world.  
 As my arguments have implied throughout, if the aims of liberal education and the 
responsibilities of liberal educators are conceived only in terms of the development of students’ 
intellectual capacities or their engagement in the learning process, we can easily neglect to 
consider how our practices are shaping the actual substance of students’ lives — their lived 
experience and the engagements that constitute a worthwhile life. A liberal education that 
succeeds in developing autonomous critical thinkers but does not nurture or diminishes their 
capacities to experience life as worthwhile and to pursue engagements that are worthwhile is 
                                                 
563 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 362. 
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ultimately not a worthwhile education. Dewey expresses this idea in more general and formal 
terms with regard to the educative value of an experience: “any experience is mis-educative that 
has the effect of arresting or distorting growth or further experience,” where “further experience” 
means a “richer experience” in the future.564  
 Dewey fought against the tendency to see the experience of formal education as separate 
from the experience of living itself and to see formal education as only preparation for some 
future experience. What students experience in and through their education is how they learn to 
experience and engage with the knowledge and skills they gain in school throughout the rest of 
their lives: “A person, young or old, gets out of his experience all that there is in it for him at the 
time in which he has it…. We always live at the time we live and not at some other time, and 
only by extracting at each present time the full meaning of each present experience are we 
prepared for doing the same in the future.”565 Dewey does not mean that a person gets out of his 
experience all that is possible to get out of the experience. He means that what the person himself 
sees in the experience for him to gain is what he gets out of it, and what he gets out of it then 
prepares him to extract the same meaning through a similar experience in the future.  
 It is for this reason, for instance, that many criticize the instrumentalization 
and vocationalization of education — students come to see school learning and the subject matter 
they encounter as only a means to achieve a desired test score or credential rather than to 
appreciate either the process of discovery or the substance of what they are learning. Similarly, 
Roth worries that students continue to rely on the skeptical and critical approach to others’ ideas 
that they learned through liberal education even when they are no longer required to do so and 
even when it is not beneficial: 
                                                 
564 Dewey, Experience and Education, 25–26. 
565 Ibid., 49. 
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Once outside the university, our students continue to score points by displaying 
the critical prowess for which they were rewarded in school. They wind up 
contributing to a cultural climate that has little tolerance for finding or making 
meaning, whose intellectuals and cultural commentators delight in being able to 
show that somebody else is not to be believed.566 
 
Like Jack and Lucas, the students Roth describes are wholeheartedly engaged in critical thinking, 
but this engagement is not directed toward what many would consider an objective good — that 
of refuting another person’s argument for the sake of showing off.  
 If flourishing is wholehearted engagement with the good and if the value of liberal 
education depends on its capacity to enable students to flourish, then liberal education must 
develop students’ intellectual capacities in the context of engaging with and experiencing 
substantive and objective goods. Again, what these objective goods are is debatable, but that 
does not mean the liberal educator cannot introduce potential goods — through course materials, 
their own views, and the ethos of the classroom community — for students to experience and 
consider. Furthermore, in order for students to experience these goods, they must engage in 
holistic and affirmative inquiry. 
 But what about the large numbers of students who do not care about “the life of the 
mind” or who do not even consider a liberal arts program or course because it seems to offer no 
practical value? Even if the risks of liberal education are real and should be taken seriously, this 
problem and the recommendations I have made may apply to a decreasing number of students, as 
enrollments in liberal arts colleges and programs have been in decline. If there are fewer students 
enrolled in liberal arts courses and large numbers of students who are not interested in engaging 
in deep thought and reflection, then liberal educators may not even have much opportunity to 
disrupt students’ lives. While this possibility is real, it should be the hope of liberal educators 
                                                 
566 Roth, Beyond the University: Why Liberal Education Matters, 183 emphasis in original. 
 240 
that the problem motivating this study is one that becomes relevant to more students because 
more become engaged in an education that leads them to earnestly examine of their lives. The 
decline in enrollment in liberal arts programs, I believe, places a greater burden on liberal 
educators and institutional leaders to offer prospective and current undergraduates a liberal 
education they will find worthwhile. 
This view might evoke a pessimistic response. Considering the forces working against 
higher education today, which are similar to the threats to liberal education that Oakeshott 
identified, Grigsby asks,  
Can we reasonably expect higher education institutions … to engage students who 
arrive at college with little motivation or interest in being challenged 
academically or of moving outside of their relational comfort zone? The simple 
answer is that engaging disinterested students authentically in academics and 
other activities that broaden their interpersonal skills and worldview is a daunting 
challenge for faculty and staff in higher education institutions [with such 
students], particularly with the context of competitive recruiting based on rhetoric 
that is consumer-choice centered and within a popular-culture environment that 
highlights peer-centered hedonistic fun and denigrates intellectual 
and academically oriented college students.567 
 
Grigsby does not quite respond to her own question, but she seems to think the answer is no, as 
she calls for public institutions to receive greater funding so they can be “shelter[ed] from  
the worst excesses of the service industry model.”568  
 I do not disagree that public institutions would benefit from more reliable funding or that 
institutions and faculty face a daunting challenge in trying to engage students who are not 
interested in intellectual engagement for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is the 
standardized testing that has been a defining feature of the educational experience for many 
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students prior to college.569 I would like to suggest that the vision of liberal education I have 
proposed, which prioritizes caring relationships and engages in holistic and affirmative 
existential inquiry, offers an education that would draw more students to liberal education.  
 Grigsby’s response implies that she sees students’ interests as fixed and that professors 
can neither influence them nor find a way to connect intellectual engagement to their interests. 
Without denying that consumerism, careerism, and the social aspects of college are formidable 
forces with which to contend, I also would argue that liberal education that is governed by the 
critical ethos does not offer an alternative that would be attractive to students who are not already 
somewhat intellectually inclined or are not somehow already predisposed to choosing liberal arts 
courses or programs (for instance, due to family influence). As the HERI study on American 
freshman and studies of undergraduate life have shown, most students see their courses and their 
college degrees as a means to getting a job and become financially secure. At the same time, 
many also say they are interested in exploring existential questions to help them gain some 
clarity about who they are and how to live meaningful lives and expect to do so in college. 
Traditional liberal education courses, however, do not offer to teach students knowledge or skills 
that students believe they need to be hired, and, within the critical ethos and overall academic 
culture, courses do not address the kinds of existential questions that are on students’ minds. 
Why, then, would students who see the purposes of college as obtaining job-related knowledge 
and skills, exploring existential questions, and having fun choose courses that help them achieve 
none of these goals, especially in light of the cost?  
 Christopher Newfield argues that one of the reasons that the humanities have struggled in 
an increasingly market-oriented environment is that humanities departments adapted to the 
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market and did not learn to “manage markets — how to discover hidden demands, how to create 
demand for products one thinks are important, how to adapt the market to one’s output, how to 
subordinate markets to the needs of one’s ‘customers,’ not to mention the wider society.” 
Newfield uses this consumer and market-orientated language not to advocate a thoroughly 
business mentality with regard to scholarship and education but is making an analogy between 
humanities scholars and “craft-labor professionals [who] had to master [business lessons] if they 
were to thrive or even survive in complex economies.”570 His point, however, is insightful, 
raising the question of what compelling “product” the humanities (and liberal education) are 
offering students in the marketplace, where professional majors, campus activities, and pop 
culture seem more worthwhile. The hidden demand of students is their desire to explore 
existential questions that bear on their flourishing, not only among friends but also within the 
context of their courses, and professors can create demand for their “product” by showing 
students how their disciplines and particular specialty’s bear on those questions. Doing so does 
not require a sacrifice of intellectual “rigor” or substance, but a reframing of the subject matter. 
Scholars in the sciences and economics, for instance, have proposed ways to raise questions 
about aesthetic matters, ethical values, and the nature of humanity through interdisciplinary 
approaches to their subjects (albeit not to attract more students but to engage them in questions 
these scholars believe are important).571 To this approach, I would simply add that students 
should also be asked to reflect on how these courses apply to their lives.  
 I have seen excellent teaching that connects to students’ “hidden” desires and engenders 
excitement and curiosity about philosophical questions in non-liberal arts students who had, up 
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to that point, been passive and reluctant participants in their education. In true market fashion, 
other students became interested by word-of-mouth. I have seen students for whom “liberal arts” 
evoked the question, “What are you going do with that?”, come to appreciate the value of liberal 
education after experiencing lectures and discussions about questions that mattered or came to 
matter to them. Returning to Dewey’s view that the meaning a person gains from an experience 
determines the meaning they will gain from it in the future, I argue that it is a subjectively 
worthwhile experience with the liberal arts that convinces someone that liberal education is 
worthwhile. As another case in point, three years after Rubio denigrated philosophy, he changed 
his mind because he read the Stoics and found them helpful to his life: “I’ve changed my view on 
philosophy. But not on welders. We need both! Vocational training for workers & philosophers 
to make sense of the world.”572 Perhaps if more politicians and parents had taken worthwhile 
liberal arts courses in college, they would be more likely to advocate liberal education. 
Students’ interests can be influenced, and educators should not underestimate their ability 
to do so (for good or ill). They should expect that students will not share their views of what is 
good and what their subject is good for, but they should also, as Higgins argues, see part of the 
work of educating as expanding students’ sense of what is good. Liberal educators cannot 
convince students or the public that liberal education is valuable by merely explaining its 
benefits, either for self-cultivation or for potential employment. They have to make the 
experience of liberal education a worthwhile experience, one that students cannot experience 
through other means.  
It may seem that I am placing too much responsibility on the shoulders of individual 
liberal educators, both for the purpose of addressing the risks of the examined life and for 
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reviving liberal education. Larger institutional and cultural forces, along with factors in students’ 
personal lives, affect the status of liberal education and students’ engagement in learning. I have 
focused throughout this project on the work that liberal educators carry out with students in the 
classroom for two reasons. First, as stated, those who teach undergraduates are in a unique 
position to support and positively influence them during especially formative years of their lives. 
The teaching and learning that students experience in their courses should be the heart of a 
college education and is where the value of liberal education in particular is justified, in any type 
of institution. Without the academic or intellectual component, college is an expensive, extended, 
and glorified camp and/or an elaborate bureaucratic and cognitive obstacle course through which 
a young person must pass on the way to job.  
  Second, change can most immediately take place in the educational practices of 
individual teachers who care about improving their teaching and the development of their 
students. Nearly all critics of undergraduate education since the advent of the modern research 
university have faulted the prioritization of research in the university’s mission and in the 
training and promotion of faculty at the expense of the education and development of 
undergraduates. Some have also faulted the admissions process, in which prospective applicants 
are not evaluated for their interest in teaching, much less student development. I do not expect 
institutional policies to change any time soon nor do I have new recommendations to make 
regarding large-scale institutional reforms. 
 That said, there are less drastic reforms that could be implemented beyond the classroom 
but related to teaching. First, in order to reach non-liberal arts students, the kind of teaching I 
propose would be particularly valuable in general education courses. Second, courses or 
programs could be organized around various existential topics or framed in a way that makes 
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existential questions relevant. Such courses could be interdisciplinary and team-taught. Third, 
year-long courses could be created for certain subject matter that more directly deal with 
existential questions to allow more time to build community. Finally, departmental and 
interdepartmental opportunities for faculty to discuss how their disciplines can serve students’ 
flourishing could generate dialogue on deeper educational purposes and fruitful questions for 
framing their subject matter so as to engage students in the intellectual and existential 
dimensions of their specialties.  
 Although I initially framed the central problem motivating this project in terms of the 
ethical questions it raises, it should be clear that I am less interested in delineating ethical and 
professional boundaries that should not be crossed than in offering a positive conception of what 
it means to be a liberal educator. The motivating question could be restated as, What is the 
vocation of a liberal educator? Realizing the value of the examined life ultimately rests on the 
liberal educator who understands the kind of life into which she is inviting students and that her 
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